Commentary for Kiddushin 10:27

"Huppah that completes [the marriage], is it not logical that it should acquire?!" Problem: Let us say a "dayo" on the end of the ק״ו, for from where do we derive that huppah acquires? because it completes, [therefore we should say the dayo:] the target of a ק״ו can't be more stringent than the starting place—just as there [huppah acquires] after money, so too here [money should acquire] after money! Solution: [The sugya] follows Rabbi Tarfon who says (Baba Kama 25a) that "Anywhere a ק״ו would be broken, we do not say a dayo", for here, if we said a dayo, the ק״ו would be broken since we don't need [money] after money. New problem: According to us who say that huppah does not acquire, let us say that money completes after money [i.e. that betrothal money followed by more money would equal full marriage] from the ק״ו of huppah: just as huppah, which doesn't acquire, completes, money, that does acquire, isn't it logical that it should complete?! Solution: We are only able to prove [through this] that [money] completes after money like for huppah, but why should this money be stronger than that money!?

"I could include huppah which purchases elsewhere and purchases here. But couldn't the common denominator [of contract, sex, money] be that it's against her will [which would exclude huppah, which must be with her consent]!?" Even though he hands over his minor daughter to the huppah without her consent, since he stands in place of his daughter, it is not considered to be without her consent [his consent stands in place of her consent]. Problem: But will can still find a huppah which is against her will! Designation [of a Hebrew slavegirl to marry the master or his son] is separate from marriage, so it will turn out that after designation the master enters her to the huppah without the father's consent! Solution: Even though the designation can be done without the father's consent, the huppah needs to be done with his consent.

"But Rav Huna [thinks that] with marriage nevertheless we don't find [that she can be acquired] against her will." Even though the the father can betroth his minor daughter against her will, nonetheless, since it is with the father's consent, it is not called "against her will", as I explained. Furthermore, with huppah we also find that the ruling is like this (in Ketubot 47a) for the father can hand over his minor daughter [against her will] to the huppah [but we don't call this "against her will"].

The Talmud tweaks the argument. Money cannot be used for “marriage” and yet it acquires in betrothal. Therefore huppah which is the way that marriage is completed should also acquire in betrothal.

The Talmud will now raise a series of difficulties against this kal vehomer argument. Money works in betrothal because it can be used to redeem sacred things and second tithe. But huppah cannot, therefore, huppah cannot be used for betrothal.

But intercourse does not work to redeem sacred things and second tithe and nevertheless it does work in betrothal. So too should huppah.
The problem is that intercourse does work to acquire a yevamah and thus is a valid means of betrothal. But huppah does not work to acquire a yevamah and therefore cannot be used for betrothal.

The Talmud now tries to take money and intercourse together and use them both as a kal vehomer to prove that huppah can acquire in betrothal. Money and intercourse are both means to acquire “elsewhere” (in purchases or in the case of the yevamah) and in betrothal. Huppah acquires “elsewhere” (in marriage) and therefore should also acquire here, as a means of betrothal.

The Talmud refutes the comparison—sex and money are pleasurable and therefore acquire in betrothal. Huppah is not.

A document works for betrothal and nevertheless there is not pleasure in it. So too should huppah.
But the problem is that a document has the power to release a woman in divorce. Therefore it acquires in betrothal. Huppah is not a means of divorce and therefore we have no reason to think it would acquire in betrothal.

Money and intercourse are also not means of divorce and therefore they should prove that huppah can acquire. But this again could be refuted because there is pleasure with money and intercourse. As it did above, the argument goes around in circles. But what all three have in common is that they all acquire (money and documents acquire things, intercourse acquires a yevamah) and acquire in betrothal, so too huppah acquires elsewhere (in marriage) and should also acquire here.

Money and intercourse are also not means of divorce and therefore they should prove that huppah can acquire. But this again could be refuted because there is pleasure with money and intercourse. As it did above, the argument goes around in circles. But what all three have in common is that they all acquire (money and documents acquire things, intercourse acquires a yevamah) and acquire in betrothal, so too huppah acquires elsewhere (in marriage) and should also acquire here.

The Talmud now refutes the commonality—money, document and intercourse can all be performed against her will whereas huppah cannot (money buys the handmaiden, document frees a divorcee against her will, and intercourse acquires the yevamah).
But R. Huna could respond that money does not work against her will to betroth her in marriage. Therefore, there is no “commonality” and the three together can be used to demonstrate that huppah is a means of betrothal.
So after all of this the Talmud has finally provided some support for R. Huna.

Rava raises two difficulties on R. Huna. First of all, the mishnah teaches there are three ways of betrothal, not four. Second, huppah acquires in marriage only when preceded by betrothal. But without prior betrothal, why should we think there is any efficacy to huppah whatsoever.

Rava raises two difficulties on R. Huna. First of all, the mishnah teaches there are three ways of betrothal, not four. Second, huppah acquires in marriage only when preceded by betrothal. But without prior betrothal, why should we think there is any efficacy to huppah whatsoever.

Abaye answers Rava’s two difficulties on R. Huna. The mishnah only taught means of betrothal that could be learned through midrash. And R. Huna’s argument was based on the awareness that huppah acquires in marriage only after betrothal through money. He simply noted that money never acquires in marriage, even after betrothal. But huppah does aquire after betrothal. Therefore it is as strong as money and should acquire in betrothal as well.

Abaye answers Rava’s two difficulties on R. Huna. The mishnah only taught means of betrothal that could be learned through midrash. And R. Huna’s argument was based on the awareness that huppah acquires in marriage only after betrothal through money. He simply noted that money never acquires in marriage, even after betrothal. But huppah does aquire after betrothal. Therefore it is as strong as money and should acquire in betrothal as well.

This baraita teaches two things: 1) he must say to her certain words, words that can clearly be construed as words of betrothal. There are a variety of different phrases he may use to betroth her. 2) He must give the money to her. She cannot say the words and give the money to him. Yes, this is most definitely not egalitarian.

R. Papa notes that since there are two factors—giving the money and making the declaration, it is difficult to tell which is determinative. Particularly he wants to know if the kiddushin is valid if the husband gave the money and the wife made the declaration. It is interesting that R. Papa does not even consider what the rule would be if the woman gave the money.

The first resolution is to say that the husband must both give and say.

According to this interpretation, the second clause seems to clarify an unclear point in the first clause. In any case, the result is the same—he must give the money and make the statement.

According to this interpretation, the second clause seems to clarify an unclear point in the first clause. In any case, the result is the same—he must give the money and make the statement.

Here we see the slimmest of more egalitarian possibilities. If she makes the declaration, maybe the kiddushin are valid as long as he gives the money. The kiddushin would be valid and to be divorced she would need a get. We will also see that in rabbinic thinking the statement is less significant than the giving of the money.

The main thing that Shmuel says is that the husband must actively betroth her to him. He cannot betroth himself to her.

The same holds true for divorce. He has to send her forth, divorce her. He cannot divorce himself from her.

R. Papa notes that in Shmuel’s formulation the man does not say “to me.” He just says “you are betrothed.” How then do we know that he is not acting as an agent to betroth her to someone else? This is what is called “ambiguous abbreviations.” It seems, R. Papa notes, that here Shmuel holds that ambiguous abbreviations are valid.
But elsewhere Shmuel seems to hold the opposite. If a person says “I will be” he has taken a nazirite vow only if a nazirite is walking by. If not, then although this does seem to be some sort of nazirite vow formula, he is not a nazirite.

R. Papa notes that in Shmuel’s formulation the man does not say “to me.” He just says “you are betrothed.” How then do we know that he is not acting as an agent to betroth her to someone else? This is what is called “ambiguous abbreviations.” It seems, R. Papa notes, that here Shmuel holds that ambiguous abbreviations are valid.
But elsewhere Shmuel seems to hold the opposite. If a person says “I will be” he has taken a nazirite vow only if a nazirite is walking by. If not, then although this does seem to be some sort of nazirite vow formula, he is not a nazirite.

The answer is that he does say “Behold you are betrothed to me.” Without the words “to me” the statement is too ambiguous and she is not betrothed.

If the man says “Behold you are betrothed to me” she is obviously betrothed. Shmuel seems to be teaching us nothing.
The Talmud answers that the second half of each of Shmuel’s statement is what he is teaching us. As stated above, the man must betroth the woman or send her away in divorce. He cannot use language that makes it seem like he is betrothing himself to her or sending himself away from her.

"Therefore, if he gave and she said..." The reason [the Talmud] never mentioned at all [the case] "If she gave and he said" is because it is not so clear-cut, for sometimes she can be betrothed [in this manner] with an important man, as we say later (Kiddushin 7a).

"So if this isn't true, then [he is] not [a nazir]! Therefore, [Shmuel] thinks that yadayim (shorthands) that are not clear are not effective!" Problem: Why didn't [the Talmud] resolve [this by saying] that certainly he thinks that [these unclear shorthands] are effective, but there [in Nazir, the guy] said "I will be" isn't even effective as an unclear shorthand, since perhaps he meant "I will be in a fast"!? Solution: The language of "I will be" is more fitting for nezirut than it is for a fast, for "I will be" implies immediately, and sometimes he [already] ate [that day] and won't be able to be fasting until tomorrow, but regarding nezirut he can immediately begin being a nazir whenever he wants.

"This is what we're dealing with: 'When he said "to me"'". This implies that the Shmuel's conclusion here is that unclear yadayim (shorthands) are not effective. Problem: In the beginning of Nedarim (Nedarim 2b), [the Mishnah] said: "One who says to his fellow: I am vowed from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I won't eat of yours, that I won't taste of yours—is forbidden [i.e. the vow works]". And we say in the Gemara on this (Nedarim 4b): "Shmuel said: About all of these [first statements in the Mishnah (I am vowed from you etc.), none of them work] until he says: That I won't eat of yours, [or] that I won't taste of yours'". And it concludes: "What's the reason [for Shmuel to require more explication for the vows to be effective]? Perhaps 'I am vowed from you' means 'I won't speak with you','I am separated from you' means 'I won't do business with you', 'I am distanced from you' means 'I won't stand within your 4 amot'". And [the Talmud] objects (Nedarim 5b): "Let's say that Shmuel thinks unclear shorthands are not effective!" And it resolves: "Shmuel assigns our mishnah according to R. Yehudah who says 'Unclear shorthands are not effective'". And since Shmuel assigns it to R. Yehudah, it implies that he doesn't agree with him but rather thinks that they are effective! And it is not possible to explain that Shmuel assigns our mishnah to R. Yehudah and agrees with him based on what is said later: "And what forces him to assign our mishnah to R. Yehudah!?", and what's the problem!? Why would he be forced to assign our mishnah to R. Yehudah if he he also agreed with him!? Therefore, he assigns it to R. Yehudah but certainly thinks that [these unclear shorthands] are effective. Another place where this contradiction comes up: [The Talmud] said in Gittin 85a: "The core of the get is [in Hebrew] 'Behold you are permitted to any man' (an unclear shorthand, since it doesn't have any form of relation to the declarer), R. Yehudah says [in Aramaic]: 'This one should go from me' is the core of the get" (he makes the shorthand less unclear because he doesn't think unclear shorthands work), and the majority disagrees with him (R. Yehudah), and Shmuel agrees with the majority! [So again Shmuel thinks that unclear shorthands are effective.] Solution: This "Behold you are betrothed" without "to me" doesn't imply at all that "You are betrothed to me" since it is common for a man to betroth a wife for his fellow and these are shorthands which are totally unclear, which for these Shmuel certainly thinks that they are not effective shorthands, but in this case in Nedarim, [these shorthands] are more clear, and this is also the case for divorce since a man doesn't divorce his fellow's wife. But there are other versions of the beginning of Nazir 2b. Version 2: "'I will be'—this is a nazir. Shmuel said: And there was a nazir passing by him"; and [the Talmud] said "Let us say that Shmuel thinks that unclear shorthands are not effective!? Yes! Because of this, when a nazir passes before him they are clear shorthands and are effective, but if there is no nazir passing before him they are unclear shorthands and are not effective" [in other words, it is not possible here to read Shmuel as ever thinking that unclear shorthands are effective, version 2 here specifies explicitly that he thinks they are not]. Version 3: "Let us say that Shmuel thinks unclear shorthands are not effective!?", and [the Talmud answers:] "If he passes before him, this is minimally unclear shorthand, but if he is not passing before him then it is not even unclear shorthand" [so Shmuel certainly would think according to version 3 that unclear shorthands are effective and only quibbles on things that are so unclear as to not be shorthands at all, like Tosafot argued for our Gemara in Kiddushin].