לא תימא מן הספק אלא אימא מן הסתם דמודעי להו ופרשי
acted [in accordance with their own views] one can well understand why they abstained. If, however, you assume that they did not so act, why did they abstain? — And how do you understand this? Even if it be granted that they did act (in accordance with their own views], one can only understand why Beth Hillel abstained from intermarrying with Beth Shammai, because the latter, in the opinion of Beth Hillel, were guilty of offences involving <i>kareth</i> and their descendants were consequently bastards; as to Beth Shammai, however, why did they abstain from intermarrying with Beth Hillel, when they were [even in the opinion of Beth Shammai] only guilty of the infringement of a negative precept and [their descendants] were consequently legitimate? — As R. Nahman said elsewhere that the statement was required only for the case of the rival herself, so here also the Statement is required for the case of the rival herself.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whom Beth Shammai abstained from marrying before she performed the halizah.
');"><sup>24</sup></span> Why is a doubtful case different from a case of a certainty? Obviously because it is forbidden. Is not a doubtful case also forbidden? — Do not read, 'from a doubtful case', but 'from a case unknown', since when they received the information they kept away.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So long, therefore, as no report had been received the unknown case was assumed to belong to the pure families.
');"><sup>25</sup></span>
Tosefta Yevamot
Four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters, and those who married the sisters died: Behold, they (i.e., the sisters) are subject to chaltiza but not to yibbum, and if [the two surviving brothers] preemptively married them, they are taken out [of the marriages]. Rabbi Eliezer says, Beit Shammai say, they may remain, and Beit Hillel say, they are taken out. Rabbi Shimon says, they may remain. Abba Shaul says, this matter was [actually] a leniency of Beit Hillel (i.e., the opinions are reversed). If one of [the women] was the mother-in-law of one of [the surviving brothers], he is forbidden to her, and permitted to her sister, and the second [brother] is forbidden two both of them. It comes out that the forbidden is permitted and the permitted is forbidden. If one of [the women] was the mother-in-law of one of [the surviving brothers], and the other one was the mother-in-law of the second one, this one is forbidden to his mother-in-law, and permitted to his brother's mother-in-law of his brother, and that one is forbidden to his mother-in-law and permitted to his brother's mother-in-law. That is what is meant by the saying, "what is forbidden to this one is permitted to that one, and what is forbidden to that one is permitted to this one." [If] one of them was the mother-in-law of both of them, this one is forbidden to her and permitted to her sister, and that one is forbidden to her and permitted to her sister. [If] both of them were mothers-in-law to one of the them, the second [brother] is permitted to both of them. This is the general rule: Any woman [who would be] fit for him [as a wife] is forbidden to him [as a yevama], on account of (Lev. 18:18), "A woman and her sister [you shall not take in marriage, producing rivalry]." If they were forbidden to him [to take as a wife] on account of another prohibition against "uncovering the nakedness"*, he is forbidden to her and permitted to her mother-in-law*.
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