Commentary for Sanhedrin 156:15

נתכוין להכותו על מתניו ולא היה בה כדי להמיתו על מתניו והלכה לה על לבו והיה בה כדי להמיתו על לבו ומת פטור נתכוין להכותו על לבו

If the injury was declared fatal, but subsequently lightened, a second assessment of the financial damage is made.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the probable period that he would be incapacitated and the cost of medical assistance, for both of which he is liable. ');">¹⁴</span> If thereafter he grew &nbsp; &nbsp; worse and died, the second assessment is followed.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., he is liable for the financial damage, as it was computed, but not to death. ');">¹⁵</span> This is R. Nehemiah's view. The Sages maintain: There can be no second assessment after the first.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., since on the first computation the injuries were declared fatal, when he subsequently grew better, and financial damages were awarded, we do not regard him as having left Beth din a free man (in respect of the capital penalty), but judge him according to the ultimate issue, and hence he is executed. ');">¹⁶</span> Another [Baraitha] taught: If his injuries were declared fatal, they may subsequently be declared non-fatal.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he grew better, and the assailant is thus freed from death. ');">¹⁷</span> But once his injuries are declared non-fatal, they cannot subsequently be declared fatal.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he grew worse and died, the culprit is not executed. ');">¹⁸</span> If the blow was assessed to be fatal, but then he became better, a second assessment of the financial damage is made, and if he subsequently died, he must make compensation for the damage, pain [etc.]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [On the payments for injuries, v. B.K. VIII, 1.] ');">¹⁹</span> to the heirs. From when must compensation be made? — From when he smote him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In assessing the victim's worth, his value before being smitten is taken. But we do not say, since his injuries were first declared fatal, and then not fatal, subsequent to which he died, his value should be assessed on the basis of his health at the time of the second computation. ');">²⁰</span> And thus this anonymous [Baraitha] agrees with R. Nehemiah.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That financial compensation must be made, but there is no liability to death. ');">²¹</span> <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. <font>IF HE INTENDED KILLING</font> AN ANIMAL BUT SLEW A MAN, OR <font>A HEATHEN AND HE KILLED AN ISRAELITE</font>, OR A PREMATURELY BORN AND HE KILLED A VIABLE CHILD, <font>HE IS NOT LIABLE</font>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [A prematurely born child for the first thirty days is not considered viable.] ');">²²</span> IF HE INTENDED TO STRIKE HIM ON HIS LOINS, WHERE THE BLOW WAS INSUFFICIENT TO KILL, BUT SMOTE THE HEART INSTEAD, WHERE IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO KILL, AND HE DIED; OR IF HE INTENDED SMITING HIM ON THE HEART,

Explore commentary for Sanhedrin 156:15. In-depth commentary and analysis from classical Jewish sources.