Responsa for Sanhedrin 61:29

איכא דאמרי לא הימנה רב נחמן אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן והא אי בעיא

Rabbah son of R. Huna also said: The halachah does not rest with the Sages. But is this not obvious; since he says that the halachah rests with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel it automatically follows that the halachah is not as the Sages? — I might have thought that his ruling26 holds good only at the outset;27 but once it [i.e., the reverse] has been done,28 it is correct: therefore he informs us29 that even then, it [the decision] is reversed. IF THEY SAID TO HIM: 'BRING WITNESSES,' etc. … SAID RABBAN SIMEON B. GAMALIEL etc. — Rabbah son of R. Huna said in R. Johanan's name: The halachah rests with the Sages. Rabbah son of R. Huna also said in R. Johanan's name: The halachah does not rest with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel. But is this not obvious; since he said that the halachah rests with the Sages it follows automatically that the halachah does not rest with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel? What he teaches us is this: Only in this case is the halachah not as Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel holds; whereas in all other cases,30 the halachah rests with him. Thus he opposes the dictum of Rabbah b. Bar Hana in the name of R. Johanan, viz., Wherever Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel's view is taught in our Mishnah, the halachah rests with him, except in [the following three cases]: 'Areb,31 Zidon32 and 'the latter proof'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the case, dealt with in our Mishnah, of evidence offered late, the case under discussion; thus Rabbah b. R. Huna maintains that the halachah does rest with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel in respect to 'Areb and Zidon. ');">33 A lad34 was once summoned for a [civil] suit before R. Nahman. The latter asked him: 'Have you any witnesses?' He answered: 'No.' 'Have you any [documentary] proof?' 'No,' was the reply. Consequently, R. Nahman ruled him to be liable. As he went along weeping, some people heard him and said to him, 'We know your father's affairs.'35 Said R. Nahman: In such a case even the Rabbis36 agree that the youth is not expected to know his father's affairs.37 A certain woman38 produced a note of a debt,39 but said to him:40 'I know that this bill was discharged.' R. Nahman41 believed her.42 Said Raba to him: According to whose view [did you act]? According to Rabbi who said: [Ownership of] 'letters' is acquired through delivery?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., if a creditor wishes to make over a debt, he can do so merely by handing the note — referred to here as a compilation of (alphabetical) letters — to the assignee. Hence in our case, the woman could have claimed ownership of the note, on the plea that it had been handed to her not as a trustee, but in transference of the debt. Consequently her statement that the bill was paid may be regarded as true by reason of a Miggo, v. Glos. Raba was not in favour of the opinion of Rabbi, as it opposes the view of the majority of the Sages that a Shetar cannot be legally assigned by mere delivery. V. B.B. 76a. ');">43 This case is different, he replied, since she could have burnt it, had she desired.44 Others say, R. Nahman did not believe her. Thereupon Raba objected: But had she desired,

Teshuvot Maharam

Q. A demanded of B the silver girdle and golden stomacher he had deposited with him. B averred that A's wife, before her marriage to A, had deposited these jewels with him in order to withhold them from A and keep them for the children by her former marriage. Now that she had died, B wished to do her bidding and deliver the jewels to her children. We, therefore, decided that B take an oath as to the truth of his statement and deliver the jewels to the heirs of A's wife. Next day, however, when B was to take the oath, he declared that he had been reminded, by his wife, of the truth of A's claim, and that he was ready to take an oath to the effect that A deposited the jewels with him. The heirs of A's wife, however, who were present at the trial on the previous day, claimed that B had, then, admitted having in his possession jewels that belonged to them. They, therefore, demanded these jewels.
A. If B takes an oath to the effect that A deposited the jewels with him, and returns them to A, he will be free from obligation to the woman's heirs. We must be satisfied with such an oath since B had recourse to a Miggo (an alternative claim) that would only have imposed a different oath on him; for B could have claimed that he had returned the jewels to the heirs, or that the jewels had been stolen or lost, after the court had reached the above decision. Such claims by B would only have obligated him to take an oath. Although we usually do not accept a defendant's claim to have been mistaken in his original admission, even when such defendant had recourse to a Miggo, this case is different, since B is not a litigant and is to gain nothing from either alternative.
SOURCES: P. 301; Mord. B. B. 524; Agudah B. B. 64.

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Teshuvot Maharam

Q. A and B deposited a bond with C with the stipulation that C return the bond to B, should A fail to pay one mark to B within a certain period of time. The stipulated date passed but C does not know whether or not A paid the mark to B. What should C do with the bond?
A. C should return the bond to B; for had A paid the mark to B he would have informed C about it.
SOURCES: Pr. 447.

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Teshuvot Maharam

Q. How long after a decision of a court has been rendered, is a party to the suit entitled to a statement as to the reasons underlying such decision? Within what period, after a decision has been rendered, can a person appeal to a higher court? Must one declare before the local court that he will seek an appeal?
A. If a party to a suit originally wanted to bring his case to a higher court but was forced to try it at the local court, he is entitled to a written statement of the reasons for the decision, and he may appeal his case at any time. But if both parties agreed to have their case tried by the local court, the court is under no obligation to give any written opinion.
SOURCES: Cr. 281; Pr. 524; Mord. Sanh. 708; Hag. Maim. Sanhedrin, 6, 7.

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Teshuvot Maharam

Q. Rachel's husband became an apostate. She gave him one-half mark as the price of his granting her a divorce. After the divorce was delivered, the witnesses to the instrument went to R's father, and with his permission tore up R's ketubah. A had in his possession a deposit belonging to R's husband. R demanded that A give her the deposit in payment of her ketubah. The apostate, on the other hand, threatened A with great injury unless he returned the deposit to him.
A. Although the tearing of R's ketubah by her father does not cancel the apostate's obligation to R, A may not be forced to risk his life or property by handing over the deposit to R. A, therefore, should try to settle with the apostate for as little as possible, and give the remainder to R.
This Resp. is addressed to "my teachers and relatives, R. Joseph Kohen and R. Jacob."
SOURCES: Cr. 288; Pr. 974; Tesh. Maim. to Nezikim, 7; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 194b; ibid. p. 379c.

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