יג ואיבעית אימא לעולם לא קנסו ולא קשיא כאן לאותה חצר
13 do the Rabbis permit him to remove it before he incurs the liability of a sin-offering, or not?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If it remains in the oven until baked he incurs a sin-offering for baking on the Sabbath. On the other hand, it is Rabbinically forbidden to remove bread from the oven on the Sabbath. How is it here? ');"><sup>13</sup></span> Now you may deduce that they do not permit it!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the reverse answer is not given, we see that the Rabbis do not abrogate their interdict even when it leads to a liability to a sin-offering. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> That is no difficulty, and indeed solves it! Alternatively, you cannot solve it, after all: [and reply thus],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To reconcile the two Baraithas. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> The one Baraitha refers to an unwitting, the other to a deliberate act. Where it is unwitting, the Rabbis did not punish him<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. n. 1. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> for it; where it is deliberate, they punished.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Thus this has no bearing on R. Bibi b. Abaye's problem. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> Another alternative: both [Baraithas] refer to an unwitting act, but here they differ as to whether they [the Rabbis] punished an unwitting [offender] on account of a deliberate one: one Master holds that they did punish an unwitting [offender] on account of a deliberate one; the other, that they did not punish an unwitting [offender] on account of a deliberate one. Another alternative: after all, they did not punish [the one on account of the other], yet there is no difficulty. The one [Baraitha] means into the same courtyard;