Responsa for Sanhedrin 47:27

איתיביה רב אחא בר תחליפא לרבא היה חייב לחבירו שבועה ואמר לו דור לי בחיי ראשך רבי מאיר אומר יכול לחזור בו וחכמים אומרים אין יכול לחזור בו

took nineand the rest of the world one? — Yes, originally it descended to Babylon,but it travelled to Elam. This can also be inferred from the phrase, to buildher25 a house in the land of Shinar.This proves it. But a Master said that the symptom of pride is poverty, and did not povertydescend upon Babylon? — By'poverty',26 the dearth oflearning27 is meant, for it is written,We have a little sister and she has nobreasts;28 whereon R. Johanan observed:This is a symbol of Elam, which was privileged to study, but not toteach.29 What does [the name] Babelconnote?30 — R. Johanan answered:[That the study of] Scripture, Mishnah and Talmud was intermingled[therein].31 He hath made me to dwell in dark places like those that have been longdead.32 This, said R. Jeremiah, refersto the Babylonian Talmud.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which is profound and dark to the unversed. Cf. Hag. 10a. The word 'Talmud' refers to both the mode of study and the actual content of that study, and either or both may be referred to here. ');">33 MISHNAH. IF ONE [OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES] SAYS TO THE OTHER: I ACCEPT MYFATHER OR THY FATHER ASTRUSTWORTHY,34 OR, I HAVE CONFIDENCEIN THREE COWHERDS,35 R. MEIR SAYS,HE MAY [SUBSEQUENTLY] RETRACT; BUT THE SAGES RULE, HE CANNOT. IF A MAN WASUNDER THE OBLIGATION OF AN OATH TO HIS NEIGHBOUR, AND THE LATTER SAID TOHIM 'VOW TO ME BY THE LIFE OF THY HEAD,'36 R. MEIR HOLDS, HE MAY RETRACT;BUT THE SAGES MAINTAIN, HECANNOT.37 GEMARA. R. Dimi the son of R. Nahman the son of R. Joseph said: [The Mishnahrefers to a case] e.g., where he [the litigant] accepted him [sc. one ofthose mentioned] as one [of the three judgesrequired].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though there are two others eligible, R. Meir still holds that he may retract (Rashi). Tosaf. explains more plausibly: Only then do the Sages rule that he cannot retract. If, however, he had accepted one of these as the equivalent of a complete court, even the Sages admit that he can subsequently retract. V. supra p. 132, n. 11. ');">38 Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: The controversy [of R. Meir and theRabbis39 over a case] is only [wherethe plaintiff says]: 'My claim against thee be remitted' [if the judges sodecide]; but [if the defendant says], 'I will pay thy claim' [should it beso decided], all [even the Rabbis] agree that he mayretract.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Less authority is required to rule that one retains what is already in his possession, since possession itself affords a presumption of ownership, than to transfer money from one to another. Hence, only in the former case do the Rabbis rule that an undertaking to abide by the decision of an unqualified judge is binding, but not in the latter. ');">40 R. Johanan said: They differover the latter case. The scholars propounded [the following problem]: [Does R. Johanan mean that]they differ only over the latter case, but that in the former, all [evenR. Meir] agree that he cannot retract; or does he hold that they differ withrespect to both cases? — Come and hear! For Raba said: They differ [only]in respect of, 'I will pay thee;' but in the case of, 'It be remitted tothee,' all [even R. Meir] agree that he cannot retract. Now, if you say [thatR. Johanan maintains], Their difference is only in the case of, 'I will paythee'; but in the case of, 'It be remitted to thee,' all agree that he cannotretract, it is correct: then Raba's opinion coincides with that of R. Johanan.But should you say, their dispute applies to both, with whom does Rabaagree?41 — Raba [on the latterhypotheses] states an independentview.42 R. Aha b. Tahlifa objected to Raba's view: IF ONE WAS UNDER THE OBLIGATIONOF AN OATH TO HIS NEIGHBOUR, AND THE LATTER SAID TO HIM, 'VOW TO ME BY THELIFE OF THY HEAD;' R. MEIR HOLDS HE MAY RETRACT; BUT THE SAGES MAINTAIN,HE CANNOT.

Teshuvot Maharam

Q. Before A and B entered, as equal partners, into a business transaction wherein B was to be the active partner, A said to B: "Give me your faithful word as a religious Jew that you will not deny me my share of the profits." B complied with A's request. When they came to divide the profits, A demanded that B take an oath to the effect that there were no other profits except those he had admitted. B claimed that he had already given his word to A, which is equivalent to an oath.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.

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Teshuvot Maharam

Q. A and C were negotiating a marriage. They deposited pledges with B. When a dispute arose between them, they brought their case before the worthies of the community who ordered B to deliver the pledges to C. This decision was later proven to be erroneous. Now A demands that B compensate him for the loss of his pledges.
A. Since B claims that A and C had undertaken to abide by the decision of the community leaders, and that he merely obeyed such decision, he is free from obligation. Although these leaders were ignorant in the law, their decision was nevertheless binding since A and C had accepted them as judges. The leaders and worthies of a community, because they are generally accepted by the members of their community and are in the same category as the Syrian courts (Git. 23a), form an authoritative court. Should A deny B's claim (that he obeyed the order of the community leaders), B would be free from obligation since a witness supports his claim. Moreover, no oath is exacted from a trustee who claims to have carried out his commission. Even if the mistake of the court became known before B delivered the pledges to C, and B nevertheless obeyed the order of the court, he is free from obligation, for A and C originally agreed to abide by the decision of the community leaders; and the custom is widely accepted throughout our kingdom that whatever obligations a person assumes in the presence of the community leaders become binding and unretractable. The leaders of a community wield the same authority over the members of their community regarding matters for which they were elected, as the great scholars of each generation wield over all of Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 230; Tesh. Maim. to Shoftim, 10; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 298d; ibid. p. 349c. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 39.

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Teshuvot Maharam

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Teshuvot Maharam

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Teshuvot Maharam

Q. A promised B that he would not summon him to court at all if he did not do so before a certain date. The specified date passed and A did not summon B to court. May A summon B to court hereafter?
A. A verbal release does not require a kinyan, but a conditional promise of release is not binding unless accompanied by a kinyan.
SOURCES: Pr. 718; cf. Mord. Sanhedrin, 677.

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