לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב אמר לך רב כולה מתני' שוה וליטרא זהב שאני
It means literally [two ma'ahs];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' One claimed two ma'ahs (silver) , and the other admitted a perutah (copper) ; he is exempt, because the admission is not of the same kind as the claim.');"><sup>27</sup></span> that which he claimed, the other did not admit to him; and that which he admitted to him, he had not claimed from him. If so, say the latter clause: 'TWO SILVER [MA'AHS] AND A PERUTAH OF MINE HAVE YOU IN YOUR POSSESSION.' 'I HAVE OF YOURS IN MY POSSESSION ONLY A PERUTAH,' HE IS LIABLE. Granted, if you say [the Mishnah means] the value [of two ma'ahs and a perutah], therefore he is liable,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For he admits a portion of the claim: the same kind of goods.');"><sup>28</sup></span> but if you say [the Mishnah means it] literally, why is he liable? That which he claimed, the other did not admit to him, and that which he admitted to him, he had not claimed from him! - Is this not an argument against Samuel? But surely R'Nahman said that Samuel said: If he claimed from him wheat and barley, and he admitted to him one of them, he is liable.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Samuel counts this as being admission of the same kind as the claim; similarly, if he claimed two ma'ahs (silver) and a perutah (copper) , and the other admitted a perutah (copper) , he is liable.');"><sup>29</sup></span> This appears to be the more reasonable interpretation, for it states in a later clause: 'A LITRA OF GOLD OF MINE YOU HAVE IN YOUR POSSESSION.' - 'I HAVE OF YOURS IN MY POSSESSION ONLY A LITRA OF SILVER,' HE IS EXEMPT. Granted, if you say the Mishnah means them literally, therefore he is exempt;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because he claims gold, and the other admits silver.');"><sup>30</sup></span> but if you say it means their value,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Goods to the value of a litra of gold, or silver.');"><sup>31</sup></span> why is he exempt? A litra is much!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Sufficient for the minimum required for admission and denial.');"><sup>32</sup></span> - Well then, since the latter clause is intended literally, the first clause is also intended literally; shall w say, then, that it will be a refutation of Rab's view!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the first clause states that if he claims two ma'ahs, and the other admits a perutah, he is exempt, because, presumably (taking the Mishnah literally) he claims silver, and the other admits copper; but if he claimed goods to the value of two ma'ahs, and the other admitted goods to the value of a perutah, he would be liable, though the claim was only originally two ma'ahs, and was, after the admission of a perutah, diminished from two ma'ahs.');"><sup>33</sup></span> - [No!] Rab may tell you: The whole Mishnah deals with the value [of ma'ahs and perutah];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the first clause he is therefore exempt, because, after the admission, the claim becomes less than two ma'ahs; and in the second clause, when the claim is two ma'ahs and a perutah, he is liable, because after the admission of a perutah, there is still denial of two ma'ahs.');"><sup>34</sup></span> but [the case of] a litra of gold is different.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The Mishnah obviously intends this literally, for one claims a certain weight (not coins) of gold, and the other admits the same weight of silver; therefore he is exempt, because the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. If the Mishnah had said that one claimed a sum of money in gold, and the other admitted a sum of money in silver, we might have said, legitimately, that goods to the value of those sums were intended, and the man would have been liable; but since the Mishnah states the weight of the gold and silver, it means actually gold and silver; and therefore he is exempt.');"><sup>35</sup></span>
Sefer HaChinukh
Its laws are, for example, one who admits partially must take an oath by Torah writ - the explanation [of which] is one who admits to [owing] a perutah (the smallest bronze coin) but denies [owing] two meah of silver (the smallest silver coin), as [for] less then that he never takes an oath from Torah writ, unless a witness testifies against him, [then] he must swear even when he denies less than two meah (Shevuot 39b), but for less than a perutah, he never swears unless [the] claim was for vessels, as with vessels - even if they claimed two needles, and he admitted about one and denied one, he must swear; when he swears from his partial admission when they claimed something measured, numbered or weighed; the law of one who denies everything; an admission from the [same] type as the claim; the admission of a litigant; the laws of guardians; one who is obligated an oath by Torah or rabbinic writ; the law of one who swears and becomes exempt, and one who swears and takes [the disputed money or item]; the law of one who is suspect for an oath; reversals of the oath; for which sin does he become suspect; what repentance extricates him from the suspicion; the one who was not known not to be suspect and won money [in the case], and afterwards witnesses came [to testify] that he was suspect, that he is obligated to return the money; what is the law of someone who is obligated an oath that he cannot swear (Bava Batra 34a); the laws of migo (a logic establishing credibility, Ketuvot 12a); the laws of a certain claim [as opposed to] a possible claim (Bava Batra 118a); the laws of adding an oath [onto another] (Shevuot 45a), whether it is a certain one onto a certain one or onto a possible one, or even a possible one onto a possible one, and [that] for every type of oath there is addition - whether [the oath] is from the Torah, or rabbinic, or even from the decree of the later authorities; the laws of claims wherein we treat the defendant like one who returns a lost object (Shevuot 31b); things about which we do not make an oath from Torah writ; if we judge produce that has reached shoulders (is ready to be harvested) like land regarding an oath; whether we coerce one who says to his fellow, "There is a deed in your hand and I have a right to it," to bring it out; the law of one who comes to pay, not in front of the creditor; the law of one who gives a loan upon collateral and the collateral is lost, when they disagree with each other about the number of the coins loaned; the law of the creditor who is in the settlement, but [the debtor] wants to pay in the wilderness; the law of the borrower who says, "I payed half," and the witnesses testify that he paid it all; the law of the borrower who admits that they wrote the deed and claims that he paid it, whether the creditor must keep [the deed]; the law of a deed upon which he made a loan and the deed was paid back (Ketuvot 85a); the law of one who sends an amount in the hand of an agent to someone to whom he owes it, and wants to retract [the agency]; the law of a claim that it was paid for a deed in the hand of a third party; the law of whether a deed that does not have the time or place [written] on it is valid (Ketuvot 110b); the law of responsibility for an error of the scribe in all deeds besides a deed of gifting; the law of one who puts a lien on his movable goods, and one who makes his field or slave into collateral, [implicitly] or explicitly (Gittin 41a); the law of tearing [away] the profit and the fruit, whether it is the victim of theft or the creditor [that is coming to do so] (Gittin 48b); the law of the one who lost his deed or it was erased; the law of who is the one who must give the wage for the writing of the deed; the law that the appropriation [to pay a debt] can always be reversed, unless he sold the place or gave it as a gift (Bav Metzia 35a); the law of the things about which there is no oath, but just a general excommunication; that we do not swear based on the claim of a deaf-mute, a mentally incapacitated person or a minor (Shevuot 38b); the laws [of cases] that come from them with adults; that we only take testimony in front of the litigant; that a minor is like naught, even when he is in front of him; that a blind man is like a healthy one, for everything except for testimony; the law of the storekeeper [recording] on his ledger (Shevuot 44b); [that] the gathering of the three [parties, engenders] acquisition and that it is a law without an explanation, and everything related to this matter;
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