האומר ערך כלי זה עלי נותן דמיו מ"ט אדם יודע שאין ערך לכלי וגמר ואמר לשום דמים משום הכי נותן דמיו האי ערכין המטלטלין ערכין של מטלטלין מיבעיא ליה תני ערכין של מטלטלין
If one declares, 'I dedicate the value of this vessel [to the Sanctuary]', its value must be handed over. Why so? Because it is well known<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'a man knows'.
');"><sup>1</sup></span> that there is no fixed assessment [in the Torah] for such objects:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the Bible, the word [H] ('erek) is used only in reference to men, and indicates a dedication of fixed sums varying according to the age and sex of the person who is the subject of such a dedication. Hence, strictly speaking, the word is meaningless when used in reference to utensils, and therefore a different meaning has to be given to it here.
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Gray Matter II
The Chazon Ish (Sanhedrin 15:4), however, emphatically forbids litigation in Israeli civil courts, asserting that they do not share the status of Syrian erka’ot. He explains that Syrian erka’ot judged entirely based on common sense, whereas Israeli courts implement an organized non-Torah legal system.5The Chazon Ish also suggests that perhaps the Syrian erka’ot attempted to rule by Torah law, but they made mistakes out of ignorance, whereas Israeli courts make no attempt to apply Torah law. Thus, Israeli civil courts attain the status of a non-Jewish court system, despite the fact that the judges and law enforcement officials are mostly Jewish. Moreover, the Chazon Ish adds that Israeli courts are worse than non-Jewish courts, for we expect non-Jews to judge by their own laws, whereas we disapprove of Jews “who have abandoned the laws of the Torah for laws of nonsense.”6Israeli courts also differ from Syrian erka’ot in that the latter operated only in places where no halachic experts (mumchim) resided to function as a proper beit din. For further discussion of Syrian erka’ot, see Rav Shlomo Goren’s essay (printed in Techukah Leyisrael Al Pi Hatorah 1:149-152). Indeed, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 4:65) rules that one who presents a case to a secular Israeli court violates both the prohibition against using non-Jewish courts and the prohibition against causing another Jew to sin (lifnei iveir), because the case provides Jewish judges with an opportunity to apply secular laws.7See, however, Teshuvot Beit Avi (2:144), who questions whether a Jewish civil judge violates any prohibition when he adjudicates a case involving Jewish litigants. (Unlike Rav Ovadia, Rav Liebes did not live in Israel, so he is addressing the case of a Jewish judge in the American court system. Also see Rav Mordechai Eliyahu’s comments in Techumin 3:244.)
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Gray Matter II
Nevertheless, the Rama (C.M. 3:1) rules that a litigant cannot insist on zabla if there is a local established beit din (beit din kavu’a). The Chazon Ish (Sanhedrin 15:7) offers an explanation for the Rama’s ruling:
