Halakhah for Sanhedrin 29:15

שור הנסקל בעשרים ושלשה: שנא' (שמות כא, כט) השור יסקל וגם בעליו יומת כמיתת הבעלים כך מיתת השור: א"ל אביי לרבא ממאי דהאי וגם בעליו יומת לכמיתת בעלים כך מיתת השור הוא דאתא

But R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: Liability is incurred in respect of his hair. And we know that the point on which they differ is regarding the hair which is ready to be shorn. Infer, therefore, from this [that R. Abin's question is a point of difference among the Rabbis]. Shall we take it that these Tannaim24 differ in the same respect as the Tannaim of the following Mishnah? For we learnt: R. Meir says: There are things that notwithstanding their attachment to the soil are considered as movable property.25 But the Sages disagree with him. In what case? [If A says to B.] 'I handed over to thee ten vines laden with fruit,' and the latter replies, 'They were only five,' R. Meir imposes [an oath on the defendant],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in a case where there is partial admission of the claim (cf. B.K. 107a) and though an oath is not administered in cases of immovable property (v. Shebu, VI, 5). Here, however, since the vines no longer depend on the soil for ripening, they are considered as gathered. ');">26 while the Sages say that an object which is still attached to the soil is subject to the laws of immovable property.27 And R. Jose b. Hanina said: The case in question is one of grapes ready to be gathered: according to the one master,28 they are considered as gathered; according to the other.29 they are not! — No, you might say it is so30 even according to R. Meir. Only there, in the case of grapes, which after ripening deteriorate by remaining ungathered, does R. Meir hold that they are considered as gathered: whereas hair, the longer it is left, the better it is. CAPITAL CASES, CASES OF CARNAL CONNEXION WITH BEASTS etc. The law is stated categorically, without any distinction whether the connection is between a beast and a man or a beast and a woman. It is right as regards the [requirement of twenty-three] in the case of a woman, as this follows from the verse, Thou shalt slay the woman and the beast.31 But whence is it to be deduced in the case of a man? — It is written, Whosoever lieth with a beast shall surely be put to death.32 If this has no bearing on a case where a man is the active participant,33 we must refer it to one in which he is the passive offender. And it is expressed in the Divine Law as if the man were the active sinner, for the purpose of equating the passive sinner to him. Just as in the case where the man approaches the beast, both he and the beast are judged by [a court of] twenty-three; so also, where the man is approached by the beast, both he and the beast are judged by twenty-three. THE CASE OF AN OX TO BE STONED IS BY TWENTY-THREE, AS IT IS WRITTEN: THE OX SHALL BE STONED AND ITS OWNER ALSO SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH.34 AS THE DEATH OF THE OWNER [IS BY TWENTY-THREE], SO THE DEATH OF THE OX. Abaye said to Raba: Whence do we know that the verse, and its owner also shall be put to death, means to [teach that] the judgment of the ox is to be similar to that of the owner?

Gray Matter II

The Chazon Ish (Sanhedrin 15:4), however, emphatically forbids litigation in Israeli civil courts, asserting that they do not share the status of Syrian erka’ot. He explains that Syrian erka’ot judged entirely based on common sense, whereas Israeli courts implement an organized non-Torah legal system.⁵The Chazon Ish also suggests that perhaps the Syrian erka’ot attempted to rule by Torah law, but they made mistakes out of ignorance, whereas Israeli courts make no attempt to apply Torah law. Thus, Israeli civil courts attain the status of a non-Jewish court system, despite the fact that the judges and law enforcement officials are mostly Jewish. Moreover, the Chazon Ish adds that Israeli courts are worse than non-Jewish courts, for we expect non-Jews to judge by their own laws, whereas we disapprove of Jews “who have abandoned the laws of the Torah for laws of nonsense.”⁶Israeli courts also differ from Syrian erka’ot in that the latter operated only in places where no halachic experts (mumchim) resided to function as a proper beit din. For further discussion of Syrian erka’ot, see Rav Shlomo Goren’s essay (printed in Techukah Leyisrael Al Pi Hatorah 1:149-152). Indeed, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Da’at 4:65) rules that one who presents a case to a secular Israeli court violates both the prohibition against using non-Jewish courts and the prohibition against causing another Jew to sin (lifnei iveir), because the case provides Jewish judges with an opportunity to apply secular laws.⁷See, however, Teshuvot Beit Avi (2:144), who questions whether a Jewish civil judge violates any prohibition when he adjudicates a case involving Jewish litigants. (Unlike Rav Ovadia, Rav Liebes did not live in Israel, so he is addressing the case of a Jewish judge in the American court system. Also see Rav Mordechai Eliyahu’s comments in Techumin 3:244.)

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Gray Matter II

Nevertheless, the Rama (C.M. 3:1) rules that a litigant cannot insist on zabla if there is a local established beit din (beit din kavu’a). The Chazon Ish (Sanhedrin 15:7) offers an explanation for the Rama’s ruling:

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