Responsa for Sanhedrin 47:19
<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> אמר לו נאמן עלי אבא נאמן עלי אביך נאמנים עלי שלשה רועי בקר ר"מ אומר יכול לחזור בו וחכמים אומרים אינו יכול לחזור בו
— 'No'am'refers to the scholars of Palestine, who treat each other graciously [man'imim]when engaged in halachic debates; 'hoblim', to the scholars of Babylon, whoinjure each other's feelings [mehablim] when discussinghalachah.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Discussions were carried on far more energetically in the Babylonian academies than in the Palestinian, and in fact, there is considerably more controversy in the Babylonian than in the Jerusalem Talmud. ');"><sup>17</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A and C were negotiating a marriage. They deposited pledges with B. When a dispute arose between them, they brought their case before the worthies of the community who ordered B to deliver the pledges to C. This decision was later proven to be erroneous. Now A demands that B compensate him for the loss of his pledges.
A. Since B claims that A and C had undertaken to abide by the decision of the community leaders, and that he merely obeyed such decision, he is free from obligation. Although these leaders were ignorant in the law, their decision was nevertheless binding since A and C had accepted them as judges. The leaders and worthies of a community, because they are generally accepted by the members of their community and are in the same category as the Syrian courts (Git. 23a), form an authoritative court. Should A deny B's claim (that he obeyed the order of the community leaders), B would be free from obligation since a witness supports his claim. Moreover, no oath is exacted from a trustee who claims to have carried out his commission. Even if the mistake of the court became known before B delivered the pledges to C, and B nevertheless obeyed the order of the court, he is free from obligation, for A and C originally agreed to abide by the decision of the community leaders; and the custom is widely accepted throughout our kingdom that whatever obligations a person assumes in the presence of the community leaders become binding and unretractable. The leaders of a community wield the same authority over the members of their community regarding matters for which they were elected, as the great scholars of each generation wield over all of Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 230; Tesh. Maim. to Shoftim, 10; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 298d; ibid. p. 349c. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 39.
A. Since B claims that A and C had undertaken to abide by the decision of the community leaders, and that he merely obeyed such decision, he is free from obligation. Although these leaders were ignorant in the law, their decision was nevertheless binding since A and C had accepted them as judges. The leaders and worthies of a community, because they are generally accepted by the members of their community and are in the same category as the Syrian courts (Git. 23a), form an authoritative court. Should A deny B's claim (that he obeyed the order of the community leaders), B would be free from obligation since a witness supports his claim. Moreover, no oath is exacted from a trustee who claims to have carried out his commission. Even if the mistake of the court became known before B delivered the pledges to C, and B nevertheless obeyed the order of the court, he is free from obligation, for A and C originally agreed to abide by the decision of the community leaders; and the custom is widely accepted throughout our kingdom that whatever obligations a person assumes in the presence of the community leaders become binding and unretractable. The leaders of a community wield the same authority over the members of their community regarding matters for which they were elected, as the great scholars of each generation wield over all of Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 230; Tesh. Maim. to Shoftim, 10; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 298d; ibid. p. 349c. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 39.
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