Talmud for Ketubot 69:3

¹⁵¹The main parallels for the first part of this paragraph are Eruvin 10(Note 147) and Pesaḥim 6:1(33b 1.34), also Bava qamma3:12 (Notes 140–144); cf. Babli Šabbat106a, Beṣah 12b, Yebamot 16b, Bava qamma 34b, Sanhedrin 62b. There, we have stated¹⁵²Mishnah 13:3.: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes¹⁵³There is obviously a sentence missing here stating the position of R. Joḥanan. The sentence is reported in all parallel sources and is quoted by Naḥmanides in his Novellae to Šabbat 106a (ed. M. Herschler col. 365) as text here: “R. Joḥanan says, one making a fire only if he needs the ashes, one causing a wound only if he needs the blood.”. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.¹⁵⁴“Liable” and “not liable” here means financial responsibility for damages. The human who sets a fire on the Sabbath does not have to pay since he has committed a capital crime and it is a principle of talmudic law that the possibility of a death penalty bars monetary claims (cf. Terumot 7:1 Notes 16 ff.). The payment is excluded even if there is no possibility of criminal prosecution.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose¹⁵⁵The statement of the Mishnah does not mention intent; it excludes payment even if the ashes from the fire are not needed. This indicates that there is potential criminal liability also in this case, disproving R. Joḥanan’s assertion.. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose¹⁵⁶Naḥmanides (loc. cit. Note 153) quotes the text as: R. Ḥanina ben R. Hila said, this is correct. Since if it were for a purpose he would be guilty of a capital crime here even if it was for no purpose he is free from paying restitution. he should be free from paying restitution, from the following¹⁵⁷Lev. 23:21. Babli Ketubot 35a,38a; Bava qamma 35a; Sanhedrin 74b,84b.: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money¹⁵⁸The argument based on the Mishnah in Bava qamma is disproved; there is no Mishnaic source contradicting R. Joḥanan..