Commentary for Kiddushin 73:22

In general, all commandments which are connected to the land are practiced only in the land of Israel. There are some commandments such as tefillin concerning which the Torah uses language such as “When God brings you into the land…” (Exodus 13:5). One might have thought that these commandments would be obligatory only for a Jew living in the land of Israel. The mishnah, however, says that the distinction between commandments observed in and outside of Israel is not the language used in the Torah but rather whether or not the observance of the commandment itself is tied to land.
The only exceptions to this rule are “orlah” and “kilayim.” “Orlah” is the prohibition of using the fruit of a tree for its first three years. “Kilayim” refers to the prohibition of planting wheat in a vineyard.
Rabbi Elazar adds to the list of exceptions the prohibition of new produce. This refers to the prohibition from eating from the new grain harvest until the omer sacrifice is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:14).

The Torah occasionally says “when you come into the Land you shall do something.” We might have thought that mitzvoth that are dependent on the Land means mitzvoth about which the Torah uses such a phrase. The problem is that the Torah uses this phrase in relation to two mitzvoth that appear together—tefillin and the redemption of the first born donkey (Exodus 13:11-16), two mitzvoth that are obligatory outside the Land.
Therefore, R. Judah interprets the phrase to mean literally you need land to perform the mitzvah. Thus for instance the rules of tithing need land—they refer to produce that grow on the land. Therefore, they are obligatory only in the land. Other mitzvoth such as tefillin that are not connected to the land are obligatory everywhere.

The Torah occasionally says “when you come into the Land you shall do something.” We might have thought that mitzvoth that are dependent on the Land means mitzvoth about which the Torah uses such a phrase. The problem is that the Torah uses this phrase in relation to two mitzvoth that appear together—tefillin and the redemption of the first born donkey (Exodus 13:11-16), two mitzvoth that are obligatory outside the Land.
Therefore, R. Judah interprets the phrase to mean literally you need land to perform the mitzvah. Thus for instance the rules of tithing need land—they refer to produce that grow on the land. Therefore, they are obligatory only in the land. Other mitzvoth such as tefillin that are not connected to the land are obligatory everywhere.

The baraita interprets each phrase in the verse as referring to a different aspect of rabbinic Judaism—study and practice. The key section for the issue at hand is the end. The phrase “in the land” makes it seem that all mitzvoth are obligatory only in the land. On the other hand, the phrase “on the earth” refers to those living anywhere. So which is it?

The baraita interprets each phrase in the verse as referring to a different aspect of rabbinic Judaism—study and practice. The key section for the issue at hand is the end. The phrase “in the land” makes it seem that all mitzvoth are obligatory only in the land. On the other hand, the phrase “on the earth” refers to those living anywhere. So which is it?

Now that we have the phrase “in the land” and “on the earth” we have to figure out which commandments are obligatory everywhere and which only in the Land. The baraita determines this from the first mitzvah mentioned immediately thereafter—the mitzvah to uproot idolatry. This is considered a personal obligation—a mitzvah that one does with one’s body, not with the Land. Therefore it is a paradigm for all mitzvoth—any mitzvah that is a personal duty is obligatory no matter where one lives.
I might add that this sugya prevents a limiting of Judaism to those living in the Land, a notion that might have been catastrophic for the history of Judaism. Had rabbis decided that mitzvoth need only be observed inside Israel, one might wonder if Judaism would still exist.

The first possibility is that R. Elazar is stricter than the first opinion. The first opinion says that the prohibition of eating new grain is prohibited only in Israel. The word “settlements” implies that Israel has taken possession and settled the land. Thus the prohibition is only applicable in a place that Israel takes possession of and settles—the Land of Israel. It is unlike orlah and kilayim which are obligatory everywhere.

The first possibility is that R. Elazar is stricter than the first opinion. The first opinion says that the prohibition of eating new grain is prohibited only in Israel. The word “settlements” implies that Israel has taken possession and settled the land. Thus the prohibition is only applicable in a place that Israel takes possession of and settles—the Land of Israel. It is unlike orlah and kilayim which are obligatory everywhere.

The first possibility is that R. Elazar is stricter than the first opinion. The first opinion says that the prohibition of eating new grain is prohibited only in Israel. The word “settlements” implies that Israel has taken possession and settled the land. Thus the prohibition is only applicable in a place that Israel takes possession of and settles—the Land of Israel. It is unlike orlah and kilayim which are obligatory everywhere.

R. Elazar says that the prohibition of eating new produce applies everywhere, even outside the Land. The word “settlement” implies all settlements, wherever Jews may be living.

According to this reading, the first opinion holds that the prohibition of “hadash” applies everywhere, like orlah and kilayim. R. Elazar would say that hadash is obligatory only inside the land. The word “also” in the phrase, “also new produce” refers back to the beginning of the first tanna’s opinion---like most soil related prohibitions, new produce too is prohibited only in the Land. The word does not relate to its immediate antecedent, “except orlah and kilayim” for according to R. Elazar hadash differs from orlah and kilayim.

According to this reading, the first opinion holds that the prohibition of “hadash” applies everywhere, like orlah and kilayim. R. Elazar would say that hadash is obligatory only inside the land. The word “also” in the phrase, “also new produce” refers back to the beginning of the first tanna’s opinion---like most soil related prohibitions, new produce too is prohibited only in the Land. The word does not relate to its immediate antecedent, “except orlah and kilayim” for according to R. Elazar hadash differs from orlah and kilayim.

To prove that R. Elazar is more stringent than the first opinion, and holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere, the Talmud cites a statement made by Abaye. Abaye said that R. Yishmael disagrees with R. Elazar. R. Yishmael holds that wherever “settlement” is stated it means that the mitzvah is obligatory in the land, after Israel has conquered it and settled it. R. Yishmael is therefore lenient—he would rule that the prohibition of new produce is practiced only in the land. If R. Elazar disagrees, that means that he holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere.
Within the baraita, R. Akiva argues that “settlement” is not a sign that the mitzvah is observed only in the land. After all, in Leviticus 23:3, the word is used in reference to Shabbat, and Shabbat is observed everywhere. R. Yishmael seems to think that Shabbat is an exception to the rule because it can be derived through a kal vehomer.
In any case, this proves that R. Elazar holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere. The first opinion holds that it is observed only in the land.

To prove that R. Elazar is more stringent than the first opinion, and holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere, the Talmud cites a statement made by Abaye. Abaye said that R. Yishmael disagrees with R. Elazar. R. Yishmael holds that wherever “settlement” is stated it means that the mitzvah is obligatory in the land, after Israel has conquered it and settled it. R. Yishmael is therefore lenient—he would rule that the prohibition of new produce is practiced only in the land. If R. Elazar disagrees, that means that he holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere.
Within the baraita, R. Akiva argues that “settlement” is not a sign that the mitzvah is observed only in the land. After all, in Leviticus 23:3, the word is used in reference to Shabbat, and Shabbat is observed everywhere. R. Yishmael seems to think that Shabbat is an exception to the rule because it can be derived through a kal vehomer.
In any case, this proves that R. Elazar holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere. The first opinion holds that it is observed only in the land.

To prove that R. Elazar is more stringent than the first opinion, and holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere, the Talmud cites a statement made by Abaye. Abaye said that R. Yishmael disagrees with R. Elazar. R. Yishmael holds that wherever “settlement” is stated it means that the mitzvah is obligatory in the land, after Israel has conquered it and settled it. R. Yishmael is therefore lenient—he would rule that the prohibition of new produce is practiced only in the land. If R. Elazar disagrees, that means that he holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere.
Within the baraita, R. Akiva argues that “settlement” is not a sign that the mitzvah is observed only in the land. After all, in Leviticus 23:3, the word is used in reference to Shabbat, and Shabbat is observed everywhere. R. Yishmael seems to think that Shabbat is an exception to the rule because it can be derived through a kal vehomer.
In any case, this proves that R. Elazar holds that new produce is prohibited everywhere. The first opinion holds that it is observed only in the land.

In the baraita, R. Yishmael was referring to the libations brought with offerings (Numbers 15:2). But in this verse two words are used to indicate that the obligation occurs only in the land—תבואו, which means “enter” and “מושבותיכם” your settlements. For the rule to apply both of these words need to be used. If only “settlements” is used, then the mitzvah might apply outside the land.