Reference for Yevamot 76:22

אביי אמר רישא דנפלו לה כשהיא שומרת יבם סיפא דנפלו לה כשהיא תחתיו דבעל

Consequently<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the rule is that 'doubt cannot override certainty's ');">³⁹</span> it must be inferred that a bond of indebtedness which is due for repayment is regarded as already repaid.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The kethubah is, therefore, deemed to have been collected as soon as the husband died, and the widow is consequently deemed to be the virtual possessor of such a portion of his estate as would cover the amount of her kethubah. ');">⁴⁰</span> Abaye,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whose objection to Rabbah, supra, was based on a Mishnah from Baba Bathra. ');">⁴¹</span> then,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the principle of virtual possession did not occur to him as the reason for allowing a doubtful claim in face of certain one. ');">⁴²</span> should have raised his objection from this!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The Mishnah just cited which is embodied in the Tractates of Sotah and Kethuboth both of which belong to the same order as our Tractate. Since the principles in both Mishnahs are identical, why did Abaye resort to a Mishnah in another order when one was available in our order of Nashim. ');">⁴³</span> — [The law of] a wife's <i>kethubah</i> might be different owing to considerations of courtesy.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [H] 'gracefulness', 'loveliness'. It is possible that in order that pleasant and cordial relations may exist between husband and wife the law has been enacted that, despite the general rule that 'doubt cannot override a certainty', a woman shall be privileged to collect her kethubah even when her own claim is of a doubtful character and that of her litigants is a certain one. No objection could, therefore, be put forward from such a special case; and Abaye had consequently to resort to a Mishnah in Nezikin. Other explanations of [H] (v. Jast.): 'In order to make her attractive', 'that women may be willing to marry'. ');">⁴⁴</span> Then let him<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Abaye. ');">⁴⁵</span> raise his objection from the law of the <i>kethubah</i> in our Mishnah!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Where, according to Beth Shammai, the heirs of the father (by virtue of his being heir to his daughter, the widow), though their claim is of a doubtful nature, share the amount of the kethubah with the heirs of the husband whose rights to the amount of the kethubah (as the heirs of the husband) are certain. At the moment it is assumed that Beth Shammai's disagreement with Beth Hillel extends to the KETHUBAH as well as to the PROPERTY THAT COMES IN AND GOES OUT WITH HER; and 'considerations of courtesy' could not, of course, apply when the woman is dead and the claimants are her male heirs. Cf. Keth. 97b. ');">⁴⁶</span> They<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Beth Shammai. ');">⁴⁷</span> do not dispute this point.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' They agree with Beth Hillel that the KETHUBAH IS TO RETAIN IN THE POSSESSION OF THE HEIRS OF THE HUSBAND. V. supra p. 240, n. 8. ');">⁴⁸</span> But do they not? Surely we learned,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So MS.M. Cur. edd. 'it was taught'. ');">⁴⁹</span> IF SHE DIED, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH HER <i>KETHUBAH</i> AND WITH PROPERTY THAT COMES IN AND GOES OUT WITH HER? BETH SHAMMAI SAID: THE HEIRS OF HER HUSBAND ARE TO SHARE IT WITH THE HEIRS OF HER FATHER; BETH HILLEL SAID: THE PROPERTY IS TO REMAIN WITH THOSE IN WHOSE POSSESSION IT IS! — It is this that was meant: IF SHE DIED, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH HER <i>KETHUBAH</i>? and then [the enquiry] was abandoned. As to PROPERTY THAT COMES IN AND GOES OUT WITH HER, BETH SHAMMAI SAID: THE HEIRS OF HER HUSBAND ARE TO SHARE WITH THE HEIRS OF HER FATHER AND BETH HILLEL SAID: THE PROPERTY IS TO REMAIN WITH THOSE IN WHOSE POSSESSION IT IS. Said R. Ashi: The inference from the expressions in our Mishnah leads to the same conclusion;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That Beth Shammai's disagreement with Beth Hillel does not extend to the question of the kethubah. ');">⁵⁰</span> for it was stated, THE HEIRS OF HER HUSBAND ARE TO SHARE WITH THE HEIRS OF HER FATHER<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the former take a share in that which is virtually in the possession of the latter, viz., the melog property which belongs to the heirs of the wife's father. ');">⁵¹</span> and it was not stated 'the heirs of the father [are to share it] with the heirs of the husband'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which would have referred to the kethubah which is in the virtual possession of the husband's heirs, ');">⁵²</span> This proves it. [Reverting to the previous question,]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra 38a, 'Whereby does the first clause etc. ');">⁵³</span> Abaye replied: The first clause [deals with property] that came into her possession while she was awaiting [the decision of] the levir,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the levirate bond is not strong enough to give the levir any right over that property, it is generally agreed that she and, in case of her death, her heirs also are entitled to dispose of it in any manner they like. ');">⁵⁴</span> and the latter clause [with such] as came into her possession while she was still with her husband.

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