Reference for Yevamot 174:22

אמרו לו מה אם ירצה לומר מזיד הייתי רישא

deduced? From what was taught: If his sin … be known to him,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. IV, 28; only then must he bring a sin-offering. ');">⁵⁶</span> but not when others have made it known to him. As it might have been assumed that even where he does not contradict the evidence he is exempt, it was expressly stated, If … be known to him,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. ');">⁵⁷</span> in any manner.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Ker. 11b. ');">⁵⁸</span> Now, how is this statement to be understood? If it be suggested [that it refers to a case] where two witnesses appeared, and he does not contradict them, what need then was there for a Scriptural text!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Two witnesses are, surely, always relied upon. ');">⁵⁹</span> Must it not then refer to the case of<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'but not'. ');">⁶⁰</span> one witness, and yet [we see that] when the accused does not contradict him he is trusted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And an offering is brought upon the altar on the basis of his word. Cf. supra n. 7. ');">⁶¹</span> From this, then, it maybe inferred that one witness is to be trusted.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Had such evidence been Pentateuchally inadmissible, the sin-offering would consist of a Pentateuchally unconsecrated beast which must not be offered on the altar and is also forbidden to be eaten by the priests. ');">⁵⁴</span> But whence is it inferred that [the reason<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the obligation of an offering. ');">⁶²</span> is] because he is trusted? Is it not possible that it is due to the fact that the other had remained silent, silence being regarded as an admission! You can have proof that this is so,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'you may know' that the reason is because silence is regarded as an admission. ');">⁶³</span> since in the final clause it was stated: [A man to whom] two witnesses said, 'You have eaten<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Unwittingly. ');">⁶⁴</span> suet,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [H] forbidden fat. ');">⁶⁵</span> and who replied. 'I have not eaten', is exempt; but R. Meir declares him guilty. Said R. Meir: This<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That the evidence of the two witnesses is accepted despite the denial of the accused. ');">⁶⁶</span> may be inferred a minori ad majus. If two witnesses may bring upon a man the severe penalty of death, should they not be able to bring upon him the minor penalty of a sacrifice! The others replied: What if he desired to say, 'I have acted presumptuously'!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For a presumptuous sin no sin-offering is brought. In such a case the evidence of the witnesses would be of no value. They can only testify to one's action but not to one's motive or state of mind. Since the accused could annul the evidence by such a plea he is also believed when he simply contradicts the evidence. ');">⁶⁷</span> Now, in the first clause,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where the accusation comes from one witness. ');">⁶⁸</span>

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