Responsa for Sanhedrin 61:20
אמר לו הבא עדים כו' אמר רשב"ג כו': אמר רבה בר רב הונא א"ר יוחנן הלכה כדברי חכמים ואמר רבה בר רב הונא אמר רבי יוחנן אין הלכה כרשב"ג
CAN UPSET THE VERDICT. BUT IF THEY<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The judges. So Alfasi, Me'iri and others. The text reads [H] (He, the other litigant, said unto him). The version rendered seems the more acceptable. ');"><sup>18</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A demanded of B the silver girdle and golden stomacher he had deposited with him. B averred that A's wife, before her marriage to A, had deposited these jewels with him in order to withhold them from A and keep them for the children by her former marriage. Now that she had died, B wished to do her bidding and deliver the jewels to her children. We, therefore, decided that B take an oath as to the truth of his statement and deliver the jewels to the heirs of A's wife. Next day, however, when B was to take the oath, he declared that he had been reminded, by his wife, of the truth of A's claim, and that he was ready to take an oath to the effect that A deposited the jewels with him. The heirs of A's wife, however, who were present at the trial on the previous day, claimed that B had, then, admitted having in his possession jewels that belonged to them. They, therefore, demanded these jewels.
A. If B takes an oath to the effect that A deposited the jewels with him, and returns them to A, he will be free from obligation to the woman's heirs. We must be satisfied with such an oath since B had recourse to a Miggo (an alternative claim) that would only have imposed a different oath on him; for B could have claimed that he had returned the jewels to the heirs, or that the jewels had been stolen or lost, after the court had reached the above decision. Such claims by B would only have obligated him to take an oath. Although we usually do not accept a defendant's claim to have been mistaken in his original admission, even when such defendant had recourse to a Miggo, this case is different, since B is not a litigant and is to gain nothing from either alternative.
SOURCES: P. 301; Mord. B. B. 524; Agudah B. B. 64.
A. If B takes an oath to the effect that A deposited the jewels with him, and returns them to A, he will be free from obligation to the woman's heirs. We must be satisfied with such an oath since B had recourse to a Miggo (an alternative claim) that would only have imposed a different oath on him; for B could have claimed that he had returned the jewels to the heirs, or that the jewels had been stolen or lost, after the court had reached the above decision. Such claims by B would only have obligated him to take an oath. Although we usually do not accept a defendant's claim to have been mistaken in his original admission, even when such defendant had recourse to a Miggo, this case is different, since B is not a litigant and is to gain nothing from either alternative.
SOURCES: P. 301; Mord. B. B. 524; Agudah B. B. 64.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A and B deposited a bond with C with the stipulation that C return the bond to B, should A fail to pay one mark to B within a certain period of time. The stipulated date passed but C does not know whether or not A paid the mark to B. What should C do with the bond?
A. C should return the bond to B; for had A paid the mark to B he would have informed C about it.
SOURCES: Pr. 447.
A. C should return the bond to B; for had A paid the mark to B he would have informed C about it.
SOURCES: Pr. 447.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. How long after a decision of a court has been rendered, is a party to the suit entitled to a statement as to the reasons underlying such decision? Within what period, after a decision has been rendered, can a person appeal to a higher court? Must one declare before the local court that he will seek an appeal?
A. If a party to a suit originally wanted to bring his case to a higher court but was forced to try it at the local court, he is entitled to a written statement of the reasons for the decision, and he may appeal his case at any time. But if both parties agreed to have their case tried by the local court, the court is under no obligation to give any written opinion.
SOURCES: Cr. 281; Pr. 524; Mord. Sanh. 708; Hag. Maim. Sanhedrin, 6, 7.
A. If a party to a suit originally wanted to bring his case to a higher court but was forced to try it at the local court, he is entitled to a written statement of the reasons for the decision, and he may appeal his case at any time. But if both parties agreed to have their case tried by the local court, the court is under no obligation to give any written opinion.
SOURCES: Cr. 281; Pr. 524; Mord. Sanh. 708; Hag. Maim. Sanhedrin, 6, 7.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. Rachel's husband became an apostate. She gave him one-half mark as the price of his granting her a divorce. After the divorce was delivered, the witnesses to the instrument went to R's father, and with his permission tore up R's ketubah. A had in his possession a deposit belonging to R's husband. R demanded that A give her the deposit in payment of her ketubah. The apostate, on the other hand, threatened A with great injury unless he returned the deposit to him.
A. Although the tearing of R's ketubah by her father does not cancel the apostate's obligation to R, A may not be forced to risk his life or property by handing over the deposit to R. A, therefore, should try to settle with the apostate for as little as possible, and give the remainder to R.
This Resp. is addressed to "my teachers and relatives, R. Joseph Kohen and R. Jacob."
SOURCES: Cr. 288; Pr. 974; Tesh. Maim. to Nezikim, 7; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 194b; ibid. p. 379c.
A. Although the tearing of R's ketubah by her father does not cancel the apostate's obligation to R, A may not be forced to risk his life or property by handing over the deposit to R. A, therefore, should try to settle with the apostate for as little as possible, and give the remainder to R.
This Resp. is addressed to "my teachers and relatives, R. Joseph Kohen and R. Jacob."
SOURCES: Cr. 288; Pr. 974; Tesh. Maim. to Nezikim, 7; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 194b; ibid. p. 379c.
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