Commentary for Sanhedrin 169:4
מיתיבי ומה מי שמצוה להכותו מצוה שלא להכותו מי שאינו מצוה להכותו אינו דין שמצוה שלא להכותו
An objection was raised: If one, whom it is a positive command to smite, may nevertheless not be smitten; how much more so, may one, whom it is not a positive command to smite, not be smitten. Now, do not both clauses relate to smiting as a precept, but that one treats of a son, the other of a stranger?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The meaning then will be as follows: If one, whom it is a positive command to smite — i.e., who is under sentence of flagellation — may nevertheless not be smitten by his son as the agent appointed to execute the sentence, how much more so may one, whom it is not a positive command to smite — i.e., who is not under sentence of flagellation — not be smitten by his son. Thus, by an ad majus reasoning, a formal prohibition is deduced against a son's striking his father. For Ex. XXI, 15 merely prescribes the punishment; but it is either stated or deduced from elsewhere. On this interpretation, of course, R. Shesheth's ruling is contradicted. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
Explore commentary for Sanhedrin 169:4. In-depth commentary and analysis from classical Jewish sources.