Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Responsa for Nedarim 38:11

אמר אביי סיפא רבי אלעזר ברבי צדוק היא דתניא רבי יהודה אומר סתם תרומה ביהודה אסורה רבי אלעזר ברבי צדוק אומר סתם חרמים בגליל אסורין

For it was taught: R. Judah said on the authority of R. Tarfon: Neither is a <i>nazir</i>, because neziroth must be expressed with certainty.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This refers to the following case: If two persons were walking together, and one said: 'I will be a nazir, if the man who is coming towards us is one'; whereupon the other said: 'I will be a nazir if he is not', the vow is binding upon neither, because of the element of doubt in each when it was made, v. Naz. 34a. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> If so, why particularly if the stack was stolen or destroyed?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even if the stack is intact and contains the stipulated measure, the vow of neziruth is invalid, since when it was taken it was unknown. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> — To shew how far-reaching is R. Simeon's view, that even if it was stolen or destroyed, he still maintains that one places himself in a doubtful position. R. JUDAH SAID: AN UNSPECIFIED REFERENCE TO <i>TERUMAH</i> IN JUDEA etc. But if they were familiar therewith, it would be binding, which shews that the doubt is ruled stringently. Then consider the last clause: UNQUALIFIED ALLUSIONS TO HARA MIM IN JUDEA ARE NOT BINDING BUT IN GALILEE THEY ARE, BECAUSE THE GALILEANS ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH PRIESTLY HARAMIM. But if they were familiar, they would be invalid: thus in doubt we are lenient? — Abaye answered: The last clause is the view of R. Eleazar b. R. Zadok. For it was taught: R. Judah said: An unspecified [reference to] <i>terumah</i> in Judah is binding. R. Eleazar son of R. Zadok said: unspecified [references to] haramim in Galilee are binding.

Teshuvot Maharam

Q. A promised to give two marks for a holy cause should he cohabit with his wife, within the year. He did cohabit with her within that time. If such promise of a gift were made by an individual, even had such money been actually delivered to the donee, it would be considered an asmakhta and would be void. Therefore, this conditional promise for a holy cause should also be void, for, although a mere verbal promise for a holy cause is as valid as an actual delivery (of money and valuables) to a private person, it has no greater validity than such delivery; and any transaction classified as an asmakhta is invalid even if the money and valuables are actually delivered. Although a conditional promise classified as asmakhta, if accompanied by a kinyan and made before an authoritative court, is valid, its validity stems from the powers of confiscation inherent in the authoritative court, but not from an act of the promisor.
A. A must pay two marks to the holy cause. A mere verbal promise to a holy cause is as binding as a similar promise to an individual accompanied by any manner of conveyance that serves to validate such promise. Since a conditional promise classified as asmakhta is valid if accompanied by a kinyan and made before an authoritative court, a mere promise of this kind made to charity or to a holy cause is binding, even though the promise was not made before an authoritative court. The validity of a conditional promise made before an authoritative court does not stem from the court's power of confiscation, otherwise no kinyan would have been required. Moreover, the power of confiscation by a Jewish court is invoked only for the furtherance of proper conduct in accordance with Jewish principles (לפגדר מלתא) but not for the sake of validating private transactions.
This responsum was addressed to Rabbi Solomon "a prominent scholar from France".
SOURCES: Am II, 99; Mord. B.K. 44; cf. Cr. 299–300; Pr. 493; Agudah B.K. 51; Asher, Responsa 13, 2; Isserlein, Pesakim 53.
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