Niddah 45
ולהכי אפניה רחמנא לבהמה משני צדדין כי היכי דלא נגמר מן מופנה מצד אחד
that in the case of beast the All Merciful made both terms available for deduction: In order that no deduction shall be made from one of which one term only is available for deduction.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since such a gezerah shawah, as stated supra, could be refuted. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
כל גזרה שוה שאינה מופנה כל עיקר למדין ומשיבין
in the name of R. Eleazar in the direction of leniency. From any <i>gezerah shawah</i> none of whose terms is available for deduction, one may make the deduction and one may also offer a refutation; if one of its terms only is available for the purpose, deduction, according to R. Ishmael, may be made and no refutation may be offered, while according to the Rabbis deduction may be made and a refutation may be offered; and if two of its terms are available for deduction, all agree that deduction may be made and no refutation may be offered. But according to the Rabbis<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who maintain that whether one, or none of the terms is available for deduction both deduction and refutation are admissible. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
מופנה מצד אחד לרבי ישמעאל למדין ואין משיבין לרבנן למדין ומשיבין
what is the practical difference between one whose one term is available for deduction and one none of whose terms is available for deduction? — The practical difference between them is the case where you find a <i>gezerah shawah</i> one of whose terms is available for deduction and another none of whose terms is available for the purpose, and neither the one nor the other can be refuted, in such a case we must leave the one neither of whose terms is available and make deduction from the one of which one term is available. But what refutation is there in this case?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The analogy (supra 22b) with man. Sc. since, as was explained supra, the only reason why deduction is made from a gezerah shawah both of whose terms are available for the purpose in preference to one of which one term only is available is the consideration that while the latter can be refuted when a logical refutation is offered the former cannot be refuted even in such a case, it follows that where no refutation can be offered it is immaterial whether the deduction is made from the one or the other. And since R. Meir (supra 22b) preferred the gezerah shawah between man and beast (both of whose terms are available) to that of man and sea-monsters (whose one term only is available) he must have intended to avoid thereby a refutation that had suggested itself to him. Now what was that refutation? ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
נ"מ היכא דמשכחת לה מופנה מצד אחד ושאינה מופנה כל עיקר ולאו להאי אית ליה פירכא ולאו להאי אית ליה פירכא שבקינן שאינה מופנה כל עיקר וגמרינן ממופנה מצד אחד
since he contracts uncleanness<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' From a dead creeping thing, for instance. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
והכא מאי פירכא איכא
even when he is alive.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Other creatures, however, while alive can never become unclean. It could, therefore, have been argued that man who is subject to the one restriction of uncleanness may also be a cause of uncleanness to his mother when he is born, but any other creature which is not subject to the former restriction is also exempt from the latter. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
מה לאדם שכן מטמא מחיים
This is the reason of R. Meir: Since the expression of 'forming' has been used in its case as in that of man. Said R. Ammi to him: Now then, If an abortion was in the shape of a mountain would the woman who aborted it<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'its mother'. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
א"ל רבי אמי
— The other replied: Does she ever abort a mountain? She can only abort something in the shape of a stone, and that can only be described as a lump.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To which the term 'mountain' cannot apply. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
(עמוס ד:יג) כי הנה יוצר הרים ובורא רוח
be unclean by reason of the birth because the expression of 'creating' has been used about it as about man, since it is written, And createth<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' An expression of 'creating' like that used of man. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
אבן היא דקא מפלת ההוא גוש איקרי אלא מעתה המפלת רוח תהא אמו טמאה לידה הואיל ונאמרה בו בריאה כאדם דכתיב {עמוס ד } ובורא רוח
is not available for deduction,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., it is required for its own context. ');"><sup>17</sup></span>
וכי תימא
[it could be retorted:] Since it could have been written, 'Formeth the mountains and the wind', and yet it was written 'And createth the wind' it may be inferred, may it not, that it<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. prev. n. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
לא מופנה מדהוה ליה למכתב יוצר הרים ורוח וכתיב ובורא רוח ש"מ לאפנויי
was intended to be made available for deduction? — The other replied: An analogy for legal purposes may be drawn between words that occur in the Pentateuch<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Torah, in its restrictive connotation. ');"><sup>18</sup></span>
א"ל
but no analogy may be drawn between words that occur respectively in the Pentateuch and in the post-Pentateuchal books.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Kabalah, lit., 'acceptance', 'tradition' as distinct from Torah. (Cf. prev. n.). ');"><sup>19</sup></span>
אלא מעתה המפלת דמות נחש תהא אמו טמאה לידה הואיל וגלגל עינו עגולה כשל אדם
eyes are similar to those of human beings. Now then, if an abortion was in the likeness of a serpent would the woman who aborted it<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'its mother'. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
וכי תימא
be unclean on account of the birth since its eye-ball is round like that of a human eye? And should you suggest that the law is so indeed [it could be retorted]: Why then was not the serpent mentioned?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In our Mishnah, among the shapes of creatures that cause the woman's uncleanness. ');"><sup>23</sup></span>
אי תנא נחש הוה אמינא
it might have been presumed that only in the case of the serpent do the Rabbis disagree with R. Meir, since the expression of 'forming' was not written about it but that in the case of a beast or a wild animal they do not differ from him since the expression of 'forming' had been written about it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the omission of the serpent. ');"><sup>24</sup></span>
והא גבי מומין קתני לה את שגלגל עינו עגול כשל אדם
'One whose eyeball is like that of a man'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Bek. 40a. Now since such likeness is regarded as a blemish it is obvious that the normal eye of a beast is different from the human one. How then could R. Johanan maintain that a beast's eyes are like human eyes? ');"><sup>26</sup></span>
מיתיבי
a bird whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head and R. Meir nevertheless ruled that it is a cause of uncleanness? — Abaye replied: This<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Meir's ruling just cited. ');"><sup>33</sup></span>
אלא פשיטא בשאר עופות מכלל דר"מ פליג בשאר עופות
does not then apply to other birds! An objection was raised: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Tosaf. supra 8b. s.v. [H]. Cur. edd. in parenthesis, 'Antigonus'. ');"><sup>36</sup></span>
חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני ר' חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר
stated, I approve of the view of R. Meir in regard to beasts and wild animals and that of the Sages in regard to birds. Now what did he mean by 'birds'? If it be suggested: kadia<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Or (as cur. edd.) 'karia', a species of owls. ');"><sup>34</sup></span>
והתניא א"ר אלעזר בר' צדוק
[the difficulty would arise]: Wherein do beasts and wild animals differ [from other creatures]? [Obviously in that] that their eyes are fixed in front of their heads like those of men. Now are not those of the kadia<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Or (as cur. edd.) 'karia', a species of owls. ');"><sup>34</sup></span>
אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא
he must have meant other birds. Thus it may be implied, may it not, that R. Meir differs from the Rabbis in regard to the other birds?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If he had not differed, there would have been no point in R. Hanina's statement, 'I would approve … that of the Sages'. ');"><sup>39</sup></span>
הואיל ויש להן לסתות כאדם
stated, I approve of the view of R. Meir in regard to beasts and wild animals, this applying also to the kadia and the kipufa; and that of the Sages in regard to other birds; for even R. Meir disagreed with them only in regard to the kadia and the kipufa, but in the case of other birds he agrees with them. And so it was also taught: R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok stated: An abortion that had the shape of a beast or a wild animal is, according to the view of R. Meir, regarded as a valid birth, but according to the view of the Sages it is no valid birth; and in the case of birds an examination should take place. Now according to whose view should an examination take place? Obviously<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'not?' ');"><sup>41</sup></span>
למאי נפקא מינה לאיתסורי באחותה
to the kadia and the kipufa and not to the other birds! R. Aha son of R. Ika retorted: No; the examination should take place according to the Rabbis who ruled that kadia and kipufa are regarded as valid births<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'yes'. ');"><sup>43</sup></span>
למימרא דחיי
but not other birds. But wherein does the kadia or the kipufa in this respect differ from beasts and wild animals?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who also have their eyes in the sides of their heads. If according to the Rabbis an abortion of the former causes uncleanness why should not also the latter? ');"><sup>44</sup></span>
לא אמרה ר"מ אלא הואיל ובמינו מתקיים
R. Jeremiah enquired of R. Zera: According to R. Meir who ruled: 'A beast that was in a woman's body is a valid birth', what is the law where its father<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who is entitled to effect the betrothal of his daughter while she is a minor. ');"><sup>46</sup></span>
מתקיים אמר רב ירמיה מדפתי
that it is viable! But did not Rab Judah citing Rab state: R. Meir gave his ruling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That an abortion of a beast or wild animal is regarded as a valid birth. ');"><sup>51</sup></span> only because in the case of its own species<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Beast born from beast or wild animal from wild animal. ');"><sup>52</sup></span> it is viable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But not when a woman aborted such creatures. The question of wife's sisters, consequently, could never arise in such a case. What then was the point in R. Jeremiah's peculiar enquiry? ');"><sup>53</sup></span> Said R. Aha b. Jacob: 'To such an extent did R. Jeremiah try<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By his absurd enquiries. ');"><sup>54</sup></span> to make R. Zera laugh; but the latter did not laugh'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is forbidden to indulge in laughter in this world (cf. Ber. 31a). ');"><sup>55</sup></span> [Reverting to] the [previous] text, 'Rab Judah citing Rab stated: R. Meir gave his ruling only because in the case of its own species it is viable.' Said R. Jeremiah of Difti: