Sanhedrin 67

מאי טעמא דר' יוסי בר יהודה דאמר קרא (במדבר לה, ל) עד אחד לא יענה בנפש למות למות הוא דאינו עונה אבל לזכות עונה ורבנן אמר ריש לקיש משום דמיחזי כנוגע בעדותו

What is R. Jose b. R. Judah's reason?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the view that the witnesses may change their evidence only in favour of the accused. ');">¹</span> — Scripture says: But one witness shall not testify against any person [that he die]:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Num. XXXV, 30. ');">²</span>

ורבנן האי למות מאי דרשי ביה מוקמי ליה באחד מן התלמידים כדתניא אמר אחד מן העדים יש לי ללמד עליו זכות מניין שאין שומעין לו ת"ל עד אחד לא יענה מניין לאחד מן התלמידים שאמר יש לי ללמד עליו חובה מניין שאין שומעין לו ת"ל אחד לא יענה בנפש למות:

hence, only 'so that he die' may he not testify, but he may testify for acquittal. And the Rabbis?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why do they forbid a change of his evidence in favour of the accused? ');">³</span> — Resh Lakish answered: Their reason is that the witness seems personally concerned in his testimony.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since he might have been induced to change his evidence in favour of the accused, lest he be proved a Zomem and so become subject to punishment by the law of retaliation. ');">⁴</span>

דיני נפשות המלמד כו': אמר רב לא שנו אלא בשעת משא ומתן אבל בשעת גמר דין מלמד זכות חוזר ומלמד חובה

But how do our Rabbis interpret, so that he die?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which seem to indicate that the testimony may not be changed only when it leads to death. ');">⁵</span> — They apply it to one of the disciples,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That he may not put forward arguments in favour of condemnation. ');">⁶</span>

מיתיבי למחרת משכימין ובאין המזכה אומר אני המזכה ומזכה אני במקומי המחייב אומר אני המחייב ומחייב אני במקומי המלמד חובה מלמד זכות אבל המלמד זכות אינו יכול לחזור וללמד חובה

as it has been taught: Whence do we learn that if one of the witnesses says, I have a statement to make in his favour, that he is not listened to? — From the verse, But one witness shall not testify.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Num. XXXV, 30. I.e., change his testimony even in his favour. ');">⁷</span> And whence do we know that if one of the disciples says, I can argue a point to his disadvantage, that he is not listened to? From the verse, One<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who is not a witness, but a disciple. ');">⁸</span>

והא למחרת גמר דין הוא וליטעמיך למחרת משא ומתן מי ליכא כי קתני בשעת משא ומתן

shall not testify against any person that he die.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ibid. But he may do so for acquittal. ');">⁹</span> IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ONE WHO ARGUED etc. Rab said: They taught this only of the period of the deliberations,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' When all endeavours must be used to strengthen the case for acquittal. ');">¹⁰</span>

ת"ש דנין אלו כנגד אלו עד שיראה אחד מן המחייבין דברי המזכין ואם איתא ליתני נמי איפכא תנא אזכות קא מהדר אחובה לא קא מהדר

but at the time of pronouncement of the verdict,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' When all arguments in favour of acquittal have been exhausted. ');">¹¹</span> one who has argued for acquittal may turn and argue for condemnation. An objection is raised:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. infra 40a. ');">¹²</span>

ת"ש דאמר ר' יוסי בר חנינא אחד מן התלמידים שזיכה ומת רואין אותו כאילו חי ועומד במקומו ואמאי נימא אילו הוה קיים הדר ביה השתא מיהא לא הדר ביה

On the following day, they rise early and assemble. He who was for acquittal declares, I was in favour of acquittal and I stand by my opinion. He who was for condemnation says, I was in favour of condemnation and I stand by my opinion. He who was in favour of condemnation may argue in favour of acquittal. But he who was in favour of acquittal may not retract and argue in favour of conviction. Now surely, on the 'the following day' the decision is to be promulgated!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Then why not retract in favour of conviction. ');">¹³</span> — But on thy view, are there no deliberations on the 'the following day'? Therefore the reference of the Mishnah is merely to the period of the deliberations.

והא שלחו מתם לדברי ר' יוסי בר חנינא מוצא מכלל רבינו אין מוצא איתמר

Come and hear! They debate the case amongst themselves, until one of those who are for conviction agrees with those who are for acquittal.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 40a. ');">¹⁴</span> Now if that is so,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz., that when the decision is about to be pronounced, an opinion can be reversed even for condemnation. ');">¹⁵</span>

תא שמע שני סופרי הדיינין עומדין לפניהן אחד מן הימין ואחד מן השמאל וכותבין דברי המזכין ודברי המחייבין

then he [the Tanna] should have taught the reverse too! — But the Tanna fosters the possibilities of acquittal, not those of condemnation.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Theoretically, however, the trend of the debate might be in the reverse direction. ');">¹⁶</span> Come and hear! R. Jose b. Hanina said: If one of the disciples pronounced for acquittal and then died, he is regarded [when the vote is taken] as if he were alive and [standing] in his place.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 43a. ');">¹⁷</span>

בשלמא דברי המחייבין למחר חזו טעמא אחרינא ובעו למעבד הלנת דין אלא דברי המזכין מאי טעמא לאו משום דאי חזו טעמא אחרינא לחובה לא משגחינן בהו

But why not assume, had he been alive, he might have retracted?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In favour of conviction, when judgment is pronounced. ');">¹⁸</span> — Because in fact he did not retract! But did they not send [a message] from 'there' [Palestine], that the words of R. Jose b. Hanina preclude the words of our Master?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Sc. Rab. Therefore his ruling not to consider an eventual change of opinion is due to the fact that he holds that at the promulgation of the decision one cannot retract. ');">¹⁹</span>

לא כדי שלא יאמרו שנים טעם אחד משני מקראות כדבעא מיניה רבי אסי מרבי יוחנן אמרו שנים טעם אחד משני מקראות מהו אמר ליה אין מונין להן אלא אחד

The true version was, 'Do not preclude [the words of our Master]'. Come and hear! Two judges' clerks stand before them [the judges], one on the right and one on the left, and indite the arguments of those who would acquit, and those who would convict.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra 36b. ');">²⁰</span>

מנהני מילי אמר אביי דאמר קרא (תהלים סב, יב) אחת דבר אלהים שתים זו שמעתי כי עז לאלהים מקרא אחד יוצא לכמה טעמים ואין טעם אחד יוצא מכמה מקראות דבי ר' ישמעאל תנא (ירמיהו כג, כט) וכפטיש יפוצץ סלע מה פטיש זה מתחלק לכמה ניצוצות אף מקרא אחד יוצא לכמה טעמים

Now, as for the arguments for conviction. It is well [that they be recorded], for on the following day another argument<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For condemnation. ');">²¹</span> may be discovered, which necessitates postponement of judgment over night.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra 17a; i.e., so as to give the judges a chance to alter their opinion. Hence the necessity of recording their statements in order to shew that they have changed their grounds for conviction, so necessitating a further postponement. ');">²²</span>

היכי דמי טעם אחד משני מקראות אמר רב זביד כדתנן מזבח מקדש את הראוי לו

But why [record] the grounds of the defenders; surely so that should they discover different arguments for conviction, they may not be heeded?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Unless they erred in a law accepted even by the Sadducees. Hence the necessity of recording their grounds for acquittal in order to be able to discover the nature of the error. This proves that an opinion for conviction may not be reversed even at the time of the promulgation of the decision. ');">²³</span> — No, it is lest two judges draw a single argument from two Scriptural verses, as R. Assi asked R. Johanan: What if two [judges] derive the same argument from two verses? — He answered: They are only counted as one.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since no two verses are intended to teach one and the same thing, one of the judges must have erred. ');">²⁴</span>

רבי יהושע אומר כל הראוי לאשים אם עלה לא ירד שנאמר (ויקרא ו, ב) העולה על מוקדה מה עולה שהיא ראויה לאשים אם עלתה לא תרד אף כל שהוא ראוי לאשים אם עלה לא ירד

Whence do we know this? — Abaye answered: For Scripture saith, God hath spoken once, twice have I heard this, that strength belongeth unto God.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ps. LXII, 12. ');">²⁵</span> One Biblical verse may convey several teachings, but a single teaching cannot be deduced from different Scriptural verses. In R. Ishmael's School it was taught: And like in hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Jer. XXIII, 29. ');">²⁶</span>

רבן גמליאל אומר כל הראוי למזבח אם עלה לא ירד שנאמר היא העולה על מוקדה על המזבח מה עולה שהיא ראויה לגבי מזבח אם עלתה לא תרד אף כל שהוא ראוי למזבח אם עלה לא ירד

i.e., just as [the rock] is split into many splinters,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The test contains a grammatical difficulty. Literally translated, it is, Just as the hammer is split etc.; whereas for the present translation, the text must read [H] instead of [H], and some commentators emend the text accordingly. R. Tam, however, on the basis of Ekah R. IV, 7, retains the present text and its literal translation, as above, and explains, Just as the hammer, when it smites an extraordinary hard object, may itself be split, — so may the Biblical verse, when subjected to the scrutiny of a very keen intellect, split up into different meanings. ');">²⁷</span> so also may one Biblical verse convey many teachings.

ותרוייהו מאי קמרבו פסולין מר מייתי לה ממוקדה ומר מייתי לה ממזבח

What is an example of: 'One argument drawn from two Biblical verses'? — R. Zebid answered: As we learnt: The Altar sanctifies<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., that nothing that was laid upon it may be taken back. ');">²⁸</span> all that is 'fit' for it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., anything which has come into contact or relationship with the altar, after having been appointed for it. Even if it became subsequently invalid for its original purpose, for any reason, e.g., in the case of a sacrifice, if the officiating priest slaughtered it with a forbidden intention, it nevertheless retained its sanctity. Now, this statement lays down the general principle with which all are in agreement, the further definition and application of which form the subject of dispute amongst various teachers whose views the Mishnah proceeds to state. ');">²⁹</span>

והא התם מיפלג פליגי דקתני סיפא אין בין דברי רבן גמליאל לדברי ר' יהושע אלא הדם והנסכים שר"ג אומר לא ירדו ור' יהושע אומר ירדו

R. Joshua said: [That means,] Anything 'fit' for the fire of the Altar',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., only that which could have served that purpose. e.g., the flesh of a burnt offering. If, however, the blood of a sacrifice became invalid, since that is not intended to feed the fires of the altar, it does not retain its sanctity. ');">³⁰</span> once it ascended [thereon], may not descend,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., may not be taken back, for the altar has given it a sacred character. ');">³¹</span>

אלא אמר רב פפא כדתניא ר' יוסי הגלילי אומר מתוך שנאמר

for it is written: The burnt offering, it is that which goeth up upon its fire-wood, upon the altar:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. VI, 2. ');">³²</span> Just as the burnt offering which is 'fit' for the altar-fire, once it ascended, may not descend,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Derived from&nbsp;… upon the altar all night unto the morning. (ibid). ');">³³</span> so everything which is 'fit' for the altar-fire, once it ascends, may not descend. R. Gamaliel said: Anything 'fit' for the altar,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., not only fit for the fires of the altar, but used in any service of the altar. Hence, in his opinion, the law applied to blood and libations too, since these were respectively sprinkled and poured upon the altar. ');">³⁴</span> once it has ascended, may not descend, for it is written: The burnt offering, it is that which goeth up upon its fire-wood upon the altar: Just as the burnt offering which is 'fit' for the altar, once it has ascended, may not descend, so everything else which is 'fit' for the altar, once it has ascended, may not descend. What do both include?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Among the things which may not be taken back when once laid upon the altar. ');">³⁵</span> — Invalidated objects.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As explained in note 2. ');">³⁶</span> One Master [sc. R. Joshua] deduces the law from the word 'fire-wood', and the other from 'altar'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Now, at this stage it is assumed that since both deduce the same general principle from two different verses, there is no real disagreement between them. Thus this affords an illustration of 'one law drawn from two different verses. ');">³⁷</span> But there, they do actually differ! For the second clause [of that Mishnah] states: R. Gamaliel and R. Joshua differ only with reference to the Sacrificial blood and libations: according to R. Gamaliel. these may not descend; whereas in R. Joshua's view, they do descend.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e.. they lose their sanctity. For the explanation of this, v. p. 215. n. 3. Hence, this is not a true example of one law devised from two texts. (Note: A single word is also referred to as a 'verse' or 'text'.) ');">³⁸</span> But, said R. Papa, it [the required example] is illustrated in the following Baraitha: R. Jose the Galilean said: From the verse,