Sanhedrin 157

והיה בה כדי להמית על לבו והלכה לה על מתניו ולא היה בה כדי להמית על מתניו ומת פטור

WHERE IT WAS ENOUGH TO KILL, BUT STRUCK HIM ON THE LOINS, WHERE IT WAS NOT, AND YET HE DIED, HE IS NOT LIABLE. IF HE AIMED A BLOW AT AN ADULT, &nbsp; &nbsp; WHOM IT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO KILL, BUT CAUGHT A CHILD,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'a minor'. ');">¹</span>

נתכוון להכות את הגדול ולא היה בה כדי להמית הגדול והלכה לה על הקטן והיה בה כדי להמית את הקטן ומת פטור נתכוון להכות את הקטן והיה בה כדי להמית את הקטן והלכה לה על הגדול ולא היה בה כדי להמית את הגדול ומת פטור

WHOM IT WAS ENOUGH TO KILL, AND HE DIED, HE IS NOT LIABLE. IF HE STRUCK AT A CHILD WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO KILL HIM, BUT IT CAUGHT AN ADULT, FOR WHOM IT WAS INSUFFICIENT, AND YET HE DIED, HE IS NOT LIABLE. BUT IF HE INTENDED TO STRIKE HIS LOINS WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO KILL, BUT CAUGHT THE HEART INSTEAD, HE IS LIABLE. IF HE AIMED A BLOW AT AN ADULT HARD ENOUGH TO KILL, BUT STRUCK A CHILD INSTEAD, AND HE DIED, HE IS LIABLE.R. SIMEON SAID: EVEN IF HE INTENDED KILLING ONE BUT KILLED ANOTHER, HE IS NOT LIABLE.

אבל נתכוון להכות על מתניו והיה בה כדי להמית על מתניו והלכה לה על לבו ומת חייב נתכוון להכות את הגדול והיה בה כדי להמית את הגדול והלכה לה על הקטן ומת חייב ר' שמעון אומר אפילו נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור:

<b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. To which clause does R. Simeon refer? Shall we say to the last? In that case, the Mishnah should state, R. Simeon declares him not liable.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why repeat, Even if he intended etc.? Since it bears upon the clause immediately preceding, the circumstances having been stated, it is sufficient just to give R. Simeon's ruling. ');">²</span>

<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> ר"ש אהייא אילימא אסיפא ר"ש פוטר מיבעי ליה

But he refers to the first clause: <font>IF HE INTENDED KILLING</font> AN ANIMAL, BUT SLEW A MAN, OR <font>A HEATHEN AND HE SLEW AN ISRAELITE</font>, OR A PREMATURELY BORN AND HE SLEW A VIABLE CHILD, <font>HE IS NOT LIABLE</font>. This implies, that <font>if he intended killing one [Israelite] and killed another, he is liable</font>. [Thereupon] R. SIMEON SAID: EVEN IF HE INTENDED KILLING ONE BUT KILLED ANOTHER, HE IS NOT LIABLE.

אלא ארישא נתכוון להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם לעובד כוכבים והרג את ישראל לנפלים והרג את בן קיימא פטור הא נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה חייב ר"ש אומר אפילו נתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור

Now, it is obvious that if Reuben and Simeon were standing, and the murderer said, 'I intended killing Reuben, not Simeon [whom he did actually kill] — that is the case wherein they differ. But what if he said, 'I intended killing any of then,';<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Does R. Simeon regard this as intentional, or not, since he would have been equally satisfied had the other been killed. ');">³</span>

פשיטא קאי ראובן ושמעון ואמר אנא לראובן קא מיכוונא לשמעון לא קא מיכוונא היינו פלוגתייהו אמר לחד מינייהו מאי א"נ כסבור ראובן ונמצא שמעון מאי תא שמע דתניא ר"ש אומר עד שיאמר לפלוני אני מתכוון

or [again], if he thought that this victim was Reuben, but then found him to be Simeon? — Come and hear! For it has been taught: R. Simeon said: [He is not liable] unless he declares, 'My intention was to kill so and so' [whom he did kill].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This proves that in both cases propounded, he is not liable according to R. Simeon. ');">⁴</span>

מאי טעמא דר"ש אמר קרא (דברים יט, יא) וארב לו וקם עליו עד שיתכוון לו ורבנן אמרי דבי רבי ינאי פרט לזורק אבן לגו

What is R. Simeon's reason? — The Writ saith, [But if any man &nbsp; &nbsp; hate his neighbour,] and lie in wait for him, and rise up against him:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XIX, 11 ');">⁵</span>

היכי דמי אילימא דאיכא תשעה כותים ואחד ישראל ביניהן תיפוק ליה דרובא כותים נינהו אי נמי פלגא ופלגא ספק נפשות להקל

teaching that his intention must be against him. <font>But the Rabbis?</font><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' How do they interpret 'for him' and 'against him'? ');">⁶</span>

לא צריכא דאיכא תשעה ישראל וכותי אחד ביניהן דהוה ליה כותי קבוע וכל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי

— The disciples of R. Jannai said: <font>This excludes the case of one who threw a stone into the midst of a company [of Israelites and heathens]. How is this? Shall we say that the company consisted of nine heathens and one Israelite? Then his non-liability can be inferred from the fact that the majority were heathens. And even if half and half, when there is a doubt in a capital charge, a lenient attitude must be taken!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since they were equally divided, we do not know whether he aimed at a Israelite or a heathen, and hence even without a verse we know that he is not liable. ');">⁷</span></font>

בשלמא לרבנן דאמרי נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה חייב דכתיב (שמות כא, כב) וכי ינצו אנשים ונגפו אשה הרה ואמר רבי אלעזר במצות שבמיתה הכתוב מדבר דכתיב (שמות כא, כג) אם אסון יהיה ונתתה נפש תחת נפש

— The verse is necessary only if there were nine Jews and one heathen, so that the heathen [though in a minority] is 'settled' there, and every 'settled' [minority] is as half and half.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This is a general rule in the Talmud. Although the majority is always followed, that is only when the minority is not [H] Kabua', fixed, settled in a certain place; but otherwise, it is equal to the majority. The following example from the Talmud will make it clearer. If there are ten butcher shops in a street, nine of which sell only kosher meat, the tenth selling terefah meat, and a piece of meat is found in the street, it may be assumed to be kosher, as the majority is followed. But if meat was bought in one of the shops, and it is not known from which, this assumption may not be made, because the doubt arises not in the street but in the shop, and the minority is in a settled place. Thus here too, since the company is all together, the place of the heathen is known and fixed, as it were. The verse under discussion teaches that the murderer in this case is not liable: hence it becomes the source of the principle that a 'settled' minority is regarded as equal to the majority. ');">⁸</span>

אלא לר"ש האי ונתתה נפש תחת נפש מאי עביד ליה ממון וכדרבי דתניא רבי אומר ונתתה נפש תחת נפש ממון אתה אומר ממון או אינו אלא נפש ממש נאמרה נתינה למטה ונאמרה

All is well according to the Rabbis, who maintain that if he intended killing one man and killed another, he is liable. For it is written, If men strive, and hurt a woman with child;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 22. ');">⁹</span> whereupon R. Eleazar observed: The verse refers to attempted murder,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'the verse speaks of a strife with murderous intent'. ');">¹⁰</span> because It is written, And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. 23; v. supra, 74a. ');">¹¹</span> But how does R. Simeon interpret, 'thou shalt give life for life'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the murder of the woman was unintentional, according to R. Simeon there is no death penalty. ');">¹²</span> — It refers to monetary compensation, in harmony with Rabbi's [interpretation]. For it has been taught: Rabbi said: Then thou shalt give life for life: this refers to monetary compensation.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the value of the woman's life must be paid to her husband. ');">¹³</span> You say, monetary compensation: but perhaps this is not so, life being literally meant? 'Giving' is stated below;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., in the verse under discussion. ');">¹⁴</span> and 'giving' is also stated