Nedarim 86
אבל אם היה הפקירו קודם לנדרו הרי זה מותר ואי אמרת עד דאתי לרשות זוכה מה לי נדרו קודם להפקירו מה לי הפקירו קודם לנדרו
but if his renunciation preceded his vow, it is permitted. Now if you say [that it belongs to the first owner] until it comes Into the possession of him who acquires it, what does it matter whether his vow preceded his renunciation or the reverse? — He raised the objection and answered it himself: He who vows has no thought of what he has renounced.
הוא מותיב לה והוא משני לה כל הנודר אין דעתו על מה שהפקיר
Raba objected: [If the dying person assigned] part [of his property] to the first, and all of it to the second, [and then recovered,] the first acquires, but not the second!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. B.B. 148b. The law of a sick person likely to die is this: If he assigns all his property to anyone, and then recovers, his gift is invalid, it being assumed that it was made only on account of expected death. But if he leaves part for himself, it is valid; for, we argue, were it on account of approaching death, he would have left nothing for himself. Here, when he made the first assignation, part was still left for himself: hence it remains valid on his recovery. But after the assignation of the second nothing is left: consequently, on his recovery, it is null. Now, if it is maintained that a gift is not valid until the recipient actually takes possession, why is it more valid for the first than for the second: just as the portion assigned to the second is the residue left by the first, so that assigned to the first may be regarded as the residue left by the second? — So Rashi. On this interpretation, 'all of it' means 'the rest of it'. Asheri and Tosaf., however, point out that in such a case both gifts would be null on recovery, since he leaves after all nothing for himself. Accordingly, they explain thus: He assigned part of his property to A, then all to B, meaning also that already assigned to A. Consequently his gift to B was the result of a new intention, not borne in mind when making his first gift. Now, just as in making a gift, the donor intends it to apply even to that which he has already given away, as shewn, so when one vows, the vow is made even with respect to that which he has previously declared hefker. This refutes the distinction drawn by R. Abba. — Ran has a variant reading of this passage. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
מתיב רבא מקצתן לראשון וכולן לשני ראשון קנה
But Raba said, This is R. Jose's reason: It is a preventive measure, on account of the gift of Beth Horon.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. 48a. There it is a case of a gift being an obvious evasion; so here too, his declaration of hefker does not appear genuine but as a mere evasion of his vow. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
שני לא קנה
It was taught: If one declares his field hefker: he can retract within the first three days, but not after.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This is in reference to the tithe. No tithe was due on produce taken from ownerless fields. Now, if he either revokes his declaration within the first three days, or takes possession without a formal retraction, his declaration is null: consequently, it has never been ownerless, and the crops must be tithed. But after three days, the declaration has legal force. Naturally, if no one else takes possession thereof, he can do so himself, but whether he or another, it is free from tithe. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>