Sanhedrin 169

ורבי שמעון האמר כל מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה פטור עליה

but R. Simeon also maintains that any mode of work not required for itself is not punishable.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' E.g., the carrying out of a dead body on its bier from a private to a public domain. Now, this is not done because the dead body is wanted there, but because it is not wanted in the private domain. So here too, when a thorn is extracted and a wound made, even intentionally, no punishment is involved, because the purpose of the work is extraction, not wounding. ');">¹</span>

בעו מיניה מרב ששת בן מהו שיעשה שליח לאביו להכותו ולקללו

A problem was propounded to R. Shesheth. May one be appointed an agent [by <i>Beth din</i>] to flagellate and curse his father?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., if his father had to be thus punished or banned, when a curse was pronounced (for the latter). ');">²</span>

א"ל ואחר מי התירו אלא כבוד שמים עדיף הכא נמי כבוד שמים עדיף

— He replied, Who then permitted even a stranger to do this, but that the Divine honour overrides [other prohibitions]: so here too, the Divine honour overrides [the prohibition against smiting and cursing one's parents].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is an offence to curse or smite any Jew; nevertheless, it is permitted in God's honour, i.e., as a punishment for transgressing the Divine law: hence it is likewise permitted to a son. ');">³</span>

מיתיבי ומה מי שמצוה להכותו מצוה שלא להכותו מי שאינו מצוה להכותו אינו דין שמצוה שלא להכותו

An objection was raised: If one, whom it is a positive command to smite, may nevertheless not be smitten; how much more so, may one, whom it is not a positive command to smite, not be smitten. Now, do not both clauses relate to smiting as a precept, but that one treats of a son, the other of a stranger?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The meaning then will be as follows: If one, whom it is a positive command to smite — i.e., who is under sentence of flagellation — may nevertheless not be smitten by his son as the agent appointed to execute the sentence, how much more so may one, whom it is not a positive command to smite — i.e., who is not under sentence of flagellation — not be smitten by his son. Thus, by an ad majus reasoning, a formal prohibition is deduced against a son's striking his father. For Ex. XXI, 15 merely prescribes the punishment; but it is either stated or deduced from elsewhere. On this interpretation, of course, R. Shesheth's ruling is contradicted. ');">⁴</span>

מאי לאו אידי ואידי במקום מצוה הא בבנו הא באחר

— No. In both clauses no distinction is drawn between a son and a stranger, yet there is no difficulty. The one treats of smiting as a precept, the other when not. And it is thus to be interpreted: If when a precept is involved, i.e., when it is a positive command to smite [sc. a person under sentence of flagellation], it is nevertheless a command not to smite [unnecessarily, i.e., with more than the prescribed number of lashes, viz., forty]; then when no positive command is involved, viz., when one is not to be flagellated, one is surely commanded not to smite unnecessarily.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence this teaches a prohibition against smiting anyone unless sentenced by Beth din. ');">⁵</span>

לא אידי ואידי לא שנא בנו ולא שנא אחר ולא קשיא כאן במקום מצוה כאן שלא במקום מצוה

Come and hear: If one was going forth to execution, and his son came and smote him and cursed him, he is liable; if a stranger did this, he is exempt. Now we pondered thereon, What is the difference between a son and a stranger? And R. Hisda answered: This refers to one who is being impelled forth, but holds back?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence this teaches that his son, as an agent of Beth din, may not smite him to drive him forward, and is punished for so doing, which is in contradiction to R. Shesheth. ');">⁶</span>

והכי קתני ומה במקום מצוה שמצוה להכותו מצוה שלא להכותו שלא במקום מצוה שאינו מצוה להכותו אינו דין שמצוה שלא להכותו

— R. Shesheth maintains that it refers to one who is not urged to go forth. If so, a stranger too [should be punished for beating him]? — As far as a stranger is concerned, he is already a dead man.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But this reasoning obviously cannot apply to his son, who is bound to honour him even after death, the verse excluding a transgressor from this filial duty being at this stage of the discussion unknown. ');">⁷</span>

תא שמע היוצא ליהרג ובא בנו והכהו וקיללו חייב בא אחר והכהו וקיללו פטור והוינן בה מאי שנא בנו ומאי שנא אחר ואמר רב חסדא במסרבין בו לצאת ואינו יוצא

But did not R. Shesheth say: If one insulted a sleeping person, and he died [in his sleep], he is nevertheless liable [to punishment for same]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though he was not even aware of it. Surely then smiting a condemned man comes under the same category. ');">⁸</span>

רב ששת מוקי לה בשאין מסרבין בו לצאת

— The reference here is to a blow which inflicted an injury less than a <i>perutah</i> in value. But did not R. Ammi say in R. Johanan's name: [Even] if one smote his neighbour with a blow inflicting less than a perutah's worth of damage, he is punished with lashes? — By 'exempt', non-liability to monetary compensation is meant. It follows then that a son is liable to monetary compensation!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But that is impossible, since the injury is less than a perutah's worth. ');">⁹</span>

אי הכי אחר נמי אחר גברא קטילא הוא

But it must therefore mean, [he is liable] according to the law pertaining to him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the law pertaining to the smiting of a father by his son, viz., death. ');">¹⁰</span>

והאמר רב ששת ביישו ישן ומת חייב הכא במאי עסקינן בשהכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה

If so [a stranger too is exempt from] the law pertaining to him [for smiting his neighbour, viz., lashes].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Thus the question remains, what is the difference between his son and a stranger? ');">¹¹</span>

והאמר רבי אמי אמר ר' יוחנן הכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה לוקה מאי פטור דקאמר פטור מממון

But this is the reason why a stranger is exempt, because the Writ saith, Thou shalt not curse a prince among thy people:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXII, 27. ');">¹²</span>

מכלל דבנו חייב בממון אלא בדינו הכא נמי בדינו

meaning, [only] when he acts as is fitting for thy people.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But to transgress is not 'fitting for thy people': hence the prohibition does not apply to such a case. ');">¹³</span>

אלא אחר היינו טעמא דפטור דאמר קרא (שמות כב, כז) ונשיא בעמך לא תאור בעושה מעשה עמך

This is well as far as cursing is concerned: but whence do we know the same of smiting? — Because we compare smiting with cursing. If so, should not the same apply to his son? — Even as R. Phineas said [elsewhere]: This refers to one who had repented. If so, even a stranger [should be liable]? — R. Mari answered, 'among thy people' implies 'abiding among thy people'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But when one is sentenced to death, he is no longer so. ');">¹⁴</span>

התינח קללה הכאה מנלן דמקשינן הכאה לקללה

If so, should not the same apply to his son?

אי הכי בנו נמי כדאמר רב פינחס בשעשה תשובה הכא נמי בשעשה תשובה

אי הכי אחר נמי אמר רב מרי בעמך במקוים שבעמך

אי הכי בנו נמי