Yevamot 237
מתני׳ <big><strong>האשה</strong></big> שהלך בעלה וצרתה למדינת הים ובאו ואמרו לה מת בעליך לא תנשא ולא תתייבם עד שתדע שמא מעוברת היא צרתה
<b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. A WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND AND RIVAL WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, AND TO WHOM PEOPLE CAME AND SAID, 'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD', MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since her husband, when he departed, was known to have had no issue. ');"><sup>1</sup></span> NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It being possible that her rival had a child from their husband. ');"><sup>2</sup></span> UNTIL SHE HAS ASCERTAINED WHETHER HER RIVAL IS PREGNANT.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If the rival is found to be pregnant the woman is free to marry again; and if she is not pregnant, levirate marriage or halizah must be performed. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
היתה לה חמות אינה חוששת יצתה מליאה חוששת רבי יהושע אומר אינה חוששת:
IF SHE HAD<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Overseas. ');"><sup>4</sup></span> A MOTHER-IN-LAW<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who, at the time of her departure, had no other son but the one who is now dead. ');"><sup>5</sup></span> SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BIRTH OF ANOTHER SON];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To her mother-in-law. It is only in respect of a rival that the possibility of a birth must be taken notice of, since a child, whatever its sex, exempts the woman from the levirate obligations. In the case of a mother-in-law, however, the birth of a female would not affect the woman's freedom to marry again, since it is only a male that subjects her to the levirate obligations. There is no need to apprehend that the mother-in-law had not only (a) given birth to a child but also (b) that that child was not a female but a male. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> מאי היא צרתה הא קמ"ל להא צרה הוא דחיישינן אבל לצרה אחריתי לא חיישינן:
BUT IF SHE DEPARTED WHILE PREGNANT [SUCH POSSIBILITY] MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the only doubt is whether the child was a male. Cf. supra n. 6. ');"><sup>7</sup></span> R. JOSHUA RULED; SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [SUCH A POSSIBILITY].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because here also two possibilities must be postulated: (a) that the mother-in-law did not miscarry and (b) that the child born was not a female but a male. ');"><sup>8</sup></span> <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. What is implied by<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'she' or 'it'. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
לא תנשא ולא תתייבם וכו': בשלמא יבומי לא דדלמא מיעברא וקפגעה באשת אח דאורייתא אלא לא תנשא אמאי הלך אחר רוב נשים ורוב נשים מתעברות ויולדות
'HER RIVAL'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Emphasis on HER. ');"><sup>10</sup></span> — It is this that we are told: {The possibility of a birth in respect] of that rival<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> need be apprehended; in respect of another rival, however, it need not be apprehended.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If witnesses testified that the known rival (v. supra n. 11) was not pregnant there is no need to apprehend the possibility of a marriage with another wife who may have given birth to a child. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
לימא ר"מ היא דחייש למיעוטא
MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE etc. It is quite proper that she shall not contract levirate marriage since it is possible that [her rival] is pregnant and that she would in consequence cause an infringement<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'meet'. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> [of the prohibition against marriage] of a brother's wife, which is Pentateuchal; but why should she not marry [a stranger]? The majority of women should be taken as a criterion<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'go'. ');"><sup>14</sup></span> and the majority of women conceive and bear children! Must it then<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the majority principle is not followed. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
אפילו תימא רבנן כי אזלי רבנן בתר רובא רובא דאיתיה קמן כגון תשע חנויות וסנהדרי אבל רובא דליתיה קמן לא אזלי רבנן בתר רובא
be assumed that [the ruling is that of] R. Meir who takes a minority also into consideration?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hul. 6a; and since some women do not conceive and bear, the possibility that the rival belonged to this minority must be provided against by forbidding levirate marriage. Would then our anonymous Mishnah represent the view of an individual! ');"><sup>16</sup></span> — It may even be said [to represent the view of] the Rabbis; for the Rabbis follow<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'when do they go'. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> the majority principle only where the majority is actually present<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'which is before us'. ');"><sup>18</sup></span>
והרי קטן וקטנה דרובא דליתא קמן היא ואזלי רבנן בתר רובא דתניא קטן וקטנה לא חולצין ולא מייבמין דברי ר' מאיר אמרו לו לר' מאיר יפה אמרת שאין חולצין איש כתיב בפרשה ומקשינן אשה לאיש אלא מה טעם אין מייבמין
as, for instance, in the case of 'nine shops'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which were selling permitted meat, while one shop in their vicinity was selling forbidden meat. If between these shops a piece of meat was found and it is not known from which shop it came, it is assumed to be permitted meat, since the majority of the shops were selling meat of such a character. V. Hul. 95a. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> and 'Sanhedrin',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A majority of whom (twelve against eleven) are in favour of a certain decision. V. Sanh. 40a. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> but in respect of a majority that is not actually present<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The majority of women in general who are assumed to conceive and bear. ');"><sup>21</sup></span>
אמר להם קטן שמא ימצא סריס קטנה שמא תמצא אילונית ונמצאו פוגעים בערוה ורבנן סברי זיל בתר רובא דקטנים ורוב קטנים לאו סריסי נינהו זיל בתר רוב קטנות ורוב קטנות לאו אילונית נינהו אלא מחוורתא מתניתין רבי מאיר היא
the Rabbis were not guided by the majority principle. Behold the case of a minor boy and a minor girl, where the majority is one that is not actually present and the Rabbis nevertheless follow the majority principle; for it was taught: A minor, whether male or female, may neither perform nor submit to <i>halizah</i>, nor may he contract levirate marriage; so R. Meir. They said to R. Meir: You spoke well [when you ruled] that 'He may neither perform nor submit to halizah', since in the Pentateuchal section<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Dealing with halizah. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> man was written,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Deut. XXV, 7. ');"><sup>23</sup></span>
במאי אוקימתא כר' מאיר אימא סיפא היתה לה חמות אינה חוששת אמאי הלך אחר רוב נשים ורוב נשים מתעברות ויולדות מיעוט מפילות וכל היולדות מחצה זכרים ומחצה נקבות סמוך מיעוטא דמפילות למחצה נקבות והוו ליה זכרים מיעוטא וליחוש
and we draw a comparison between 'woman' and man.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the male must be of mature age and not a minor, so must also be the female. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> What, however, is the reason why he may not contract levirate marriage? He replied: Because a minor male might be found to be a saris;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Glos. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> a minor female might be found to be incapable of procreation; and thus the law of incest would be violated. The Rabbis, however, maintain, 'Follow the majority of male minors'; and the majority of male minors are not sarisin;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Pl. of saris, v. Glos. ');"><sup>26</sup></span>
דלמא כיון דאיחזקה לשוק לא חייש רישא דאיחזק לייבום תייבם
'Follow the majority of female minors' and the majority of female minors are not incapable of procreation!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Bek. 19b. Cf. supra 61b, 105b. The majority spoken of here is, surely, one which is not actually present, and the Rabbis are nevertheless guided by it! ');"><sup>27</sup></span> — But, clearly, [it must be admitted], our Mishnah represents the view of R. Meir. How have you explained it?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'in what did you place it', sc. the first clause of our Mishnah. ');"><sup>28</sup></span>
אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה רישא דאיסור כרת חששו סיפא דאיסור לאו לא חששו
That it is in agreement with the view of<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'like'. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> R. Meir? Read, then, the final clause: IF SHE HAD A MOTHER-IN-LAW SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BIRTH OF ANOTHER SON]; but why? One should be guided by the majority of women, and the majority of women conceive and bear while a minority miscarry, and, since all those who bear [produce] a half of males and a half of females, the minority of those who miscarry should be added to the half [of those who bear] females, and so the males would constitute a minority which<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to R. Meir. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> should be taken into consideration!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And, contrary to the ruling in our Mishnah, the woman should, as in the first clause, be forbidden marriage. ');"><sup>31</sup></span>
אמר רבא מכדי הא דאורייתא והא דאורייתא מה לי איסור כרת מה לי איסור לאו אלא אמר רבא
— It is possible that since the woman was confirmed<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' When her mother-in-law departed. ');"><sup>32</sup></span> in her status of permissibility to strangers<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'to the market'; because there was no known levir. ');"><sup>33</sup></span> [the possibility of the birth of a levir] was not taken by him<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Meir. ');"><sup>34</sup></span> into consideration. In the first clause, then,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If a woman's confirmed status at a certain period is a determining factor. ');"><sup>35</sup></span> where she was confirmed in the status of eligibility for the levirate marriage,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since her husband when he departed, had no issue. ');"><sup>36</sup></span> let her contract the levirate marriage! — R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: In the first clause where a prohibition which is subject to the penalty of <i>kareth</i> [is involved, the possibility of the birth of a son]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By the rival. ');"><sup>37</sup></span> had to be provided against; in the final clause, however, where a prohibitory law [only is involved]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The marriage of a yebamah to a stranger. ');"><sup>38</sup></span> no [such possibility]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That a son was born by the mother-in-law. ');"><sup>39</sup></span> was taken into consideration. Said Raba: Consider: The one [prohibition] is Pentateuchal and the other also is Pentateuchal;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Neither is a mere Rabbinically preventive measure. ');"><sup>40</sup></span> what matters it, then, whether the prohibition is one involving <i>kareth</i> or whether it is only a mere prohibitory law? — Rather, said Raba;