Commentary for Kiddushin 127:1
נאמן לנדרים ולחרמים ולהקדשות ולערכים אבל לא למכות ולעונשין
he is believed in respect of vows, haramim,sanctifications, and 'arakin;but not in respect of flagellation and [other] punishments.<br> <br> MISHNAH. [IF A MAN DECLARES.] T HAVE GIVEN MY DAUGHTER IN BETROTHAL,'T GAVE HER IN BETROTHAL AND DIVORCED HER WHILST A MINOR,' AND SHE IS [NOW] A MINOR,HE IS BELIEVED.T GAVE HER IN BETROTHAL AND DIVORCED HER WHILST A MINOR,' AND SHE IS NOW AN ADULT, HE IS DISBELIEVED.'SHE WAS TAKEN CAPTIVE AND I REDEEMED HER,WHETHER SHE IS A MINOR OR AN ADULTHE IS DISBELIEVED.<br> <br> GEMARA. Wherein do the first and the second clauses differ? - In the first clause, it is in his hand;in the second, it is not in his hand. Is it not? Surely it is in his power to marry her to a halal, whereby he unfits her for the priesthood! - That is no difficulty: it [our Mishnah] agrees with R.<br> <br> But it is in his powei to marry her to a mamzer? - This agrees with R. Akiba, who maintained, Kiddushin has no validity with those [marriages forbidden by] negative injunctions. But it is in his power to marry her, if a widow, to a High Priest, and in accordance with R. Simai; for it was taught: R. Simai said: [The issue] of all [marriages forbidden by a negative injunction] R. Akiba declared [to be] mamzer, excepting that of a widow [married] to a High Priest, since the Torah said, [a widow . . .] he shall not take, and he shall not profane [his seed]: he renders [his seed] profane, but not mamzer! - This is according to R. Yeshebab, who said: Come, let us cry out against Akiba son of Joseph who declared: He who has no entry in Israel, the issue is mamzer. Now, on R. Yeshebab's view, it is well if he states an independent opinion [of R. Akiba's ruling]. But if he [merely] comes to combat R. Simai, then it is [still] in his [the father's] power to marry her to a person forbidden by a positive injunction? R. Ashi answered: Is it logical that the first clause [states that he is believed] because it is in his power? Granted that it is in his power to betroth her, is it in his power to divorce her? Moreover, if this person [to whom he desires to betroth her] says that he has no pleasure in her, can he then betroth her against his will? But, said R. Ashi, in the first clause the Divine Law declared him trustworthy, as R. Huna [said]. For R. Huna said in Rab's name: How do we know that a father is believed to interdict his daughter by Biblical law? Because it is said: I gave my daughter unto this man [to wife]: [with the words] 'unto a man,' he renders her forbidden [to all]; with 'this [one]', he frees her. [Now,] the Divine Law believed the father in regard to marriage but in regard to captivity it did not believe him.<br> <br> MISHNAH. IF A MAN SAYS AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH I HAVE SONS, HE IS BELIEVED; T HAVE BROTHERS,' HE IS DISBELIEVED. <br> <br> GEMARA. This shews that he is believed to free, but not to bind. Shall we say [then] that our Mishnah does not agree with R. Nathan? For it was taught: if at the time of betrothal one declares that he has sons, but at the time of his death he asserts that he has no sons; If at the time of betrothal he declares that he has brothers, while at the time of his death he declares that he has no brothers: he is believed to free, but not to bind: this is Rabbi's view. R. Nathan said: He is believed to bind too! - Said Raba, there it is different: since he retracts at the time of his death, I assume that he may be speaking truth. Abaye asked him: Does it [the reverse] not follow a minori: If there, though he contradicts his [former] words, you say that he may be speaking truth; surely it is all the more so in our Mishnah, where he does not contradict his [former] words! But, said Abaye, our Mishnah treats of one who is not presumed to possess brothers or sons: hence we rule, since he is not presumed to possess either brothers or sons, if he says. T have sons,' he is believed; but if he declares, T have brothers,' he is disbelieved, [because] it does not rest solely with him to forbid her to the whole world. [Whereas] the Baraitha refers<br>
Daf Shevui to Kiddushin
In all of these cases we can see the rabbis’ famous leniency when it comes to punishments. A witness (the father) might be believed, but the credence the court lends him only extends to non-punishment types of consequences, mostly economic consequences. There needs to be greater evidence before someone can be punished.