Sanhedrin 156

על משענתו ונקה המכה וכי תעלה על דעתך שזה מהלך בשוק וזה נהרג אלא זה שאמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה ולאחר כך הכביד ומת שהוא פטור

upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 19. ');">¹</span>

ורבנן האי ונקה המכה מאי דרשי ביה מלמד שחובשין אותו

Now, could you have thought that whilst he walks in the market place his assailant is executed! But it must refer to one who, it was judged, would die [of his injuries], but then their effect lessened, only to increase subsequently so that he died, [the Torah thus teaching that his assailant] is quit. But how do the Rabbis<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The representatives of the anonymous opinion in the Mishnah. ');">²</span>

ורבי נחמיה חבישה מנא ליה יליף ממקושש

explain 'then shall he that smote him be quit'? — This teaches that he is incarcerated [until the result is known]. Whence does R. Nehemiah know this? — From the 'gatherer [of sticks]'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Num. XV, 32-36. Pending a decision, 'they put him in ward'. ');">³</span>

ורבנן נמי לילפי ממקושש מקושש בר קטלא הוא ומשה לא הוה ידע קטליה במאי לאפוקי האי דלא ידעינן אי בר קטלא הוא אי לאו בר קטלא הוא

Then let the Rabbis also deduce it thence? — The 'gatherer' was certainly liable to death, Moses merely not knowing by which death;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence it is obvious that he had to be incarcerated. On this view, Moses knew that he had to be executed. This is discussed below. ');">⁴</span>

ורבי נחמיה יליף ממגדף דלא הוה ידע אי בר קטלא הוא וחבשוהו

that excludes our case, where we do not know whether he is liable to death at all.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., this case could not be deduced from the other. ');">⁵</span>

ורבנן מגדף הוראת שעה היתה

But R. Nehemiah maintains that it can be deduced from the 'blasphemer': though not knowing whether he was liable to death, they imprisoned him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 10-14. ');">⁶</span>

כדתניא יודע היה משה רבינו שהמקושש במיתה שנאמר (שמות לא, יד) מחלליה מות יומת אלא לא היה יודע באיזו מיתה נהרג שנאמר (במדבר טו, לד) כי לא פורש וגו' אבל מגדף לא נאמר בו אלא לפרש להם על פי ה' שלא היה משה יודע אם הוא בן מיתה כל עיקר אם לאו

But the Rabbis say that in case of the blasphemer, [his incarceration] was an ad hoc decision.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'a decision for the moment'. For, death not having been previously prescribed for blasphemy, there was no reason for his incarceration, but that it seemed expedient. But a special ad hoc decision cannot be taken as precedent for normal procedure. ');">⁷</span>

בשלמא לרבי נחמיה היינו דכתיבי תרי אומדני חד אמדוהו למיתה וחיה וחד אמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה אלא לרבנן תרי אומדני למה לי

[The preceding discussion agrees with what] has been taught: Moses knew that the 'gatherer' was to be executed, for it is written, Every one that defileth it shall surely be put to death;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXXI, 14. ');">⁸</span>

חד אמדוהו למיתה וחיה וחד אמדוהו לחיים ומת

but he did not know by which death, as it is written, [And they put him in ward,] because it was not declared what should be done to him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Num. XV, 34. ');">⁹</span>

ורבי נחמיה אמדוהו לחיים ומת לא צריך קרא שהרי יצא מבית דין זכאי

But in the case of the blasphemer, it is only said, [And they put him in ward,] that the mind of the Lord might be shewed them;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 12. This implies that the entire law was unknown, whilst 'what should be done to him' indicates that only the details, i.e. mode of death, were unknown. ');">¹⁰</span>

תנו רבנן המכה את חבירו ואמדוהו למיתה וחיה פוטרין אותו אמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה אומדין אותו אומד שני לממון ואם לאחר כן הכביד ומת הלך אחר אומד האמצעי דברי רבי נחמיה וחכמים אומרים אין אומד אחר אומד

implying that Moses did not know whether he was at all liable to death or not.

תניא אידך אמדוהו למיתה אומדין אותו לחיים לחיים אין אומדין אותו למיתה אמדוהו למיתה והקל ממה שהיה אומדין אותו אומד שני לממון ואם לאחר כן הכביד ומת משלם נזק וצער ליורשים

Now, on R. Nehemiah's view, it is right that two phrases bearing on judicial assessment are written;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Ex. XXI, 18f: And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: If he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed. Two phrases are superfluous, viz., 'and he die not', and 'If he rise again and walk abroad upon his staff', for it is self-evident that the assailant cannot be executed under such circumstances: hence they must refer to a judicial calculation that he would not die, which was, however, subsequently falsified. ');">¹¹</span>

מאימתי משלם משעה שהכהו וסתמא כרבי נחמיה:

one teaching that if his injury was declared to be fatal, but yet he survived; the other, that if it was judged that he would die, and then the effect of the blow was lightened, [yet he subsequently died — that in both cases he is quit]. But according to the Rabbis [who maintain that in the latter case he is executed], why are two such clauses necessary? — One teaches that if his injuries were declared fatal, yet he survived, and the other, that if they were declared non-fatal, yet he died, — [that in both cases the assailant is free]. But R. Nehemiah maintains that no verse is necessary for the latter case, since he left <i>Beth din</i> a free man.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A favourable verdict cannot be reversed (v. supra 33b). Therefore in the latter case it is obvious that 'he is quit'. ');">¹²</span>

<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> נתכוין להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם לעובד כוכבים והרג את ישראל לנפלים והרג את בן קיימא פטור

Our Rabbis taught: If a man smite his neighbour and the blow was assessed to be fatal, yet he survived, he is dismissed.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [I.e., exempt from death, but liable to pay damages.] ');">¹³</span>

נתכוין להכותו על מתניו ולא היה בה כדי להמיתו על מתניו והלכה לה על לבו והיה בה כדי להמיתו על לבו ומת פטור נתכוין להכותו על לבו

If the injury was declared fatal, but subsequently lightened, a second assessment of the financial damage is made.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the probable period that he would be incapacitated and the cost of medical assistance, for both of which he is liable. ');">¹⁴</span> If thereafter he grew &nbsp; &nbsp; worse and died, the second assessment is followed.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., he is liable for the financial damage, as it was computed, but not to death. ');">¹⁵</span> This is R. Nehemiah's view. The Sages maintain: There can be no second assessment after the first.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., since on the first computation the injuries were declared fatal, when he subsequently grew better, and financial damages were awarded, we do not regard him as having left Beth din a free man (in respect of the capital penalty), but judge him according to the ultimate issue, and hence he is executed. ');">¹⁶</span> Another [Baraitha] taught: If his injuries were declared fatal, they may subsequently be declared non-fatal.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he grew better, and the assailant is thus freed from death. ');">¹⁷</span> But once his injuries are declared non-fatal, they cannot subsequently be declared fatal.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he grew worse and died, the culprit is not executed. ');">¹⁸</span> If the blow was assessed to be fatal, but then he became better, a second assessment of the financial damage is made, and if he subsequently died, he must make compensation for the damage, pain [etc.]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [On the payments for injuries, v. B.K. VIII, 1.] ');">¹⁹</span> to the heirs. From when must compensation be made? — From when he smote him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In assessing the victim's worth, his value before being smitten is taken. But we do not say, since his injuries were first declared fatal, and then not fatal, subsequent to which he died, his value should be assessed on the basis of his health at the time of the second computation. ');">²⁰</span> And thus this anonymous [Baraitha] agrees with R. Nehemiah.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That financial compensation must be made, but there is no liability to death. ');">²¹</span> <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. <font>IF HE INTENDED KILLING</font> AN ANIMAL BUT SLEW A MAN, OR <font>A HEATHEN AND HE KILLED AN ISRAELITE</font>, OR A PREMATURELY BORN AND HE KILLED A VIABLE CHILD, <font>HE IS NOT LIABLE</font>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [A prematurely born child for the first thirty days is not considered viable.] ');">²²</span> IF HE INTENDED TO STRIKE HIM ON HIS LOINS, WHERE THE BLOW WAS INSUFFICIENT TO KILL, BUT SMOTE THE HEART INSTEAD, WHERE IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO KILL, AND HE DIED; OR IF HE INTENDED SMITING HIM ON THE HEART,