Commentary for Kiddushin 117:1

ומאי שנא התם דקתני האומר לשלוחו

whilst elsewhereit is taught. 'If he says to his agent'?— We are informed of something noteworthy here, and likewise there. We are informed of something noteworthy here: for if 'his agentS were stated: I might think, Only his agent is stigmatised a cheat, because he relies upon him, thinking, 'He will perform my bidding';but as for his neighbour, seeing that he does not rely upon him,I might say that he is not a cheat. There too we are taught what is noteworthy. For if it were stated: 'If he says to his neighbour.' I might think, Only if his neighbour betroths her elsewhere is she not betrothed, because he thinks that he will not trouble;but as for his agent, who will trouble. I might think, He merely indicates the place to him.Hence we are taught [otherwise]. Rabinthe pious went to betroth a certain woman for his son, but betrothed her for himself. But was it not taught. What he did is done, but that he has behaved toward him as a cheat? — They would not give her to him [his son]. Then he should have informed him!— He feared that in the meantime another man might come and betroth her. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah gave money to Rab [and] instructed him, 'Buy this land for me,' but he went and bought it for himself. But did we not learn, What he did is done, yet he has behaved toward him as a cheat? — It was a stretch of land belonging to lawlessmen; for Rab they shewed respect, but would not for Rabbah b. Bar Hanah. Then he should have informed him? He feared that in the meantime another person might come and buy it. R. Giddal was negotiating for a certain field, when R. Abba went and bought it. Thereupon R. Giddal went and complained about him to R. Zera, who went [in turn] and complained to R. Isaac Nappaha. 'Wait until he comes up to us for the Festival,' said he to him. When he came up he met and asked him, 'If a poor man is examining a cake and another comes and takes it away from him, what then?' 'He is called a wicked man,' was his answer: 'Then why did you, Sir, act so?' he questioned him. T did not know [that he was negotiating for it],' he rejoined. 'Then let him have it now,' he suggested. T will not sell it to him,' he returned, 'because it is the first field [which I have ever bought], and it is not a [good] omen; but if he wants it as a gift, let him take it.' Now, R. Giddal would not take possession, because it is written: But he that hateth gifts shall live, nor would R. Abba, because R. Giddal had negotiated for it; and so neither took possession, and it was called'The Rabbis'field'.  LIKEWISE, IF ONE SAYS TO A WOMAN, BE THOU BETROTHED UNTO ME etc. What if another does not come and betroth her within these thirty days? — Rab and Samuel both rule: She is betrothed, even if the money [of betrothal] is consumed. What is the reason? This money is neither like a loan nor like a deposit. It is not like a deposit, [because] a deposit is consumed in its owner's possession, whereas this is consumed in her possession. Again, it is not like a loan, [because] a loan is given to be expended, whereas this was given to her for betrothal. What if another does not come and betroth her, but she herself retracts? — R. Johanan said: She can retract, [because] words can come and nullify words. Resh Lakish maintained: She cannot retract, [because] words cannot come and nullify words — R. Johanan refuted Resh Lakish: If he annuls, if before he [his agent] has made a separation, his separation is invalid. Now here it is speech against speech, yet one comes and nullifies the other? — Giving money into a woman's hand is different, because it is like action, and words cannot come and annul action. He refuted him: If one sends a divorce to his wife, and then overtakes the messenger or sends [another] messenger after him and says to him, 'The divorce which I gave you is null,' it is indeed null. Now, giving the divorce into the messenger's hand is like giving money into a woman's hand, and yet it is taught: 'it is indeed null'? — There too, as long as the divorce has not reached her hand, it is speech against speech, and so one comes and annuls the other. Resh Lakish objected to R. Johanan: All utensils become liable to their uncleanness by intention, but ascend thence only by a change in substance.

Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

The Talmud asks why our chapter calls the one sent to betroth, “his neighbor” while the other chapter calls him “his agent.” It suggests that in both cases the mishnah uses a word that is “new” meaning it teaches us something that we would not have otherwise thought.
Here it teaches “neighbor” to let us know that even though one does not generally rely on neighbors for such types of favors, even so, the neighbor who betroths the woman to himself is still considered deceptive.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

Rabin is ironically called “pious” even though his actions don’t seem all that pious. He is supposed to betroth a woman for his son, but then decides he’s going to betroth her for himself. The Talmud asks how Rabin could do such a thing. His excuse is that the men giving the woman away in betrothal (the brother, the father?) did not want to give her to the son, they wanted the father. And he was afraid that if he went back to his son and told him about what was happening, the girl would meanwhile be given to another.
Sounds like a good story to me.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

This is the same exact story except the agent is sent to buy land, not betroth a woman.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

This story again discusses one who ends up buying something that someone else wanted. When my grandmother of blessed memory would play Monopoly with me, she would not buy a third property if I already had two. She was a very kind woman, and an amazing grandmother. But she always lost Monopoly.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

According to the mishnah, if the first man says to her “be betrothed to me after thirty days” and another comes and betroths her in the meanwhile, she is betrothed to the second. But what if no one else comes and betroths her during these thirty days?
Rav and Shmuel both say she is betrothed even though the money has been used up. This is slightly surprising because at the time the kiddushin go into effect, she is not getting any money. She received it already.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

Had the money been given to her as a deposit or a loan she would not be betrothed. But that is not the case. The money he gave her is not a deposit. It’s her money and when she uses it she is not using the original owner’s money. It’s also not a loan because a loan would be given for her to use and therefore there would be no money around at the time of betrothal. Here, the money was for betrothal.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

This is the beginning of a classic dispute between R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish. Can the woman change her mind within this thirty day period? After all, she is not betrothed until after thirty days. R. Yohanan says that she can change her mind—her subsequent words can nullify her earlier words. Resh Lakish says that they cannot.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

The case here is one who sends an agent to separate terumah but then annuls the agency. If he does so before the agent separates the terumah, the separation is not valid. But here is a case of speech annulling speech. This seems to support R. Yohanan.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

Here Resh Lakish retreats from his position a bit. Speech can annul speech. But the case of kiddushin was more than just speech. The woman received money. Since she accepted it for the sake of kiddushin, she cannot retract because this is like an action.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

If a man sends an agent to deliver a get, a divorce document, to his wife, he can cancel the agency by telling the agent not to deliver the get. But this seems to be a case of a speech cancelling an action (giving the get to the agent). Therefore, it is a difficulty against Resh Lakish.
Resh Lakish resolves the difficulty by pointing out that until the get reaches the woman’s hand, this is a case of speech nullifying speech. The giving of the get to the agent is really not relevant. And Resh Lakish agrees that speech can nullify another act that consisted purely of speech.

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

The mishnah quoted here is about purity laws. A vessel becomes susceptible to impurity when one thinks that one has finished it. For instance, if I’m making a dish and I intend to glaze it, it is not susceptible to impurity until I do so. But if I think to use it unglazed, it is susceptible to impurity before it is glazed. In order for it to become not susceptible to impurity, one would have to do something to it, like break it.
The mishnah then summarizes the power of acts and intention. An act is powerful enough to annul an intention or another act, but intention is not powerful enough to annul either speech or action.
This is a difficulty against R. Yohanan who holds that speech should be able to cancel other speech.

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