Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Responsa for Sanhedrin 59:33

ואיבעית אימא קרא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו

WHEN THE VERDICT IS ARRIVED AT, etc. Whom [do they admit]? Shall we say,the litigants: but they are therealready?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Nowhere in the Mishnah is it mentioned that they had to withdraw. ');"><sup>31</sup></span> But [if it refers to] thewitnesses: whose view is this? Assuredly it does not agree with R. Nathan,for it has been taught: The evidence of witnesses cannot becombined,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As is necessary for it to be valid. ');"><sup>32</sup></span> unless they simultaneouslysaw what they state in evidence. R. Joshua b. Korha said: Evidence is valideven if they witnessed it consecutively. Again, their evidence is not admissibleby the court unless they both testify together. R. Nathan said; The courtmay hear the evidence of one witness one day, and when the other appearsthe next day, they may hear hisevidence!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Tosef. Sanh. V; B.B. 32a. Hence if it is the witnesses who are admitted after a decision has been arrived at, which implies the necessity of their joint appearance this interpretation of the law is not in accord with the view of R. Nathan as given. ');"><sup>33</sup></span> No. In reality, the litigantsare meant, and this represents the view of R. Nehemiah. For it has been taught:R. Nehemiah said: This was the custom of thefair-minded<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [H] v. supra p. 131, n. 3. Ms.M. [H] 'men of Jerusalem' whom Klein, S., loc. cit., regards as synonymous with [H]. ');"><sup>34</sup></span> in Jerusalem; firstthe litigants were admitted and their statements heard; then the witnesseswere admitted and their statements heard. Thenthey<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This is understood to refer to the witnesses. ');"><sup>35</sup></span> were ordered out, and the matterwas discussed. [And when the verdict was arrived at etc.]<a rel="footnote" href="#56a_36"><sup>36</sup></a> But has it notbeen explicitly taught: When the deliberations come to an end, the witnessesare readmitted?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the necessity of their conjoint appearance. ');"><sup>37</sup></span> That certainly doesnot agree with R. Nathan. The above text [reads]: 'The evidence of witnesses cannot be combined unlessthey simultaneously saw what they state in evidence. R. Joshua b. Korha said:It is valid even if they saw it consecutively.' Wherein do they differ? —If you wish, I might say, in the interpretation of a Biblical verse;alternatively, in a matter of logic. On the latter assumption, [the firstTanna argues,] the [loan of the] <i>maneh</i> to which the one testifies, is notattested by the other, and viceversa.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' E.g., if A claims a mina from B, and C testifies that he saw B receive a maneh from A on the first day of the month, while D testifies that he saw B receive a maneh on the second of the month, notwithstanding that both testify that A gave B a maneh, it is evident that they do not refer to the same transaction, and therefore there is only one witness for each alleged loan, and therefore the evidence is invalid. ');"><sup>38</sup></span> Whereas the other [Tanna]<a rel="footnote" href="#56a_39"><sup>39</sup></a> [argues that, after all,] both testify to a mina ingeneral.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the fact of the loan is proved, though one witness must have mistaken the date. ');"><sup>40</sup></span> Alternatively, they differin respect to a Biblical verse. For it is written, And he is a witness whetherhe has seen or known of it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 1, referring to witnesses who were adjured by parties in a case to testify before the court in their favour. ');"><sup>41</sup></span> Now,it has been taught:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Sot. 2b; 31b. ');"><sup>42</sup></span> From theimplications of the verse, A witness shall not rise upetc.,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XIX, 15. ');"><sup>43</sup></span> do I not know that one ismeant? Why then state 'one'.? — That it may establish the principle thatwherever it says A witness, it implies two, unless one is specified by theverse.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Therefore in the text above, And he is a witness, two are implied. Also, because the guilt-offering for the transgression of the oath imposed on the witnesses ([H]), referred to in the Biblical text, applies only to two witnesses and not to one. V. J. Sanh. III, 9; and Shebu. 31b. ');"><sup>44</sup></span> And the Divine Law expressedit in the singular to teach that they must witness [the act in question]both together as one man.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Otherwise their testimony is invalid. ');"><sup>45</sup></span> And theother?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Joshua b. Korha: how does he interpret the verse? ');"><sup>46</sup></span> — He is a witness whetherhe hath seen or known of it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which appears superfluous, for a witness is supposed to see and know of things. ');"><sup>47</sup></span> teachesthat in all circumstances [the evidence isadmissible].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whether the act was witnessed or the evidence given at the same time or not. ');"><sup>48</sup></span> 'Again, their evidence is not admissible by the court unless they both testifytogether. R. Nathan said: The court may hear the evidence of one witnessone day, and when the other witness appears the next day, they may hear hisevidence.' Wherein do they differ? — Either in a matter of logic or in [theinterpretation of] a Biblical text. 'Either in a matter of logic.' One Master argues: A single witness comesto impose an oath, but not to proveliability.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If the claimant produces one witness in his favour, an oath is imposed on the defendant, but he is not ordered to repay. (V. Shebu. 40a.) Hence, when witnesses testify separately, the evidence of neither proves liability, and therefore the two testimonies cannot be combined. ');"><sup>49</sup></span> Theother<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Nathan. ');"><sup>50</sup></span> argues: Even if they appearsimultaneously, do they testify with onemouth?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Surely not! ');"><sup>51</sup></span> But [nevertheless], theirevidence is combined. So here too [where they come separately] their evidencemay be combined. 'Or [in interpretation of] a Biblical text.' [And he is a witness whetherhe has seen or known of it;] If he do not utter it, then he shall bear hisiniquity.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. V, 1. ');"><sup>52</sup></span>

Teshuvot Maharam

R. Isaac left his wife Sarah in the month of Adar of the year 5031 (1271), and travelled to a distant place in search of sustenance for his family. Next year he learned that his wife had played the harlot and had thus become pregnant. He returned home, and in the month of Ab of the year 5032 (1272) he appeared before us and asked us to investigate his wife's conduct during his absence, since she bore a child in the month of Adar of the same year (1272), twelve months after he had left her. Sarah asserted, however, that she was pregnant when her husband left her. Therefore we, the undersigned, wrote to R. Shealtiel and his two sons, who lived in the same village with Sarah, and they testified in writing that Sarah bore a child twelve months after R. Isaac left her. The signatures and seals of the deponents have been attested to by reliable witnesses. Then, a person appeared before us because of the ban (proclaimed against all those who knew anything relating to this case and did not appear as witnesses) and testified that on the evening of Shabuot of the previous year (1271) he went to Sarah's home in order to recite the kiddush in her presence, and found Gentiles, loafers, who caroused with her, caressed and embraced her. We concluded, therefore, that she must have become pregnant at that time. Other persons testified to have seen her on Purim of this year (1272) in the last stages of pregnancy. On previous occasions, however, in the month of Elul, she violently protested that she was not pregnant, and cursed and abused those who had said to her that she was pregnant. Moreover, before the evil report reached the town, Sarah's father appeared before us and asked us to allow him to put his daughter to death by drowning her. When asked for his reasons, he stated that a daughter of his (meaning Sarah) was an incorrigible harlot, who bore a bastard daughter by a Gentile and then killed her child. When asked whether he tried other means of controlling her, he answered that whenever he reproved her she threatened to apostatize altogether and pleaded that she was not the first woman who ever sinned. She had left the house on a number of occasions but was persuaded to return by the entreaties of her mother. The father feared lest she turn to evil and, therefore, asked for permission to kill her. However, we did not permit him to carry out his design. We sent the testimony to Rothenburg to the great luminary, Rabbi Meir. Since the Rabbis of Erfurt who are near us, and those of Würzburg, who are far from us, as well as Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg, all agree to allow R. Isaac to divorce Sarah even against her will, the divorce has been given in our presence. Signed: Moses Azriel b. Eleazar hadarshan, Eleazar b. Yehiel, Ephraim b. Joel.
R. Meir's opinion was as follows:
The testimony of R. Shealtiel and his sons is of no consequence for two reasons. a) They are related to each other; their testimony is that of a single witness, and, therefore, insufficient. b) The foetus could have lingered in the mother's womb for twelve months (cf. Yeb. 80b). Sarah's giving birth to a child twelve months after her husband left her, is, therefore, no proof of her depravity. The testimony of the other witness regarding Sarah's indecent behavior on the evening of Shabuot, being the testimony of a single witness, does not deprive Sarah of her right to her ketubah. If R. Isaac believes the aforementioned witness or if he takes the word of his wife's own father, he must divorce Sarah even against her will. If she renders it impossible for him to divorce her, he may marry another woman without divorcing Sarah as a warning to all indecent and depraved women. But he must pay Sarah her ketubah. However, if Sarah admits her guilt, or acknowledges the truth of the testimony regarding her indecent conduct on the evening of Shabuot, or if she cannot satisfactorily explain why she denied her being pregnant in the month of Elul of the previous year, or answer all other questions regarding her conduct, she loses her right to her ketubah and is entitled only to whatever is left of the valuables she had brought with her upon her marriage.
SOURCES: L. 310; Tesh. Maim. to Nashim 25; Hag. Mord. to Yeb. 121; cf. Sinai vol. V (1941) p. 296; Asher Responsa 32, 11; Weil, Responsa 8; ibid. 88; Isserlein, Pesakim 22.
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