Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Halakhah for Nedarim 15:9

אמר ליה רב אחא לרב אשי שמתיה ושרו ליה בחלמיה מאי א''ל כשם שאי אפשר לבר בלא תבן

I but if they had only learnt [Mishnah],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So Rashi and Ran on the basis of our text. Mishnah is the law in broad outline, which characterises the whole of our present Mishnah, as compiled by R. Judah I. Hilketha (halachah) (law, rule) would appear to connote here the Talmudic discussion thereon, i.e., the amoraic development of the Mishnah. For tanu ([H],) referring to amoraic teaching instead of Tannaitic. cf. Kaplan, Redaction of the Talmud, pp. 209 seq. Ran, Asheri, and Tosaf, offer another interpretation, based on a slightly different reading: They must have taught law, but not merely learnt it (themselves). ');"><sup>9</sup></span> they cannot lift the ban; but if such as have studied <i>halachah</i> are unavailable, then even those who have only learnt Mishnah], but had not studied [<i>halachah</i>] will do. But if even such are unavailable, let him go and sit at the cross-roads, and extend greetings<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'give peace' — the usual form of a Jewish greeting. ');"><sup>10</sup></span> to ten men, until he finds ten men who have studied <i>halachah</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Tosaf.: the greetings of ten men at the cross-roads will remove his grief; but ten scholars are necessary for the removal of the ban. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> Rabina asked R. Ashi: If he knew [in his dream] the person who placed him tinder a ban, can this person lift the ban? — He answered: He might have been appointed [God's] messenger to ban him, but not to revoke it. R. Aha asked R. Ashi: What if one was both banned and readmitted<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'it was loosened for him'. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> in his dream? — Said he to him: Just as grain is impossible without straw,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Jer. XXIII, 28. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>

Sefer HaChinukh

And so from this reason, an oath cannot rest upon an oath [about the same matter], but a vow can rest upon a vow [about the same matter]. As with an oath, behold once a man has himself entered into the partition of [something's] existence, as we have said, even if he repeats his word that he is entering there a thousand times, the entrance of his body into another place is done [only] one time. And this that he does after that is only repeating words pointlessly. But with a vow in which he is like one that accepts upon himself that something permissible is as if it is forbidden; with each time that he repeats his acceptance, he adds [a further] prohibition if he [breaks his vow]. And hence he is liable for each and every one. And it is the same matter itself that an oath cannot rest upon the matter of a commandment (Nedarim 16a), but a vow can rest even upon the matter of a commandment. As one who makes an oath speaks about his body, and his body is already obligated in that matter [of the commandment] from Mount Sinai. But with a vow, he is only speaking about the object that he wants to bring into the category of the forbidden, and about this specific object, he was never obligated. And hence [his new] prohibition rests upon it. And we do not feed a person something that is forbidden for him [because of an oath or a vow]. And this is what they, may their memory be blessed, said (Ran on Nedarim 8a, s. v. Vehalo mushva) that the one who makes an oath forbids himself to the object and the one who makes a vow forbids the object to himself.
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