Commentary for Kiddushin 70:1
איש דבר מצות אין אשה לא ואי אשמעינן הא משום דאיכא איבוד נשמה חס רחמנא עלה אבל הנך תרתי אימא לא צריכא:
it applies only to man, who is subject to precepts, but not to woman, who is not subject to them.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Actually, of course, she is subject to certain precepts, as stated on 29a, but not liable to as many as man (Tosaf.) .');"><sup>1</sup></span> And if the last [alone] were intimated, - since there is loss of life, the All-Merciful had compassion upon her;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And imposed upon the owner the payment of ransom for the death of a woman as for that of a man.');"><sup>2</sup></span>
Daf Shevui to Kiddushin
There are three derivations of the general rule—the first from a verse about atonement for accidental sins, the second about civil law, and the third about paying a ransom when an animal murders a human being. Why do we need all three?
The first would not be sufficient to teach that women are subject to all civil law because women did not engage in commerce as did men.
The second, about civil law, would not be sufficient to teach that if an animal kills a woman the owner must pay a ransom because women are not obligated in all commandments, as are men. (I know, this is a bit of an ugly one. But I do think it is a faithful representation of what happens when you exempt people from commandments. You might start to think that there life is less worthy than those fully commanded. This seems to be what might have happened to at least one strand of rabbinic thought).
If all we had was the third rule we might have thought that in that case, men and women were equated because it is a matter of life. But in cases of atonement or civil laws, they are not equal. Therefore we need all three derivations to teach that they are equal in all negative commandments.
The first would not be sufficient to teach that women are subject to all civil law because women did not engage in commerce as did men.
The second, about civil law, would not be sufficient to teach that if an animal kills a woman the owner must pay a ransom because women are not obligated in all commandments, as are men. (I know, this is a bit of an ugly one. But I do think it is a faithful representation of what happens when you exempt people from commandments. You might start to think that there life is less worthy than those fully commanded. This seems to be what might have happened to at least one strand of rabbinic thought).
If all we had was the third rule we might have thought that in that case, men and women were equated because it is a matter of life. But in cases of atonement or civil laws, they are not equal. Therefore we need all three derivations to teach that they are equal in all negative commandments.
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