Responsa for Shevuot 96:19

Q. A married a widow, B, and lived with her for eight years till her death. B had not taken the customary widow's oath regarding her ketubah due her from her former husband. When she married A she was not considered very rich and no one suspected that she owned more than the value of her ketubah. But, after her death, when A declared, under oath, to the community (leaders, probably for purposes of taxation) the value of his assets, it was discovered that he had inherited from B more than the value of her ketubah from her former husband. The heirs of the latter, therefore, demand that A return the excess to them.
A. If the valuables B brought to A were undistinguishable and no one recognized them as having belonged to B's former husband, A is free from obligation for five reasons. a) Even if the valuables B brought to A were worth more than the value of her ketubah, such valuables may not all necessarily have come from the estate of her former husband, for she might have received some gifts or found a treasure. b) Were B still alive she would have been obliged to take an oath [to the effect that she did not take from her former husband more than the value of her ketubah], but now that she is dead, A is free from the obligation of taking an oath, since he is not supposed to know his wife's affairs. c) A is not even required to take the oath of an heir — that B never told him, and that he did not know that she had received from the estate of her former husband more than the value of her ketubah — since the heirs of B's former husband are not positive in their claim. The heirs, however, may pronounce the ban (herem) in the synagogue against anyone who does possess such knowledge and does not reveal it. Such ban would include A. d) Whatever a person would have retained, had he taken an oath, his heirs may retain without the necessity of taking an oath. e) Some authorities require A to take the oath of an heir; but since many great authorities absolve him from such oath, and since A is in possession of the aforesaid valuables, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. For similar reasons A would be free from the obligation of taking an oath, even if some of the valuables brought to him by B were distinguishable and were recognized as having belonged to B's former husband, if the valuables thus recognized were in themselves not worth more than the value of B's ketubah. But, if the distinguishable valuables are in themselves worth more than the value of B's ketubah, A must return the difference to the heirs of B's first husband.
Q. Witnesses have testified to the effect that B and her former husband, C, had made a binding agreement that in the event of the death of one party, the surviving party would share the property with the heirs. After C's death, B settled with all of C's heirs, except the youngest, D, who was born after the drawing up of the agreement. D, therefore, is now pressing his claim.
A. D was entitled to his share even though he was born after the agreement was made, for in it B did not bestow benefits on anybody; she merely relinquished her rights to C's property up to a certain extent, and D later became heir to the relinquished property. However, A may claim that B brought him nothing from C's estate, or he may contend that B had already settled with D, and be free from obligation for the reasons enumerated above.
SOURCES: Am II, 17; cf. Hayyim Or Zarua, Responsa 86; ibid. 165; ibid. 191.

Q. A claims that he and his friend gave B a horse to ride on, but that B unwarrantably gave the horse to a Gentile and the horse was lost. B avers that he does not recall the incident.
A. If A and B were partners, and A was engaged in managing some of the partnership money, even if the horse was lost through B's willful neglect, B would be free from obligation since the horse would thus have been lost "in the presence of its owner." Your letter indicates that A and B were partners. Nevertheless, if A suspects that B misappropriated the horse, he may demand that B deny such charge under oath. In general, A may demand at any time that B take the "partner's oath", and B may impose the same oath on A. However, if A and B are not partners, B must merely take an oath either to the effect that he did not take a horse from A, or that he does not recall having taken a horse from A, and be free from obligation.
SOURCES: Cr. 295.

Q. A claims that B misappropriated money from their partnership. B denies A's claim.
A. If B will take the "partners' oath", he will be free from obligation. Although after a partnership is dissolved, an ex-partner is no longer required to take the "partners' oath", in this case, since B must take oaths in support of his other claims as against A, he must include an "entailed oath" regarding the above claim.
Q. B's former partners claim that the Gentile who seized from B valuables that belonged to the partnership, has seized them, as the Gentile claimed, in payment of money B owed him. B denies having owed anything to the Gentile.
A. Although Gentiles are robbers, and their excuses for seizing property from Jews are not to be taken seriously —ordinarily such a claim would not require an oath of denial on the part of B — in this case, however, B must take an "entailed oath". On the other hand, if B should admit that he owed money to the Gentile, he would have to pay this money to his former partners.
SOURCES: Cr. 302–3.

Q. Before A and B entered, as equal partners, into a business transaction wherein B was to be the active partner, A said to B: "Give me your faithful word as a religious Jew that you will not deny me my share of the profits." B complied with A's request. When they came to divide the profits, A demanded that B take an oath to the effect that there were no other profits except those he had admitted. B claimed that he had already given his word to A, which is equivalent to an oath.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.

We were obliged to try the case of a betrothed, L, who demanded that her bridegroom, A (Jacob), come to her father's house and marry her there. A's father, B (Moses), representing his son, brought forth the following claims: a) When he (B) had arranged the match with L's father, C (Judah), he had promised C to send his son to live in C's house; b) he kept his promise, and, after A betrothed L through a messenger, he sent A to C; c) at the time the match was arranged C promised to clothe A suitably, to support him, and to hire a capable teacher for him; d) after A stayed in C's house for one year, he was sent back to his father and C took no further notice of him; A was forced to interrupt his studies and he, B, with very limited means, had to support him for five difficult years; and, f) he asked many persons to urge C to keep his promise of support to A, but C refused. The undersigned (R. Meir) also, sent many letters to C, asking him to have pity on his son-in-law who suffered poverty and privation — all to no avail. Moreover, we have learned (from a letter) that C does not at all desire the consummation of the marriage, but has set his heart on a divorce since A displeased him. Thus, B claims that he has fulfilled his promise and sent his son to C; but, that the latter put A to shame and now he, B, can no longer force A to return to C's house; that A is afraid to return to C's place of residence since many persons have warned him that C's servants were threatening to do him injury unless he agree to divorce L; that though A cannot, and will not, return to C, he is nevertheless ready to marry L whenever she will come to his place of residence.
Taking the above into consideration, we have decided that A cannot be compelled to settle in C's town, marry L, and live with her there; nor can he be forced to divorce L. Our decision is based on irrefutable proof: Thus, the majority of our leading authorities agree that a man living in one country who betrothed a woman living in another country, may force the woman to come and live with him in his country. Although the Tosephta (Ket. 13, 2) and the Palestinian Talmud, (Ket. 13, 10) seem to disagree on this score, we believe that our interpretation of the statements in these two sources removes the discrepancy and shows that both agree regarding this law. Moreover, when the man betrothed the woman through a messenger, there is not a shadow of a doubt that according to both sources given above, the woman ought to be forced to move to her husband's place of residence. This opinion is shared by Rashi, Maimonides and other leading authorities. R. Tam, however, believes that these sources deal with cases in which we force the husband to change his place of residence to that of his wife. Therefore, in view of this difference of opinion (although I do not agree with the view of R. Tam) we must accept the strictures of each opinion. Thus, we are forced to decide that neither the husband nor the wife can force a change in the other's place of residence. We cannot compel the husband to change his place of residence because of the opinion of Rashi, Maimonides, and the other leading authorities; but neither can we compel the wife to change her place of residence, because of the opinion of R. Tam. Although B had agreed at the time of the betrothal that A would settle in C's town, B had no right to bind A to such terms and we can find no evidence that A had voluntarily agreed to change his place of residence. The fact that A went to visit C is no evidence of such voluntary agreement. Moreover, he went on this visit after the betrothal, while we are concerned with his intentions at the time of the betrothal. Therefore, this agreement between B and C is void. Furthermore, had A himself voluntarily agreed at the time of the betrothal to move to C's place of residence, we should not be able to force A to keep his part of the agreement since C, on his part, had made many promises at that time which he later failed to keep.
Some Rabbis wrote their opinion that A should be compelled to move to L's place of residence since it was not dignified for a woman to move from place to place, as expressed by the verse: "All glorious is the king's daughter within the palace" (Ps. 45,11; cf. Git. 12a). Moreover, it is humiliating for a woman to pursue her husband into a distant place. However, I regard this manner of reasoning as very strange indeed; for in the talmudic period women were more honorable and discreet than today, and yet talmudic law required them to move to their husband's place of residence. The aforementioned Rabbis also wrote that since, according to the Talmud, a woman's station may be elevated through marriage but not lowered, L should not be forced to move to A's town. For L was brought up in great luxury and abundance, and were she to move to A's house she would have to share his poverty and privation. However, L would not have to suffer privation. C had promised A a large sum of money as a dowry; with that money A should be able to support L in a manner befitting her station, and on a standard equal to that of the other women of her family. Although she would miss some of the extravagances of her father's house, she would have to bear with such minor inconvenience. In conclusion, since A is ready to marry L whenever she will come to live in his town, we cannot compel A to move to L's town or to divorce her. This decision is required by talmudic law and the Rabbis made no distinction between a poor woman and a rich woman. Signed: R. Meir b. Baruch.
SOURCES: L. 386; Tesh. Maim. to Nashim, 28; Hayyim Or Zarua, Responsa 147. Cf. Hagahot Asheri Ket. 12, 3; Asheri Ket. 13, 17; Tur Eben Haezer 75.
The following Responsa by R. Samuel b. Salomo, R. Jacob B. Joseph, R. Yehiel b. Jacob ha Levi, and R. Eliezer B. Ephraim, refer to the same case:
This letter is written regarding the youth of Rothenburg who betrothed, through a messenger, the daughter of R. Judah of Düren. At the time the match was concluded the youth's father had agreed that his son would take up his permanent abode with his father-in-law. After the betrothal the bridegroom came to stay with R. Judah who hired a teacher for him and treated him honorably for a long time. A year later the youth became sick and R. Judah, thinking that this was a result of the change of climate, sent him home accompanied by his teacher, and expended large sums of money on him. Subsequently, R. Judah sent for the youth to come to his house and marry his daughter. The youth, however, changed his mind on the matter of residence, and refused to come to Düren, stating however that he was ready to marry his bride if and when she came to live in Rothenburg. Thus it is apparent that the youth was intending to exact money from R. Judah. Therefore, it is my opinion that the youth be forced either to marry his bride on her terms, or divorce her. First, it is obvious that at the time of her betrothal the bridegroom had intended to settle in Düren. Secondly, his father had explicitly agreed with R. Judah to the youth's change of abode. Therefore, we assume that the youth also had agreed to it, since a young son does not dare to oppose his father and usually subscribes to the father's arrangement of his affairs. Again in agreements arising between the various parties interested in a marriage, the conditions apparently implied, though not expressly stated, are presumed to form part of such agreements (see Git. 65b; Ket. 54b; 79a; B. B. 132a). Thus, in our case, it is apparent that R. Judah did not intend to have his daughter leave him and her mother and remove from the country of her birth, and suffer privation in Rothenburg with her poverty stricken husband; that he did not intend to spend the large sum of money required to finance the safe conduct of one who was the daughter of a magnate whose name was known throughout the countries. Thus, the overlord of Rothenburg acting on the mere rumor [that R. Judah's daughter was coming to settle in Rothenburg] already sought ways of subjugating R. Judah to his will [using his daughter as a hostage]. Finally, according to the Talmud (Ket. 110b) a husband cannot force his wife to move from a humble to a more sumptuous dwelling since she can hold that such change of abode, even though it was for the better, would cause her many inconveniences. Any woman who gives plausible reasons against the change of abode demanded by her husband, therefore, cannot be forced to undertake such a change. In our case the bride's reasons against a change of abode are numerous and reasonable. Therefore, the youth ought to be forced by flagellation or the use of the ban either to marry his bride or to divorce her. This case was already brought before us last year, and we decided in the bride's favor. Because of these reasons, I have agreed to ban and chastise the bridegroom until he either marry his bride on her terms or divorce her. If he refuses to comply with our order he shall bear his sin and those who support him shall likewise suffer. None is excluded from our ban, excepting, of course, our honored teacher Rabbi Meir. Rabbenu Gershom requires that a husband be coerced into divorcing his rebellious wife lest the latter turn to mischief. Although many authorities disagree with Rabbenu Gershom and we do not follow his decision, in cases similar to the one at hand, however, we must protect the daughters of Israel lest unscrupulous youths use the inability and unwillingness of daughters of rich men to change their place of residence, as a means of extorting money from their fathers. Signed: Samuel b. Salomo (Pr. 250).
Wailing and complaint that cannot be silenced, arose because of Jacob b. Moses who betrothed the daughter of R. Judah…. The bridegroom may be coerced either to marry the bride on her terms or divorce her. R. Tam decided that a court must compel a levir to marry, or give halitzah to his brother's childless widow, even by the use of force; and that it is even permissible to have Gentiles use force on the levir until he comply with the decision of the Jewish court. Although according to the Jerusalem Talmud whenever the Mishna fails expressly to allow the use of coercion we can use no physical compulsion (Ket. 11, 7), and although the ban is a strong form of coercion, nevertheless, since R. Tam allowed the use of physical compulsion (in a case where the Mishna does not expressly allow the use of such measures, cf. B. Yeb. 39a) we ought to ban the bridegroom until he comply with our decision. Moreover, custom changes law; whenever we are uncertain regarding a certain law, we observe and follow the accepted practice. Thus, the custom is universally accepted of performing the marriage ceremony in the house of the bride's father. Therefore, we invoked against the youth all the curses great and small, until he comply with our decision. Signed Jacob b. Rabbi Joseph (Pr. 251).
To our Rabbis of Germany, your love has obliged me to express my opinion regarding the above. Since witnesses testify to the fact that there was a stipulated condition at the time of the betrothal, such condition is binding and the bridegroom must live up to its terms. Even if there are no such witnesses, the fact that his father-in-law kept him in his house together with his teacher, even though he returned home because of illness, proves that the father-in-law intended that the wedding take place in his house. It is difficult to imagine that the latter intended to brave the grave danger of sending his daughter and his money to Germany, which is very unsafe country. Furthermore, a man may not force his wife to leave her country and to come to live in his country. Therefore, we may force the bridegroom to do one of two things: either marry his bride and come to live in her place of residence, or divorce her. The Rabbis ought to coerce him by the use of chastisement and the ban, for fear lest his bride remain a deserted wife. We find many instances where the Rabbis decreed special laws and took extraordinary measures in order to prevent the possibility of a woman remaining a deserted wife. Signed: Yehiel b. Jacob ha Levi (Pr. 251).
To my teacher Rabbi Meir. I saw the decision of the judges in the case of the honorable R. Judah of Düren who betrothed his daughter to Jacob b. Moses of Rothenburg. At the time of the betrothal Moses agreed to send his son Jacob to Düren in order that he marry his bride there. Moses kept his agreement and sent his son to R. Judah. But, when the latter saw that Jacob was small in stature, homely, and despicable, he had pity on his daughter. Fearing lest she begin to despise her bridegroom, he sent Jacob back to his father to stay there till he grow up. When the bride grew up and R. Judah was told that Jacob also gained in strength, he sent for the latter to come and marry his bride. However, Moses refused to send Jacob to Düren. As time dragged on and R. Judah's daughter saw that her bridegroom refused to come to her, she sent a messenger to Rothenburg to demand that Jacob either marry her on the conditions previously agreed upon, or divorce her. But Jacob answered that he did not personally agree to move to Düren, that he did not join in his father's agreement on that score, that he would not come to her father's house, and that he would marry her only if she come to Rothenburg. Thereupon it was decided [by R. Meir] that she could not compel Jacob to move to Düren nor force him to divorce her. This decision, however, is very strange, and, in my opinion, is a perversion of justice for a number of reasons. a) Some of our great authorities quote the opinion of R. Tam to the effect that both the Mishna (Ket. 13, 10) and the Tosephta (Ket. 13, 2) which treat of the conditions under which a party to a marriage may be forced to remove to the place of residence of the other party, deal with forcing the husband to move to the place of residence of the wife. Therefore, the conclusion of both sources is that the husband who married a wife living in another country must move to that country. Again, whenever the talmudic sources state that the husband be so forced to move, the implication is that upon refusing to do so he must divorce his wife and pay her the ketubah. Next, it is well known that the bride's home is luxurious and comfortable [for which reason she ought not to be forced to remove to her husband's humble abode], that her traveling to Rothenburg would entail great difficulties and serious hazards since the entire road is infested with lurking dangers, and that her very stay in Rothenburg would be perilous because of her father's great reputation for wealth. Therefore, Jacob cannot force her to take such a step. Besides, even if she wanted to go to Rothenburg, her father's repeated objections would not allow her to do so, and she could do nothing about it. Therefore, this case is similar to the one quoted in the Mishna (Ket. 13, 5), in which case Admon decided that the bride might demand from her bridegroom that he either marry, or divorce her. Finally, Jacob is bound by his father's agreement, since it is customary for the parents of a couple to enter into all agreements governing the marriage, and for such agreements to be considered binding on the couple. Although the principle is accepted that "the consent of the father does not imply the consent of the son (Kid. 45b)", this principle applies only to the actual betrothal but not to the other arrangements appertaining thereto. Moreover, the fact that he came to live in Düren proves that he had agreed to his father's arrangement; while his having been sent home temporarily, because of illness, did not invalidate the original agreement.
Therefore, it seems to me that the decision cited above was a perversion of justice, or, at least, against common sense, and not in the interest of the public welfare. For were we to accept the principle implied in your decision, the interests of the wealthy would suffer greatly. Thus many unscrupulous persons, knowing that the daughters of the rich cannot move away from their home towns, would betroth such women and then extort money from their fathers by refusing to marry them until either the women move away from their homeland, or their fathers pay exorbitant sums of money. And you, my teacher, R. Meir, how did you come to subscribe to such a decision? Everybody is wondering at this. For R. Judah is ready to fulfill all his previous promises and more; he wants Jacob and the bride also wants him. They are ready to give guarantees that they will not act treacherously against him; and, in case he does not want her, she is ready to accept her divorce and forego her ketubah. In the face of such facts, how can any Rabbi, student, or judge, give heed to those who insidiously demand that R. Judah's daughter come to live in Rothenburg, knowing full well that she can not do so! It is obvious that these persons are only interested in extorting money from R. Judah, and it is not becoming your dignity to uphold the cause of these extortionists. Should we allow an Israelite daughter to become a deserted wife because her father is averse to becoming a victim of extortion? I know that R. Judah did not acquiesce; that he could not bear the idea of being coerced and forced to part with his money; and that he sent inquiries to the elders, the greatest authorities of France, and to other places. It appears that those authorities have all agreed that Jacob ought to be forced to marry his bride on her own terms or to divorce her. Although you are the greatest authority of our generation, you will not find it easy to oppose the decision of our great authorities, lest dissensions multiply in Israel. "Therefore, leave off contention, before the quarrel break out" (Proverbs 17,14). Signed: Eliezer b. Ephraim. (Am. II, 81).