Responsa for Gittin 67:1
יתומין שבאו לחלוק בנכסי אביהן בית דין מעמידין להן אפוטרופוס ובוררים להן חלק יפה הגדילו יכולין למחות ורב נחמן דידיה אמר הגדילו אין יכולין למחות דאם כן מה כח בית דין יפה
'If orphans [under age] desire to divide the property left to them by their father, the <i>Beth din</i> appoints for each of them a guardian who sees that he obtains a fair share. When they grow up, however, they are able to object,' and did not R. Nahman, speaking in his own name, hold that they are not at liberty to object, because if they are, what becomes of the authority of the <i>Beth din</i>? — The question there was one of money, here it is one of a forbidden act.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., of allowing a married woman to marry again, and where this was involved the Rabbis disregarded the authority of the Beth din. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
Maharach Or Zarua Responsa
(2) The letter "vov" was missing from A's name in the bill of divorcement. Does this necessarily invalidate the divorce?
A - (1) The previous protest of A may not be valid for the following reasons: 1 - Since A agreed to accept money, we may assume that he fully agreed to grant the divorce out of his own free will. 2 - The witnesses before whom the the protest was lodged, could not state with certainty, that A did not grant the divorce out of his own free will, since the fact that A agreed to take money disproves their contention.
Furthermore, inasmuch as A consented to accept money, it is possible that he no longer wanted L as his wife, but was actually desirous of granting her a divorce. After B received the money from Naftali, A issued the divorce without making any stipulation whatsoever. Although A revealed the intention of not wanting to divorce L, without receiving money, nevertheless, the law prevails according to Abaye, who holds that revealing of intention in respect of a divorce, makes no difference. (Gitin 34a). Therefore, Naftali could even have demanded that B return the money without invalidating the bill of divorcement.
Some authorities have found fault with this divorce. R. Hayyim Eliezer therefore, insisted that since there was a strong possibility that the divorce was valid, A is to be coerced to give L a second divorce for the following reasons: there is no doubt that the first divorce which A issued, may have validity. Therefore, it is forbidden for L to dwell together with A (since one is not permitted to live together with an unmarried woman). A must then be forced to give her another divorce, inasmuch as L can not live with A, nor may she marry another man. For A's own good, we would advise him to grant this divorce willingly, and without having the court resort to coercion.
R. Hayyim Eliezer adds: I personally observed how R. Meir b. Baruch had ordered a husband to divorce his rebellious wife, without paying her the Ketubah, while the husband was awarded only the property which he had brought into marriage. When incidents of rebellious wives increased, R. Meir sent word to R. Yedidiah, who was then in Spiers, to have the three communities convene for a synod. The purpose was to pass an ordinance to the effect that a rebellious wife should lose even the possessions which she had brought into marriage. However, I do not know if this ordinance was universally accepted.