Commentary for Kiddushin 9:20

"How do we know [a wife can be acquired] with a contract?" And it is not possible to say this from the ק״ו of Hebrew slavegirl who isn't acquired with sex but is acquired with a contract. Firstly because we derive the slavegirl herself from the hekesh to "another" (=a wife) later (Kiddushin 16a where we derive that a Hebrew slavegirl can be acquired with a contract from the wife). And even according to Rav Hisda who derives it (on Kiddushin 16a) from "'She shall not go out like slaves go out' (Shemot 21:7), but she can be acquired with the acquisition of slaves" [i.e. with a contract and therefore he does not derive this law for the slavegirl from the law of the wife], it is [still] possible to object [to the ק״ו] as above [on 4b where they pointed out] "that she [the Hebrew slavegirl] can go out with money [unlike the wife]"! Secondly, since according to Rav Hisda the father writes [the contract for the Hebrew slavegirl], it is not possible to learn [from this] about a wife who is not acquired in this way since the husband writes [the contract].

"For [with money] they can redeem hekdesh and tithe". [Problem:] But if you say: All of this I can put into the ק״ו—Just as money, even though with it they can redeem hekdesh and tithe but can't go out [of the marriage with it] and even so can enter [the marriage with it], a contract, which even though they can't redeem with it hekdesh, she can go out, isn't it logical that she should be able to enter?! Solution: A stringency written in the verse it is not possible to combine it into the ק״ו [and the Torah excludes non-money means of redemption], because only a logical stringency is able to be put into the ק״ו, one that is written we have to say that [the Torah] causes it to be effective [it doesn't interact with other logical bases we might use for a ק״ו]. [Problem:] But if you say: Let us say a ק״ו from land [with which] they can't go out and even so can enter!—i.e. a person is allowed to betroth a wife with land but can't divorce her with land—and there it wouldn't be possible to object "For [with money] they can redeem hekdesh" [so instead of comparing contract to money which is broken by the baraita with the fact that money is stronger (can redeem), why don't we compare contract to land which is not stronger in this way (can't redeem)]! Solution: It is possible to object [to this]: Land can be acquired with moveable objects, can you say the same with a contract [so land is stronger in a different way and this would break this tentative ק״ו]!? [Problem:] But if you say: Moveable objects will break [this breakage of the ק״ו] since they cannot be acquired with [other] moveable objects, they can't leave, but they can enter, so I should be able to include contract! Solution: With moveable objects they redeem hekdesh [so we would be back to the exact same problem we had with money].

"Just as 'being' is with money so too 'her leaving' is with money!?" [The question is: We suggested to apply this hekesh for contract to money, why didn't we try to apply this hekesh to sex as well?] On the topic of sex it would be impossible to say "Just as 'being' is with sex so too 'her leaving' is with sex" since he has to distance himself from her to divorce her, and further because a common [reason for divorce is] he found in her ervat davar (e.g. adultery) in which case he would have to separate.

"A defence attorney becomes a prosecuting attorney" [when money is the same thing that gets you in and out of the marriage]. Problem: If this is true, how could [the Talmud] say above: "A Hebrew slavegirl that goes out with money, isn't it logical that she should be acquired with money"? On the contrary, it is a disadvantage since we don't want a prosecuting attorney to become a defence attorney! Solution: For a Hebrew slavegirl it is not possible to say this since, originally, when her father sold her into slavery he received the money from the master, and if so when [the father] wants to redeem her, it is logical that the master should receive the money [it's a transaction, it doesn't make it look like she goes out and comes in with the exact same thing]. But a man that betroths a wife, everything comes through him, whether betrothal or divorce, so there it is relevant to object "They will say 'Money causes [her] to enter...' etc." [The money regarding a wife's entering or leaving never changes hands, it is the husband's throughout].

"[The verse] is about divorce [so comes to] exclude something else about divorce" [supporting Rava]. But it would not be logical to say [that the verse] is about writing [so comes to] exclude something else about writing [which would be against Rava], since the plain sense of the verse implies that it comes to say [he can divorce her] only with writing, for it says "If she didn't find favour in his eyes, and he wrote for her", this implies that it is specifically about this topic. [In other words: the verse is indeed primarily about divorce but it just tells you that methods not involving writing are wrong.]

The law that betrothal can be done through deed is derived from a kal vehomer from divorce. If a document works to divorce but money does not, then since money works for betrothal, all the more so a document should as well.

The Talmud now refutes the argument. Money can be used for betrothal because it can also be used to redeem sacred property and second tithe (the money becomes holy and the things become not-holy). But documents cannot be used to redeem sacred things and therefore there is no reason to assume that documents may be used to betroth a woman.

Having rejected logic as a source, the Talmud now brings in a verse to prove that she can be betrothed through a document. The verse compares being married with being divorced—just as she is divorced through a document, so too she is betrothed through a document.

If we’re going to compare means of divorce with means of betrothal, then why not say that just as she can be betrothed through money, so too she can be divorced through money. Abaye responds that were this to be so, then the “defender”—money used for betrothal—would become the “prosecutor”—money used for divorce.

If we’re going to compare means of divorce with means of betrothal, then why not say that just as she can be betrothed through money, so too she can be divorced through money. Abaye responds that were this to be so, then the “defender”—money used for betrothal—would become the “prosecutor”—money used for divorce.

The next difficulty is obvious—if the defender cannot become the prosecutor then how can the prosecutor (document) also become the defender—a document used for betrothal.
The resolution is that the documents are different, whereas all coins are the same. So the fact that a document can be used for both betrothal and divorce is not a problem of the prosecutor becoming the defender. But money is all the same, so it would be a problem.

The next difficulty is obvious—if the defender cannot become the prosecutor then how can the prosecutor (document) also become the defender—a document used for betrothal.
The resolution is that the documents are different, whereas all coins are the same. So the fact that a document can be used for both betrothal and divorce is not a problem of the prosecutor becoming the defender. But money is all the same, so it would be a problem.

Rava cites a midrash to prove that she cannot be divorced through money—the Torah says that the husband writes her a divorce. He does not give her money.

Why not read the verse another way—as if it says that she is divorced through money but not betrothed.
The resolution is the same comparison—just as she can be divorced through a document, so too she can be betrothed.

We could have read the verses in another way. The verse that juxtaposes divorce and marriage would teach that just as she can be betrothed through money so too she can be divorced. Then the verse about divorce would teach that she cannot be betrothed by document.
The Talmud resolves this by saying that a verse that is talking about divorce must be excluding a means of divorce, not a means of marriage. So that verse must mean that she can be divorced by document and not by money. And then the comparison verse must teach that just as she can be divorced through money so too she can be betrothed through money.

R. Yose Hagalili uses the next few words of the verse as the basis for the fact that she is divorced through writing but not through any other means.

The rabbis use the word “divorce” which can also be translated as “severing” as teaching that the husband cannot try to maintain control over her by offering a conditional divorce which limits her future behavior. Note, even if she agrees to the condition, this is not divorce. However, if there is a time limit, then the divorce is effective. She can disagree with the condition and simply not be divorced. But it is a possible means of divorce.

The rabbis use the word “divorce” which can also be translated as “severing” as teaching that the husband cannot try to maintain control over her by offering a conditional divorce which limits her future behavior. Note, even if she agrees to the condition, this is not divorce. However, if there is a time limit, then the divorce is effective. She can disagree with the condition and simply not be divorced. But it is a possible means of divorce.

The Talmud now asks, as it usually does, how does R. Yose Hagalili derive this last halakhah—that divorce must sever the relationship. After all, he has already used that word to teach that she must be divorced with a document.
He can get two laws out of this verse because it is in the plural “keritut” instead of “karet.” The rabbis, however, do not make anything out of the use of the plural. This is also how the discussion can be completed.

The first suggestion as to which means of betrothal could be derived from the others is that betrothal through a document could be derived from money and intercourse. For this to work, we would need there to be nothing common to money and intercourse that is not common to the document. But there is—there is pleasure in receiving money and engaging in intercourse. But there is no pleasure in receiving a document. Thus betrothal through a document could not be derived from betrothal through money and intercourse.

We could not have derived betrothal through intercourse from betrothal through money and document because money and documents are normal ways of acquiring. Intercourse works as a means of acquisition only in marriage.

Money cannot be derived from the other two because money never works in marriage against the woman’s will, whereas intercourse does in the case of a yevamah and a document divorces a woman against her will.

If one were to push back and say that money does work, for a Jewish girl can be sold into slavery against her will, the answer is that money does not work against her will in the case of marriage.

R. Huna argues that if money can acquire a wife in betrothal but still does not allow her to eat terumah (if she is betrothed to a priest) then all the more so huppah, which does allow her to eat terumah (when marrying a priest) should also acquire her in betrothal.

Ulla stated that according to the Torah, a woman betrothed to a priest should be able to eat terumah immediately after betrothal through money. She is fully connected to him and is part of the priest’s family. Halakhah does not allow this lest she come to give terumah to the members of her childhood family who are not priests.

Ulla stated that according to the Torah, a woman betrothed to a priest should be able to eat terumah immediately after betrothal through money. She is fully connected to him and is part of the priest’s family. Halakhah does not allow this lest she come to give terumah to the members of her childhood family who are not priests.

The Talmud tweaks the argument. Money cannot be used for “marriage” and yet it acquires in betrothal. Therefore huppah which is the way that marriage is completed should also acquire in betrothal.

"'With the understanding that you will not go to your father's house ever'—this is not a get". Rashi's explanation: "All her days she is bound to uphold this condition on his account". Problem: Why shouldn't it be a get since, if her father dies, then she is able to enter the house and she is no longer bound to him, since after the death of her father it is not considered "her father's house", as we say in Nedarim 46a: "[Someone says to their fellow:] 'Konam is your house that I will not enter it'—if he [the house owner] dies or sells it, he is permitted [to enter it]" [which should be the case for the condition that the husband made the wife swear about her father's house]! Solution: It is called her father's house by all of her father's offspring even though he died, as it is written about Tamar, "Return as a widow to your father's house" (Bereishit 38:11), even though her father died as the verses prove.

"But Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili derives [the permanent conditions that interfere with the efficacy of a get in the baraita] from [the fact that the verse could have said sefer] karet [but instead said sefer] keritut". Problem: In chapter Ha-Megaresh (Gittin 83b) it said about the Rabbanan of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah [i.e. the majority opinion he disputed] that they do not make a derash with karet-keritut, and Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili is included in the Rabbanan [since he is not Riva, he must be among the majority opinion against him]. But here it said that Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili made a derash with karet-keritut! Solution: It didn't say "They don't learn it" but rather "They don't make a derash", i.e. [they don't derash] this derashah there [to learn דבר הכורת בינו לבינה] for they need it for the derashah here [to learn אין דבר אחר כורתה].

"[If it weren't written about money, I would think] that [money too] is [effective] without her agreement [like sex and contract]". Rashi's explanation: Sex with a yevamah [is effective without her agreement], contract with divorce, and money with the Hebrew slavegirl. But this was a problem for Rabbenu Tam: If this is considered to be "without her agreement", that the father can sell his daughter without her agreement, if so, what does Rav Huna [mean when he, on Kiddushin 5b] says later that "Money regarding marriage nonetheless we do not find [it to be effective] without her agreement"—can't the father betroth his minor daughter with money without her agreement!? [Solution:] Rabbenu Tam said: Since the father stands in place of his daughter, this is not considered "without her agreement" since it is with the consent of the father. Problem: But if you say: If so, how can [the Talmud] say that money also is [effective] with a Hebrew slavegirl without her agreement—for the father sold her with his consent! Solution: This is what [the Talmud meant by its] object[ion with וכ״ת]: Money is [effective] with a slavegirl without her agreement in the case when the master designates [as a wife for his son] the Hebrew [slavegirl] with money from her acquisition with the agreement of neither the father nor the daughter. [Problem:] For it says later (Kiddushin 19a), "'That he did not designate her'—that he needs to designate her", [Solution: This] doesn't [mean] that he needs to do it with her consent but that he needs to inform her that she is designated for the sake of betrothal. [Problem:] And even though [the Talmud] said below "With marriage nonetheless we do not find [that money is effective without her agreement]", [Solution:] nevertheless, in a case like this where she is designated to be married, originally the money wasn't for marriage [it was for acquisition of a slavegirl]. There are those who return to Rashi's explanation that certainly the sale of a Hebrew slavegirl is called "without her agreement" for it is a debt for her since, if she were capable of decision-making [i.e. not a minor] she would not have agreed to [being sold]. But minor betrothal is not a debt to her like sale and in the end she will remain married, so if she were capable of decision-making she would have agreed [the assumption is that women would prefer to married than unmarried for financial and social security]—thus it is not really "without her agreement".