Responsa for Nedarim 38:3
אמר ליה רב הונא בר יהודה לרבא אמר הריני נזיר עולם מאי
and offer his sacrifice, which may be eaten, but if he is a doubtful <i>nazir</i>, he may never shave.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because this must follow his sacrifices. But being a doubtful nazir, he cannot offer any at all, lest he be not one, in which case the animal, having been wrongfully designated as a nazir's sacrifice, is hullin (q.v. Glos.), which may not be brought to the Temple Court. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A promised to give two marks for a holy cause should he cohabit with his wife, within the year. He did cohabit with her within that time. If such promise of a gift were made by an individual, even had such money been actually delivered to the donee, it would be considered an asmakhta and would be void. Therefore, this conditional promise for a holy cause should also be void, for, although a mere verbal promise for a holy cause is as valid as an actual delivery (of money and valuables) to a private person, it has no greater validity than such delivery; and any transaction classified as an asmakhta is invalid even if the money and valuables are actually delivered. Although a conditional promise classified as asmakhta, if accompanied by a kinyan and made before an authoritative court, is valid, its validity stems from the powers of confiscation inherent in the authoritative court, but not from an act of the promisor.
A. A must pay two marks to the holy cause. A mere verbal promise to a holy cause is as binding as a similar promise to an individual accompanied by any manner of conveyance that serves to validate such promise. Since a conditional promise classified as asmakhta is valid if accompanied by a kinyan and made before an authoritative court, a mere promise of this kind made to charity or to a holy cause is binding, even though the promise was not made before an authoritative court. The validity of a conditional promise made before an authoritative court does not stem from the court's power of confiscation, otherwise no kinyan would have been required. Moreover, the power of confiscation by a Jewish court is invoked only for the furtherance of proper conduct in accordance with Jewish principles (לפגדר מלתא) but not for the sake of validating private transactions.
This responsum was addressed to Rabbi Solomon "a prominent scholar from France".
SOURCES: Am II, 99; Mord. B.K. 44; cf. Cr. 299–300; Pr. 493; Agudah B.K. 51; Asher, Responsa 13, 2; Isserlein, Pesakim 53.
A. A must pay two marks to the holy cause. A mere verbal promise to a holy cause is as binding as a similar promise to an individual accompanied by any manner of conveyance that serves to validate such promise. Since a conditional promise classified as asmakhta is valid if accompanied by a kinyan and made before an authoritative court, a mere promise of this kind made to charity or to a holy cause is binding, even though the promise was not made before an authoritative court. The validity of a conditional promise made before an authoritative court does not stem from the court's power of confiscation, otherwise no kinyan would have been required. Moreover, the power of confiscation by a Jewish court is invoked only for the furtherance of proper conduct in accordance with Jewish principles (לפגדר מלתא) but not for the sake of validating private transactions.
This responsum was addressed to Rabbi Solomon "a prominent scholar from France".
SOURCES: Am II, 99; Mord. B.K. 44; cf. Cr. 299–300; Pr. 493; Agudah B.K. 51; Asher, Responsa 13, 2; Isserlein, Pesakim 53.
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