Commentary for Kiddushin 14:24

"Learn from this: animals [have dihui, become permanently unfit due to temporary circumstances while they're still alive]." Rashi's explanations: "If they are made dihui, they are dihui forever. For there is an opinion that dihui only applies to slaughtered animals, but living animals that are made dihui can return and be fit again, and he could have brought this cow when he came back and bought the other half." "Learn from this: Dihui at the beginning is dihui"—explanation: "Such as this case, for when he made it hekdesh it was not fit to be brought as a sacrifice [since it was only half hekdesh], and there is a dissenting opinion that dihui only applies with something that was [originally] fit and became dihui [later]." "Learn from this: There is dihui in value"—explanation: "The law of dihui applies in a matter that is only hekdesh in its value [and not the actual object], such as this case that was originally only hekdesh in its value since he would have to sell the cow and make hekdesh half its value, for it is not fit to bring halves of animals to the Tample, but even so dihui took effect to make it unfit for the altar forver, and we don't say that dihui only applies to a thing that was made hekdesh and itself could be brought to the Temple". Problem: Why did it need to say these two "learn from this"s—"There is dihui in value" and "Original dihui"—isn't it impossible to have original dihui that isn't about its value?! [Like in our case: the thing that makes the half hekdesh cow dihui is that you can't sacrifice half a cow so it can only be about its money]. Solution (part 1): One can find original dihui even where it itself is hekdesh [and not just its value], as Rabbi Yohanan said in Nigmar Ha-Din (Sanhedrin 47a): "Such as one who eats forbidden fat and designates a sacrifice, but then worships idols, and reneges on it—since it becomes dihui when he worships idols because of 'Sacrifice of wicked ones is an abomination', it is dihui"—and the law there is not dependent on him designating the sacrifice at the beginning, it would actually also be the case if he worshipped idols and afterwards designates a sacrifice, which would be original dihui, since it is Rabbi Yohanan who thinks that original dihui is dihui. But because of the other statement of Rabbi Yohanan that is brought there, "He ate forbidden fat, designated a sacrifice and became insane, but returned and became sane", it is not possible to say that he became insane at the beginning, because an insane person is not capable of designation—this is why he mentioned also [the case of] "He designated the sacrifice and worships idols" [in order that the two cases in Sanhedrin teach different things, for only one of them teaches that original dihui is real dihui]. Solution (part 2): We also find hekdesh for its value which is not original dihui, such as one who designates a female sheep for his pesah offering and it gives birth to a male—this is hekdesh of money because one can't bring a female pesah, but it is not original dihui for its offspring was fit to be brought as a sacrifice [so he designated a male as well, just not realising it, and he can use that male as his pesah]. [New section:] But there is an alternate version of the text: "Learn from this: hekdesh of value causes dihui". This is explained to mean that it makes its exchange also dihui to bring as a sacrifice, based on what [Rabbi Yohanan] taught "And its exchange is like it". But [this explanation] is not correct, for in Keritot 28a regarding "A rich man who defiled the Sanctuary and designated the nest [of 2 birds, a poor man's sacrifice] in place of his sheep [the proper rich man's sacrifice] and then became poor—since it was dihui [when he designated it], it remains dihui [even though he is now poor]", we recite also "Learn from this three things" just like in our sugya, but there it is impossible to explain that the hekdesh of value makes the exchange dihui because there is no exchange for birds [which is the topic there], rather you are forced to interpret it as it is hekdesh but can't be brought as a sacrifice [just as for Rabbi Yohanan here]. New problem: Why did we need Rabbi Yohanan teach us these 3 things—we already learnt them in Mi She-Hayah Tamei (Pesahim 98a). Solution: Because it is a disagreement in the last chapter of Keritot, where Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai and Rabbanan disagree, so [the Gemara here] brings the words of the Amoraim [like Rabbi Yohanan to weigh in on this disagreement]. New problem: Why didn't [the Talmud] object on this Rabbi Yohanan like it objected on that Rabbi Oshaya at the end of Keritot, who said "A rich man who defiled the Sanctuary and designated a nest for his sheep, then became poor—since it was [once] dihui it remains dihui", for it objects from this Rabbi Shimon there who says "One who designates a female sheep for his pesah before Pesah, it should be left to pasture until it gets a blemish, then sold and he should buy with its value a pesah; if it gave birth to a male, it should be left to pasture until it gets a blemish, then sold and he should buy with its value a pesah. But Rabbi Shimon says: He himself is brought as a pesah"!? Another problem: It objected to him from Rabbi Shimon, but let it support him the Rabbanan who say in the beginning [of the baraita] that the lamb should be left to pasture until it becomes blemished!? Another problem: Since it objected from a minority opinion when it objected from Rabbi Shimon of the baraita, let it object from Rabbi Eliezer of our mishnah in Temurah, that teaches in Elu Kodashim (Temurah 18b) regarding "One who designates a female for an olah and it gives birth to a male, Rabbi Eliezer says: It itself can be brought as an olah"!? Solution: The reason that it objected from Rabbi Shimon is because with that case, even the Rabbanan would agree, for, until now, the Rabbanan disagreed with him regarding something where hekdesh of its value is relevant, for they think that, since hekdesh of value is relevant, of course hekdesh of the item itself is relevant, and there is no hekdesh of itself here because there can't be a female pesah. But regarding the nest [of birds], even the Rabbanan would agree that hekdesh of value does not take effect with birds. [Solution for sugya here:] And with regard to the statement Rabbi Yohanan here, it is not possible to object [in this way] because it is like one who designated a female for his pesah, and if it would have objected from Rabbi Shimon then I would have thought "Let it bring support from the Rabbanan!". And the statement of Rabbi Eliezer is also not able to be use as an objection because it is a minority opinion.

"Half of you with a perutah, half of you with a perutah". Problem: Why is this not effective? Didn't it see earlier (on 7a) that the kiddushin only doesn't spread throughout all of her because she is an independent will and only wants what she hears. But if we know that she wants [to be betrothed] throughout all of her, then the kiddushin spreads throughout all of her, and here her will is revealed that she wants [to be betrothed] throughout all of her [since she agreed to both halves, as opposed to above where she only agreed to 1 half]! Answer: There the case is one where he used the language of kiddushin, then it certainly would have been effective and the kiddushin would have spread throughout all of her. But here the case is one where he said to her "Behold you are engaged to me" or any of the other languages above (Kiddushin 6).

"Half of you with a perutah today, and half of you with a perutah tomorrow". He said both of these to her at the same time.

"Your two daughters for my two sons [with 1 perutah]". Says Rabbenu Yitzhak: [Interpretative point 1:] It is dealing with minor daughters, i.e. the kiddushin belongs to the father. For if it were majority daughters and the father receives the kiddushin under the law of agency (shelihut), it would be obvious that he needs a perutah for each one, for an agent has no more power than the one who sent him [so can't take away the half perutah that is owed to each of his majority daughters]. [Point 2: When the Talmud] said "After the giver [the father of the sons]", it is not specific[ally about the giver], for the giver certainly comes under the law of agency for his sons, and if we go after the giver, then he would need 2 perutot as if the sons themselves were betrothing. So the question is really about the receiver [the father of the daughters], for perhaps we are only concerned that the receiver receives something worth a perutah. [Point 3:] It must be that he specifies which of them [are married to which], e.g. Rahel to Reuven and Leah to Shimon, for if not, it would be a case of kiddushin that will not lead to [permitted] sex (see Kiddushin 51a).

"Your daughter and your cow with a perutah". Since the cow can't be acquired with money [since you need to do meshikhah, some symbolic acquisition], we throw it in with his daughter [in the same transaction]. And afterwards, [the Talmud] asks: "Your daughter and your land", for land can be acquired with money.

"Rav Yosef said: The [silks] need evaluation". [The Talmud] means [it needs to be evaluated] before kiddushin, just as Rashi explained. Problem: Later on at Kiddushin 48a, there is a baraita about "Be betrothed to me with this contract... and Hakhaimim say: Evaluate the paper; if it is worth a perutah then she is betrothed [and if not, she is not]". This implies that they evaluate the paper after kiddushin, even though originally the evaluated worth of the paper was unknown! Solution: [According to] the version [of the mahloket Rabbah-Rav Yosef here] that says that they both agree on "a small amount (kol de-hu)", [the case in Kiddushin 48a with the contract] is dealing with when he said to her, "[The contract] is [worth] a small amount". But [according to] the version [of the mahloket] where they also disagree on "a small amount", this is what it means: If he wants to betroth her with a contract, they should evaluate the contract beforehand—"if it is worth a perutah, she is betrothed" i.e. if they evaluated it beforehand—to exclude the one who says she is betrothed because it's a contract, even if it is not worth a perutah.

The Talmud learns three halakhot relevant to sacrifices and things dedicated to the Temple. The concept discussed here is called “defferal” or “dichui.” Once something has become invalid as a sacrifice, it can never return to becoming valid. This applies to live animals—so we learn from the half-dedicated animal. 2) It can be “deferred” even from the outset, as soon as it is fit. Others say (elsewhere) that in order for a sacrifice to be permanently deferred, it must first be fit for a sacrifice. This animal which was only half-dedicated, never was fit to be offered. 3) Deferral applies even if only the value of the animal was dedicated, like this one half of whose value was dedicated.

The Talmud learns three halakhot relevant to sacrifices and things dedicated to the Temple. The concept discussed here is called “defferal” or “dichui.” Once something has become invalid as a sacrifice, it can never return to becoming valid. This applies to live animals—so we learn from the half-dedicated animal. 2) It can be “deferred” even from the outset, as soon as it is fit. Others say (elsewhere) that in order for a sacrifice to be permanently deferred, it must first be fit for a sacrifice. This animal which was only half-dedicated, never was fit to be offered. 3) Deferral applies even if only the value of the animal was dedicated, like this one half of whose value was dedicated.

Essentially the question is, is this like saying “all of you with a whole perutah” and he is just counting halves or did he make two separate invalid kiddushin statements.

In the first case he said “half a perutah.” Since half a perutah does not work, we might assume that he was just counting half perutot. But what if he says a full perutah—perhaps he is making distinct betrothal statements, in which case this does not work. Or perhaps as long as all of this occurs on the same day, it still works.

Here, Rava (or the Talmud in his place) pushes the envelope and asks if this could work even if he divides the kiddushin into a two-day affair.

Finally, the Talmud proposes a way of saying this that would most seem to be a valid statement—“your two halves for one perutah.” This is clearly all at one time, so it would seem to work. Or is it again an invalid attempt to marry a woman one half at a time.
But this too does not have a clear answer. None of these questions do. They all remain unanswered. But it was certainly fun thinking this all out!

If one person does the betrothing and one person does the accepting (on behalf of their children) can they get away with a “two for the price of one” deal? No answer to this one either.

Here he tries to finagle a cow out of the deal too. Can we imagine that he is betrothing with the perutah and just acquiring the cow by drawing it to him (he’ll pay back later)? Again, no answer.

Land can be acquired by “hazakah” which means possession. Other than that, this is essentially the same question as asked by R. Papa above.

The issue is whether the woman must know exactly how much the silk is worth. Assumedly there is no question that it is worth at least a perutah, which is a very small amount.

The Talmud narrows down the scope of Rabbah and R. Joseph’s disagreement. If she explicitly agrees to be betrothed for whatever it is worth, then she is betrothed. She has a right to agree to this arrangement.
If he lies to her, obviously she is not betrothed. That would be a false acquisition
The issue is if he tells her what it is worth and his assessment turns out to be correct. According to Rabbah, the woman does not need to know beforehand that his assessment is verified. As long as what he says turns out to be true, she is betrothed.
But to R. Joseph, at the moment of betrothal she is uncertain. She is agreeing to something whose value she can’t know. Therefore, her agreement to be betrothed is not really a full agreement. The silk would need to be evaluated beforehand. Here we can see an important concept in the rules of kiddushin—the woman needs to have acquiesced to the proposal and we need to be sure that she knew what she was agreeing to.

The Talmud narrows down the scope of Rabbah and R. Joseph’s disagreement. If she explicitly agrees to be betrothed for whatever it is worth, then she is betrothed. She has a right to agree to this arrangement.
If he lies to her, obviously she is not betrothed. That would be a false acquisition
The issue is if he tells her what it is worth and his assessment turns out to be correct. According to Rabbah, the woman does not need to know beforehand that his assessment is verified. As long as what he says turns out to be true, she is betrothed.
But to R. Joseph, at the moment of betrothal she is uncertain. She is agreeing to something whose value she can’t know. Therefore, her agreement to be betrothed is not really a full agreement. The silk would need to be evaluated beforehand. Here we can see an important concept in the rules of kiddushin—the woman needs to have acquiesced to the proposal and we need to be sure that she knew what she was agreeing to.

According to this version, R. Joseph would rule strictly also in the case of a husband who says, “Be betrothed to me for whatever it is worth.” Just as a woman will know how much the money is worth, so too the woman has to know how much the goods are worth.