Commentary for Kiddushin 6:16

It does not acquire her soul - it is a disgrace to her; therefore the method of chalifin is abolished for her when doing kiddushin. And even with a vessel whose worth is greater than that of a pruta, if you bring it to her with the language of chalifin [it does not acquire her soul] until he brings her according to the laws with the language of acquisition or buying or kiddushin.

"But nothing else divorces her". [Problem:] If you say: Let the Hebrew slave girl leave [her master] with halitzah from the ק״ו of yevamah, from this exact ק״ו; and don't say that a wife breaks the ק״ו for she cannot leave [her husband] with money, which you can say for the אמה. Solution: I would have thought that a Canaanite slave girl would break the ק״ו since she can leave with money and can't leave with halitzah. [Problem:] But if you say: This is exactly what is brought in this ק״ו that excludes halitzah! Solution: It would be possibly to object: The yevamah that leaves [her levirate bond] with the death of the levir, and thus can leave with halitah, you would say that for Canaanite slave girl, who can't leave with the death of [her] master, would leave with halitzah!? [Problem:] But if you say: If so, let us also say a Canaanite slave girl breaks the ק״ו—it would be possible to object: The Canaanite slave girl that can't leave with the death of [her] master, could you then [make a connection to] the Hebrew slave girl [who does leave with the death of her master]? Solution: We could make the break of the ק״ו from [the combination of both] the wife and the Canaanite slave girl, for if you objected: The Canaanite slave girl who doesn't leave with the death of her master, a wife would break the ק״ו since she leaves with the death of her husband but doesn't leave with halitzah; the wife who can't leave [her husband] with money, the Canaanite slave girl would break the ק״ו.

"The father profits from his daughter..." It is explained in the Yerushalmi: He has the profit of sex because they give him money to betroth her with sex.

Symbolic exchange can be done with anything, even something not worth a perutah. But betrothal, as we learn in the Mishnah, can only be done with at least the value of a perutah. That is why betrothal cannot be done through symbolic exchange.

"Or I could say: it should be hers!" [Problem:] But if you say: Didn't we until now need a verse only in order to say that [the kiddushin money] is the father's, since the fact that he can betroth her with money is learnt from קיחה קיחה (the ג״ש connecting the two instances of "take/purchase") in the field of Efron! [And note we already have the verse that proves this: "'There is no money' for this master, but there is money for another master"]. Solution: Nevertheless, it can't be said that [the kiddushin money] belongs to the father based [only] on an extraneous word (in this case: אין כסף) if that is not the meaning of the verse [so we also need the other verse, "My daughter I gave to this man"], just like we say later in the conclusion that both of these verses are required [to teach that the kiddushin money belongs to the father].

The number in the second clause teaches that a married woman does not leave her marriage through “halitzah.” “Halitzah” is the release from levirate marriage, the obligation of a woman whose husband died without children to marry her husband’s brother. This woman, called the “yevamah,” is released through halitzah. We could have made a “kal vehomer” (all the more so) argument. If halitzah works to release a yevamah (a woman awaiting levirate marriage) but a divorce document, a get, does not work, then halitzah should all the more so work to release a married woman. The mishnah teaches that it does not. Halitzah is only for a woman awaiting levirate marriage.

The Torah requires a document for divorce. Halitzah, which is a ritual performed through the removal of the husband’s shoe, is not valid.

There are two questions that will be answered. 1) How do we know that betrothal can be effected through money? 2) How do we know that it goes to the father. Note that it goes to the father only if she is a minor or a young girl. Once she has hit majority age, the money is hers. The Talmud defines majority age as 12 ½.

The Talmud now begins to ask how we know that the father receives the money through which she is betrothed. Rav Judah answers with a midrash of a verse concerning a young girl who is sold into slavery. When this girl reaches a certain age, the master or his son is to marry her. If he does not, he must send her free, without the usual money used to redeem a slave. The Torah emphasizes this—“she goes out for nothing, without money.” The repetition allows Rav Judah to offer a midrash—there is no money when a girl leaves her master’s domain in this case. But in another similar case, when a girl leaves her father’s domain by being betrothed, there is money. And who receives the money—her father.

R. Judah’s midrash successfully proved that there is money when the girl leaves her father’s domain. But how do we know the father receives it? Maybe the girl who is being betrothed should receive it?
The answer is that if the father has the right to betroth her, i.e. to decide to whom she is betrothed, then shouldn’t he be the one to receive the money.

Above we said that since a father decides whom his daughter marries, he should receive the betrothal money. But a na’arah, a girl between the ages of 12 to 12.5 can decide herself to whom she is betrothed. So she should be able to receive her betrothal money, not her father. But we know that the father does receive the money. So again the question is asked, how do we know this?

The Talmud now answers with a verse taken from the context of the annulment of vows. The verse implies, to the Talmud, that all financial advantage that comes to her in her youth, while a na’arah, go to her father. This would include the money used for her betrothal.

The work that a daughter produces, her earnings, belongs to her father. Rav deduces this from the fact that a man may sell his daughter to be a maidservant. But if the verse from Numbers teaches that all of the financial advantages of a daughter go to her husband, why does Rav need to prove that a daughter’s handiwork goes to her father from that verse?

The Talmud suggests that we derive the fact that the father receives the betrothal money from the fact, learned earlier in Ketubot, that he receives any fines owed to her, such as those for rape and seduction. However, the laws of fines differ from the laws of monetary payments and therefore there is a rule that the latter cannot be derived from the former.

The Talmud now admits that the verse from Numbers does not have broader implications. It refers only to the annulment of vows and not to a father’s right to his daughter’s betrothal money. And should we suggest that just as a father has a right to annul his daughter’s vows, so too he has right to his daughter’s betrothal money, this must be rejected for one cannot derive laws regarding monetary matters from the laws of vows.

If a na’arah is raped/seduced the payments for the shame and blemish go to her father (we learned this earlier in Ketubot). But this cannot be a source for the father’s receiving the betrothal money because there is a difference with shame and blemish. The meaning of “since the father is involved” is not entirely clear. I believe that the words could mean that when she is shamed or blemished, the father also suffers. In any case, we still have no source for how we know that the father receives the betrothal money.

The resolution of how we know that the father receives the money goes back to the original source—the fact that when the daughter sold into slavery goes free, the master does not receive a payment. Had there been a payment, the master would have received it. Thus, logically, in the case of betrothal, where there is a payment, the money goes to the father, who is akin to the master.

"Or I could say: These words [apply] to a minor (קטנה)". [Problem:] Even though the verse is dealing with a na'arah! Another problem: It is written, "And they will stone her" (Devarim 22:16), but one who spreads evil rumours about a minor is exempt! [Therefore it can't be that these verses are about a minor]. Solution: Nevertheless, this is what it meant: "My daughter I gave to this man" when she was a minor, and now she is an adult [i.e. the case is when she was a na'arah, even though the father is talking about when his daughter was a minor]. [New problem:] But if you say: For a minor I didn't need a verse, for "now he can sell her, it is necessary [to find a verse for] kiddushin money!?" (Ketubot 47a) in a case just like this that we say regarding her handiwork in the chapter Na'arah She-Nitpat'tah (Ketubot 47a)! Solution: [These situations] are not similar, for regarding her handiwork it makes sense—when he sold her, he sold her handiwork, since behold she was sold for her work—but kiddushin is not connected to sale (even though he can designate her [and sell her as the wife of a freeman], this is with the money with which she is sold, but the kiddushin itself we find no [automatic] right for the father). [New problem:] But don't we say in the chapter Na'arah that "the daughter's handiwork belongs to the father *because* God gives him the right to hand her over in marriage even if it [results in] ceasing her work!? And Rashi explains there: "God gives him the right because of what is written 'My daughter I gave to [this] man'—this means all 'givings', including handing her over to marriage. But what evidence is that [i.e. how can Rashi use the verse in that way]!? I could say: These words [apply to] a minor but not a na'arah, just as we say here! [Rashi interprets the verse differently in Ketubot than here—there he assumes it applies to a na'arah, here the sugya claims that maybe it does not]. Solution: This verse "My daughter I gave" must be dealing with a na'arah as I explained. And, though for the matter of kiddushin we are able to explain [it as] "My daughter I gave" when she was a minor, for the matter of marriage it is impossible to explain it except about a na'arah. For if [she were married] while she was a minor, then she would have been married when she whorred and her punishment would be strangling rather than stoning, for she is not held responsible for the whorring while she was a minor [so she would be punished for adultery instead].

"But if you say: Let us derive it from shame and injury/blemish (פגם)". It is surprising: How could [the Talmud] want to say "Let us derive [that] kiddushin [money belongs to the father] from shame and injury", for we only know that shame and injury themselves belong to the father from kiddushin, as [the Talmud] says at the end of Elu Na'arot (Ketubot 40b): "For if he wants, he can hand her over [by betrothing her] to an ugly man or one afflicted with boils" [and this would cause her shame and injury]!? [Additional problem:] And this might lead you to say that there is a practical legal outcome from this [derivation of kiddushin from shame and injury], for if he wanted he could have handed her over when she was a minor and this shame would last even until she was a na'arah, and if so, even when she is a bogeret her shame and injury would belong to the father from this reasoning [which we know not to be the case, it belongs to her from when she is a bogeret]! Possible solution: Being a bogeret is not similar to being a na'arah because, granted that we don't derive everything [regarding the father's rights] from [the father's right to] the release of [her daughter's] vows, this we do in fact derive: that the power of the father only lasts into her being a na'arah, just as later: "Signs of puberty that don't take her out of the authority of her father but do take her out of the authority of her master, being a bogeret [does take her out of the authority of her father]"—and how would we know that being a bogeret takes her out of the authority of her father regarding kiddushin and everything else if not for [the law regarding] release of vows? [Tentative rejection:] But it is not clear because, since it depends on this reasoning that "If he wants he can hand her over" while she is a minor, this matter [the continuing shame] would be relevant while she is a bogeret just as while she is a na'arah [so it is not obvious there is any distinction as argued previously based on release of vows]. Therefore it seems to me [that we should explain the sugya] above [as so]: "I could say: These words [apply to a] minor", i.e. a minor is relevant for the ק״ו; "for now her father receives her kiddushin, she could take the money!?"—since she has no ability [as a minor] to betroth herself; "But a na'arah, who has the ability, let her betroth herself and take the money!"—since she has the ability to betroth herself, let the kiddushin be hers. But the truth is that also when she is a na'arah her father is able to betroth her, and when her father betroths her, then her kiddushin belongs to him. And now the problem above is resolved since the verse ("My daughter I gave") is dealing with when her father betrothed her, and there [in Ketubot] we derive shame and injury from kiddushin done by her father that these belong to the father; and here, this is what it meant: "But if you say: Let us derive it from shame and injury"—kiddushin done by her should [still] belong to the father because of shame and injury [which would belong to him (when she is not an adult)]. For it is certain that for her father's betrothal it would not be possible to object from a case where she did it herself totally. So initially [the Talmud] had to derive shame and injury that she did not cause from her father's betrothal, and after that it was possible to derive what she did herself from what was not caused by what her father did.