Commentary for Kiddushin 103:14

As with yesterday’s section, the Talmud asks why we need this mishnah. The answer is that it is there to teach the continuation of the same mishnah (Yevamot 2:7). The following is my commentary from Mishnah Yomit:
If Reuven and George (non-brothers) die, and each has only one brother (Shimon and Bill), Shimon must perform halitzah with both women and Bill must perform halitzah with both women. Neither can have yibbum with either woman because each woman might be the sister of the woman with whom he is truly liable to have yibbum, the z’kukah (because we don’t know who betrothed whom).
If Reuven has two brothers, Shimon and Levi and George still only has Bill as a brother, Bill must have halitzah with both Rachel and Leah. With regard to Shimon and Levi, one brother must have halitzah with both women but the other brother can have yibbum. This rule was explained in the above mishnah quoted in the previous section. The second brother can have yibbum with either women because if she was truly the woman who Reuven betrothed, then yibbum is proper. If Reuven betrothed the other sister, then the sister with whom this brother now has yibbum is no longer the sister of his z’kukah, because this other sister has already received halitzah from his other brother.
If both brothers preemptivelymarry both sisters, they are not forced to have a divorce. Certainly the second marriage is okay, and even the first marriage was only problematic in the beginning, before the second sister had yibbum. Even though the woman whom he married may have once been the sister of his z’kukah, after she has had yibbum the other sister is no longer a z’kukah.
With regard to the last example, the Talmud emphasizes that one brother must first performe halitzah and then the other can perform yibbum. But if one brother performs yibbum first he may be marrying someone else’s yevamah, and until someone performs halitzah with her, she may not be remarried.

As with yesterday’s section, the Talmud asks why we need this mishnah. The answer is that it is there to teach the continuation of the same mishnah (Yevamot 2:7). The following is my commentary from Mishnah Yomit:
If Reuven and George (non-brothers) die, and each has only one brother (Shimon and Bill), Shimon must perform halitzah with both women and Bill must perform halitzah with both women. Neither can have yibbum with either woman because each woman might be the sister of the woman with whom he is truly liable to have yibbum, the z’kukah (because we don’t know who betrothed whom).
If Reuven has two brothers, Shimon and Levi and George still only has Bill as a brother, Bill must have halitzah with both Rachel and Leah. With regard to Shimon and Levi, one brother must have halitzah with both women but the other brother can have yibbum. This rule was explained in the above mishnah quoted in the previous section. The second brother can have yibbum with either women because if she was truly the woman who Reuven betrothed, then yibbum is proper. If Reuven betrothed the other sister, then the sister with whom this brother now has yibbum is no longer the sister of his z’kukah, because this other sister has already received halitzah from his other brother.
If both brothers preemptivelymarry both sisters, they are not forced to have a divorce. Certainly the second marriage is okay, and even the first marriage was only problematic in the beginning, before the second sister had yibbum. Even though the woman whom he married may have once been the sister of his z’kukah, after she has had yibbum the other sister is no longer a z’kukah.
With regard to the last example, the Talmud emphasizes that one brother must first performe halitzah and then the other can perform yibbum. But if one brother performs yibbum first he may be marrying someone else’s yevamah, and until someone performs halitzah with her, she may not be remarried.

The Tavyumi source clearly holds that kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal are kiddushin. Rava’s statement is refuted and the halakhah follows Abaye. The Talmud ends by noting that the halakhah follows Abaye in six cases which can be remembered by the acronym, Y’Al KGM. The K stands for kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal.

The Tavyumi source clearly holds that kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal are kiddushin. Rava’s statement is refuted and the halakhah follows Abaye. The Talmud ends by noting that the halakhah follows Abaye in six cases which can be remembered by the acronym, Y’Al KGM. The K stands for kiddushin that cannot be followed by betrothal.

One is not allowed to use seventh year produce as merchandise. From our story we learn that one can use it for betrothal.

Rav also learns from the story that one cannot betroth with stolen goods. In the story, the man uses something he took from the women and it was sabbatical produce. The kiddushin are valid only because the produce he stole was sabbatical produce which is considered ownerless. During the sabbatical year, anyone can take the produce from the field. Had it not been the sabbatical year, they would not have been betrothed because one cannot use stolen goods to betroth.

In this story one woman accepts the betrothal on behalf of them all. This is allowed, even though the woman she accepts kiddushin for becomes her rival wife.

This story was used by Abaye to prove that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are kiddushin. Abaye said that in the story the sisters are not betrothed because he married both at the same time. Had he married one then become mixed up as to which one he married, they both would have both been doubtfully betrothed even though he could not have intercourse with her.
Rava said that the mishnah refers to a case where he married only one but did not say which one. This proves that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse are kiddushin.
Rav did not want to learn anything about this topic from the mishnah because he was not sure whether to read it like Abaye or Rava.
I should note that this is obviously not a chronological way of understanding Rav. Rav could not have known about the debate between Rava and Abaye, for they lived three generations after he did. Indeed, the reason that Rav does not learn anything about kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse from the mishnah is that this topic had not yet been brought up. It is also worth noting that this is a highly abstract concept, whereas the halakhot Rav did learn are far more practical. This is emblematic of the differences between early amoraim like Rav and later amoraim like Abaye and Rava. Rav is interested in real halakhic rules, whereas Abaye and Rava are interested in abstract halakhic conceptsץ

R. Yohanan is surprised that Rav would have said that one cannot betroth with a stolen object.

R. Yohanan also holds that stolen property is not the possession of the thief, as long as the owner does not despair of recovery. The thief cannot consecrate it, and therefore he cannot use it for betrothal. So why would R. Yohanan have been surprised by Rav’s ruling?
The answer is that he was not surprised by the ruling, he just didn’t realize that Rav ruled in the same way he did.

A baraita states explicitly that a woman can be betrothed with stolen goods.
The Talmud resolves this by saying it refers to goods stolen from her. When she accepts the goods she forgives him for having stolen them.

The baraita is read so that the entire baraita refers to goods stolen from her. Only in this case is she betrothed.