Niddah 45

Chapter 45

א וילפינן מופנה משני צדדין ולהכי אפניה רחמנא לבהמה משני צדדין כי היכי דלא נגמר מן מופנה מצד אחד

1 and make the deduction from the latter. And it is for this reason1 that in the case of beast the All Merciful made both terms available for deduction: In order that no deduction shall be made from one of which one term only is available for deduction.2

ב רב אחא בריה דרבא מתני לה משמיה דרבי אלעזר לקולא כל גזרה שוה שאינה מופנה כל עיקר למדין ומשיבין מופנה מצד אחד לרבי ישמעאל למדין ואין משיבין לרבנן למדין ומשיבין מופנה משני צדדין דברי הכל למדין ואין משיבין

2 R. Aha son of Raba taught this3 in the name of R. Eleazar in the direction of leniency. From any gezerah shawah none of whose terms is available for deduction, one may make the deduction and one may also offer a refutation; if one of its terms only is available for the purpose, deduction, according to R. Ishmael, may be made and no refutation may be offered, while according to the Rabbis deduction may be made and a refutation may be offered; and if two of its terms are available for deduction, all agree that deduction may be made and no refutation may be offered. But according to the Rabbis4 what is the practical difference between one whose one term is available for deduction and one none of whose terms is available for deduction? — The practical difference between them is the case where you find a gezerah shawah one of whose terms is available for deduction and another none of whose terms is available for the purpose, and neither the one nor the other can be refuted, in such a case we must leave the one neither of whose terms is available and make deduction from the one of which one term is available. But what refutation is there in this case?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The analogy (supra 22b) with man. Sc. since, as was explained supra, the only reason why deduction is made from a gezerah shawah both of whose terms are available for the purpose in preference to one of which one term only is available is the consideration that while the latter can be refuted when a logical refutation is offered the former cannot be refuted even in such a case, it follows that where no refutation can be offered it is immaterial whether the deduction is made from the one or the other. And since R. Meir (supra 22b) preferred the gezerah shawah between man and beast (both of whose terms are available) to that of man and sea-monsters (whose one term only is available) he must have intended to avoid thereby a refutation that had suggested itself to him. Now what was that refutation? ');">5 — One might object:6

ג ולרבנן מאי איכא בין מופנה מצד אחד לשאינה מופנה כל עיקר

3 A man is different7

ד נ"מ היכא דמשכחת לה מופנה מצד אחד ושאינה מופנה כל עיקר ולאו להאי אית ליה פירכא ולאו להאי אית ליה פירכא שבקינן שאינה מופנה כל עיקר וגמרינן ממופנה מצד אחד

4 since he contracts uncleanness8

ה והכא מאי פירכא איכא משום דאיכא למיפרך מה לאדם שכן מטמא מחיים

5 even when he is alive.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Other creatures, however, while alive can never become unclean. It could, therefore, have been argued that man who is subject to the one restriction of uncleanness may also be a cause of uncleanness to his mother when he is born, but any other creature which is not subject to the former restriction is also exempt from the latter. ');">9 R. Hiyya b. Abba citing R. Johanan also stated,10 This is the reason of R. Meir: Since the expression of 'forming' has been used in its case as in that of man. Said R. Ammi to him: Now then, If an abortion was in the shape of a mountain would the woman who aborted it11

ו וכן א"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן היינו טעמא דר"מ הואיל ונאמרה בו יצירה כאדם

6 be unclean by reason of the birth because it is said, For, lo, He that formeth12 the mountains and createth the wind?13

ז א"ל רבי אמי אלא מעתה המפלת דמות הר אמו טמאה לידה שנאמר (עמוס ד:יג) כי הנה יוצר הרים ובורא רוח אמר ליה הר מי קא מפלת אבן היא דקא מפלת ההוא גוש איקרי

7 — The other replied: Does she ever abort a mountain? She can only abort something in the shape of a stone, and that can only be described as a lump.14 But then, if the abortion was some inflated object would the woman who aborted it11 be unclean by reason of the birth because the expression of 'creating' has been used about it as about man, since it is written, And createth15 the wind?13 And should you reply: it16 is not available for deduction,17

ח אלא מעתה המפלת רוח תהא אמו טמאה לידה הואיל ונאמרה בו בריאה כאדם דכתיב {עמוס ד } ובורא רוח וכי תימא לא מופנה מדהוה ליה למכתב יוצר הרים ורוח וכתיב ובורא רוח ש"מ לאפנויי

8 [it could be retorted:] Since it could have been written, 'Formeth the mountains and the wind', and yet it was written 'And createth the wind' it may be inferred, may it not, that it16 was intended to be made available for deduction? — The other replied: An analogy for legal purposes may be drawn between words that occur in the Pentateuch18

ט א"ל דנין דברי תורה מדברי תורה ואין דנין דברי תורה מדברי קבלה

9 but no analogy may be drawn between words that occur respectively in the Pentateuch and in the post-Pentateuchal books.19 Rabbah20

י (אמר) רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן היינו טעמא דר"מ הואיל ועיניהם דומות כשל אדם

10 b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan stated, This is the reason of R. Meir: Because [the pupils21 of] their22

יא אלא מעתה המפלת דמות נחש תהא אמו טמאה לידה הואיל וגלגל עינו עגולה כשל אדם וכי תימא הכי נמי ליתני נחש

11 eyes are similar to those of human beings. Now then, if an abortion was in the likeness of a serpent would the woman who aborted it11 be unclean on account of the birth since its eye-ball is round like that of a human eye? And should you suggest that the law is so indeed [it could be retorted]: Why then was not the serpent mentioned?23 — If the serpent had been mentioned23

יב אי תנא נחש הוה אמינא בנחש הוא דפליגי רבנן עליה דר"מ דלא כתיב ביה יצירה אבל בהמה וחיה לא פליגי דכתיבא ביה יצירה

12 it might have been presumed that only in the case of the serpent do the Rabbis disagree with R. Meir, since the expression of 'forming' was not written about it but that in the case of a beast or a wild animal they do not differ from him since the expression of 'forming' had been written about it.24 But was it not stated in regard to blemishes,25

יג והא גבי מומין קתני לה את שגלגל עינו עגול כשל אדם לא קשיא הא באוכמא הא בציריא

13 'One whose eyeball is like that of a man'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Bek. 40a. Now since such likeness is regarded as a blemish it is obvious that the normal eye of a beast is different from the human one. How then could R. Johanan maintain that a beast's eyes are like human eyes? ');">26 — This is no difficulty, the one27

יד רבי ינאי אמר היינו טעמא דר"מ הואיל ועיניהם הולכות לפניהם כשל אדם והרי עוף דאין עיניו הולכות לפניו וקאמר ר"מ דטמא אמר אביי בקריא וקיפופא ובשאר עופות לא

14 refers to the black of the eye28 while the other refers to the slit.29 R. Jannai stated, This is the reason of R. Meir: Because their30 eyes are fixed in the front of their heads31 like those of men. But what about32

טו מיתיבי ר' חנינא בן (אנטיגנוס) אומר נראין דברי ר"מ בבהמה וחיה ודברי חכמים בעופות

15 a bird whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head and R. Meir nevertheless ruled that it is a cause of uncleanness? — Abaye replied: This33 applies only to the kadia34 and the kipufa.35

טז מאי עופות אילימא בקריא וקיפופא מ"ש בהמה וחיה דעיניהן הולכות לפניהן כשל אדם קריא וקיפופא נמי

16 It33

יז אלא פשיטא בשאר עופות מכלל דר"מ פליג בשאר עופות

17 does not then apply to other birds! An objection was raised: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel36

יח חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני ר' חנינא בן אנטיגנוס אומר נראין דברי ר"מ בבהמה וחיה והוא הדין לקריא וקיפופא ודברי חכמים בשאר עופות שאף ר"מ לא נחלק עמהם אלא בקריא וקיפופא אבל בשאר עופות מודי להו

18 stated, I approve of the view of R. Meir in regard to beasts and wild animals and that of the Sages in regard to birds. Now what did he mean by 'birds'? If it be suggested: kadia34 and kipufa35

יט והתניא א"ר אלעזר בר' צדוק המפלת מין בהמה וחיה לדברי ר"מ ולד ולדברי חכמים אינו ולד ובעופות תיבדק

19 [the difficulty would arise]: Wherein do beasts and wild animals differ [from other creatures]? [Obviously in that] that their eyes are fixed in front of their heads like those of men. Now are not those of the kadia34 and the kipufa35

כ למאן תיבדק לאו לדברי ר"מ דאמר קריא וקיפופא אין שאר עופות לא

20 fixed in the same position?37 Consequently38

כא אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לא תיבדק לרבנן דאמרי קריא וקיפופא אין שאר עופות לא

21 he must have meant other birds. Thus it may be implied, may it not, that R. Meir differs from the Rabbis in regard to the other birds?39 — Some part is missing40

כב ומ"ש קריא וקיפופא מבהמה וחיה הואיל ויש להן לסתות כאדם

22 and this is the correct reading: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel36 stated, I approve of the view of R. Meir in regard to beasts and wild animals, this applying also to the kadia and the kipufa; and that of the Sages in regard to other birds; for even R. Meir disagreed with them only in regard to the kadia and the kipufa, but in the case of other birds he agrees with them. And so it was also taught: R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok stated: An abortion that had the shape of a beast or a wild animal is, according to the view of R. Meir, regarded as a valid birth, but according to the view of the Sages it is no valid birth; and in the case of birds an examination should take place. Now according to whose view should an examination take place? Obviously41

כג בעא מיניה רבי ירמיה מר' זירא לר"מ דאמר בהמה במעי אשה ולד מעליא הוא קבל בה אביה קידושין מהו למאי נפקא מינה לאיתסורי באחותה

23 according to that of R. Meir who ruled that the law42 applied43 to the kadia and the kipufa and not to the other birds! R. Aha son of R. Ika retorted: No; the examination should take place according to the Rabbis who ruled that kadia and kipufa are regarded as valid births43

כד למימרא דחיי והאמר רב יהודה אמר רב לא אמרה ר"מ אלא הואיל ובמינו מתקיים אמר רב אחא בר יעקב עד כאן הביאו רבי ירמיה לר' זירא לידי גיחוך ולא גחיך

24 but not other birds. But wherein does the kadia or the kipufa in this respect differ from beasts and wild animals?44 — In that they have jaws like those of men.45 R. Jeremiah enquired of R. Zera: According to R. Meir who ruled: 'A beast that was in a woman's body is a valid birth', what is the law where its father46 received for it a token of betrothal?47 — In what respect could this48

כה גופא אמר רב יהודה אמר רב לא אמרה רבי מאיר אלא הואיל ובמינו מתקיים אמר רב ירמיה מדפתי

25 ever matter? — In respect of causing its sister to be forbidden.49 This then presumes50 that it is viable! But did not Rab Judah citing Rab state: R. Meir gave his ruling51 only because in the case of its own species52 it is viable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' But not when a woman aborted such creatures. The question of wife's sisters, consequently, could never arise in such a case. What then was the point in R. Jeremiah's peculiar enquiry? ');">53 Said R. Aha b. Jacob: 'To such an extent did R. Jeremiah try54 to make R. Zera laugh; but the latter did not laugh'.55 [Reverting to] the [previous] text, 'Rab Judah citing Rab stated: R. Meir gave his ruling only because in the case of its own species it is viable.' Said R. Jeremiah of Difti:

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