Commentary for Kiddushin 114:21

The midrash teaches that the bird that is set free may be eaten but the slaughtered animal may not be. But why not teach the opposite—the bird that is set free would be prohibited and the slaughtered one permitted.
R. Yohanan posits a general rule—live animals cannot be permanently prohibited.

Animals set aside to be idols or actually worshipped as idols are only prohibited for sacrificial use. Therefore, they follow R. Yohanan’s general principle.

The School of R. Ishmael derives that the bird is prohibited from the word “field” used in the verse.

The Talmud argues that the word field teaches that he must cast the bird out of a city towards an open field—not into the sea or wilderness. It does not teach that if one finds the bird one may eat it.

The School of R. Yishmael can learn two things from one word because of the word “the.”

The Nazirite’s hair is called “kadosh.” This means one cannot derive benefit from it. But it is not like other holy objects, which if one buys or redeems become desacralized and the money becomes holy. The Nazirite’s hair stays holy forever.

The Nazirite’s hair is called “kadosh.” This means one cannot derive benefit from it. But it is not like other holy objects, which if one buys or redeems become desacralized and the money becomes holy. The Nazirite’s hair stays holy forever.

According to Exodus 13:13, the firstborn of a donkey must be redeemed with a sheep. If the firstborn is not redeemed, its neck must be broken.
The mishnah rules that one may not betroth with the firstborn of a donkey. This seems to agree with R. Yehudah but not R. Shimon.
R. Nahman responds that the mishnah refers to a firstborn after its neck has been broken. In such a case, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

According to R. Yishmael the Torah prohibits cooking a kid in its mother’s milk three times to teach that there are three prohibitions—eating, deriving benefit and cooking.

The mishnah does not agree with R. Shimon b. Judah who holds that just as one may derive benefit from meat that was not properly slaughtered (one can use it to feed one’s animals), so too one may derive benefit from meat cooked in milk. I should note that this is not the accepted opinion—according to halakhah, one may not derive any benefit from meat cooked in milk.

The mishnah does not agree with R. Shimon b. Judah who holds that just as one may derive benefit from meat that was not properly slaughtered (one can use it to feed one’s animals), so too one may derive benefit from meat cooked in milk. I should note that this is not the accepted opinion—according to halakhah, one may not derive any benefit from meat cooked in milk.

The Torah clearly prohibits sacrifices offered outside the Temple. The rabbis compare this with the opposite prohibition, slaughtering non-sacred animals inside the Temple. It is forbidden to derive benefit from either.
However, the punishment of karet is given only for one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple. It is forbidden to slaughter non-sacred meat inside the Temple, but the punishment for doing so is not karet.

The Torah clearly prohibits sacrifices offered outside the Temple. The rabbis compare this with the opposite prohibition, slaughtering non-sacred animals inside the Temple. It is forbidden to derive benefit from either.
However, the punishment of karet is given only for one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple. It is forbidden to slaughter non-sacred meat inside the Temple, but the punishment for doing so is not karet.

The Talmud raises a difficulty on the analogy between hullin sacrificed in the Temple and sacrifices slaughtered outside. The latter is punished by karet, and that is why it may be prohibited to derive benefit from it. But the former is not punished by karet and therefore it might not be prohibited to derive benefit. So we need more proof.

Abaye derives the rule that one cannot derive benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple from the repetition of the same word, “it” in three verses. What do we learn from the repetition of this word? The answer will become clearer as we proceed.
The baraita begins with the verse which allows one to slaughter non-sacrificial animals when far away from the Temple. But one is not allowed to slaughter non-sacrificial animals inside the Temple.

Abaye derives the rule that one cannot derive benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple from the repetition of the same word, “it” in three verses. What do we learn from the repetition of this word? The answer will become clearer as we proceed.
The baraita begins with the verse which allows one to slaughter non-sacrificial animals when far away from the Temple. But one is not allowed to slaughter non-sacrificial animals inside the Temple.

One is liable even for slaughtering a blemished animal inside the Temple, because while this particular animal cannot be sacrificed, it is of a species that can be sacrificed.

The baraita asks how we know that one is liable for killing non-sacred wild beasts or birds inside the Temple. The former is analogized to domestic animals because both require ritual slaughter. Birds are included from the repetition of the word “it.” Note that this is not yet what Abaye is trying to prove—he is trying to prove that these words teach that one may not even derive benefit from any type of non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple.

The Talmud now proceeds to go through the same verses and logic to prove that not only may one not slaughter hullin in the Temple, if one does, the meat is prohibited.

Here the baraita adds one last point—one may derive benefit from animals not properly slaughtered. But one may not derive benefit from hullin slaughtered in the Temple.