Responsa על בבא קמא 234:6
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A and B jointly loaned money to a third party. The latter's friends went surety to A for the loan, since A was the active partner. Subsequently, A was arrested by his overlord and was forced to relinquish the debt and to release the sureties. B summoned A to court demanding his share of the loan. A claimed that his arrest was due to the loan and that he cancelled it under duress. B claims that A was arrested for other reasons, and that the investment was lost through A's own fault.
A. If A was arrested because of the aforesaid loan only and was forced simply to cancel the debt and release the sureties, he was free from obligation. Relinquishing another person's debts is a form of tort called garmi (damage done indirectly) for which the damager can not be held responsible if he acted under duress. This cancellation of the debt is similar to the burning of another person's notes of indebtedness, which latter act is considered garmi, for the debt itself is not cancelled by the burning of the notes of indebtedness; in our case similarly the obligations of the debtors and the sureties were not cancelled by A's act, even according to the law of the land, since A acted under duress. Were A able to summon the debtor and the sureties before a magistrate of another town, the latter would have held them responsible for the debt in spite of A's cancellation. Therefore, if A will take an oath to the effect that he was arrested solely for the purpose of being forced to cancel that debt, he will be free from obligation. R. Meir adds: You did not write A's answer to B's charge that when B tried to collect his share of the debt, A told the debtors they should not pay anything to B, since he, A, was the sole creditor and they owed nothing to B. The reason for this was that if B had been able to collect something on that debt, were it not for A's interference, A would be held responsible for B's loss, unless A was also forced thus to interfere.
SOURCES: Cr. 223; Am II, 157; Mord. B. K. 189; Tesh. Maim, to Nezikin, I; Agudah B. K. 146.
A. If A was arrested because of the aforesaid loan only and was forced simply to cancel the debt and release the sureties, he was free from obligation. Relinquishing another person's debts is a form of tort called garmi (damage done indirectly) for which the damager can not be held responsible if he acted under duress. This cancellation of the debt is similar to the burning of another person's notes of indebtedness, which latter act is considered garmi, for the debt itself is not cancelled by the burning of the notes of indebtedness; in our case similarly the obligations of the debtors and the sureties were not cancelled by A's act, even according to the law of the land, since A acted under duress. Were A able to summon the debtor and the sureties before a magistrate of another town, the latter would have held them responsible for the debt in spite of A's cancellation. Therefore, if A will take an oath to the effect that he was arrested solely for the purpose of being forced to cancel that debt, he will be free from obligation. R. Meir adds: You did not write A's answer to B's charge that when B tried to collect his share of the debt, A told the debtors they should not pay anything to B, since he, A, was the sole creditor and they owed nothing to B. The reason for this was that if B had been able to collect something on that debt, were it not for A's interference, A would be held responsible for B's loss, unless A was also forced thus to interfere.
SOURCES: Cr. 223; Am II, 157; Mord. B. K. 189; Tesh. Maim, to Nezikin, I; Agudah B. K. 146.
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