מסית דלא בעי התראה מאי איכא למימר מעיקרא אי אמר טעמא מקבלינן מיניה השתא אי אמר טעמא לא מקבלינן מיניה:
IF HE RETURNED TO HIS TOWN AND TAUGHT AGAIN etc. Our Rabbis taught: He is not liable unless he [himself] acts upon his ruling, or states his ruling to others, who act thereon. Now, as for stating his ruling to others, who act upon it, it is well: before [receiving the decision of the Great <i>Beth din</i>] he was not liable to death, [since he personally committed no wrong] whilst now he is [for flouting its authority]. But [as for the proviso that] he himself must act upon his ruling — even before [the decision was rendered in the Hall of Hewn Stones] he was liable to death! Now, there is no difficulty if his ruling referred to forbidden fat and blood, since before he was not liable to death,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' An offence in connection with these does not involve capital punishment.
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Sefer HaChinukh
From the laws of the commandment is, for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 1:2), "'According to the instruction that they instruct you' - these are the decrees and the practices; 'and to the judgement' - these are the things they shall teach from the [Torah] law, through one of the methods that the Torah is expounded; 'from the thing they tell you' - this is the tradition that they received, one man from the mouth of another man." And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 88b) that at the time that the Great Court is in Jerusalem, any disagreement that existed in any court in its place is asked of the Great Court, and we act according to their word. But now that, on account of our iniquities, there is no court there, any disagreement that there be between the sages in our generations - and the ones that disagree be equal in wisdom - if we are not fit to decide among them and we do not know to where the judgement inclines, we should follow the stringent [opinion] concerning a Torah [law], and follow the lenient [opinion] in scribal (rabbinic) law. And that which they said (Mishnah Eduyot 1:5) that a court is not permitted to revoke that which was forbidden by a court that preceded it, even if it appears to its opinion that the thing is not forbidden according to the letter of the law - so long as it appears that the prohibition has spread in Israel - unless it is greater in wisdom and also in numbers (is composed of more judges) than the court that forbade the thing. And about what are these words speaking, that [the later court] can revoke [it] when [the later court] is greater than [the first court] in wisdom and numbers? When the earlier court did not forbid that thing in order to make a fence for the people for [other] prohibitions. And since this is the law, it is incumbent upon each and every court in its generation to examine the matter and investigate much and to pay attention to each [rabbinic] prohibition that it appears the generation is practicing, not to breach and instruct to be lenient about it (to permit it), lest the [court] that was before it forbade it to make a fence for the people, [and] knew that the thing is permissible by the letter of the law. And 'one who breaches a fence, etc.' And the rest of the details of the commandment are at the end of Sanhedrin (the chapter [entitled] HaNehenakin.)
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