פירוש על קידושין 119:19

Abaye explains that if there are multiple betrothers, Rav would hold that she can only be betrothed to either the first (if the statement is taken as a stipulation) or the last (if it was a retraction). She could not be betrothed to any of the middle ones.

Abaye explains that if there are multiple betrothers, Rav would hold that she can only be betrothed to either the first (if the statement is taken as a stipulation) or the last (if it was a retraction). She could not be betrothed to any of the middle ones.

Were it not for Abaye we might have thought that “now and after thirty days” could imply both a stipulation and a retraction. This would mean that she would be doubtfully betrothed to each man and require a get from all of them. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that to Rav the language means either stipulation or retraction. Not both.

R. Yohanan holds that each act of betrothal was partial, leaving room for the next. Therefore, they all must give her a get. This seems to differ from the approaches we saw above. The idea would be that the betrothal begins immediately but does not fully take effect for another thirty days. Therefore, she is betrothed to them all.

This baraita seems to imply that when one says “Behold this is your divorce from today and after” it is doubtful whether it is a stipulation “from today if I die” in which case she is divorced or a retraction (and means she is divorced only after his death) in which case she is not divorced. To remedy the situation she must have halitzah (in case she is not divorced) but can’t do yibbum (in case she was divorced). This accords well with Rav. And Shmuel could say that this baraita holds like the Rabbis whereas he holds like Rabbi according to whom the divorce is valid for he holds that it is a stipulation.
But according to R. Yohanan who holds that these statements imply “partial” application, this statement should not work at all for there can be no “partial” divorce. There is a rule that the divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife. If so, she should be able to have yibbum for she is a widow not a divorcee.

This baraita seems to imply that when one says “Behold this is your divorce from today and after” it is doubtful whether it is a stipulation “from today if I die” in which case she is divorced or a retraction (and means she is divorced only after his death) in which case she is not divorced. To remedy the situation she must have halitzah (in case she is not divorced) but can’t do yibbum (in case she was divorced). This accords well with Rav. And Shmuel could say that this baraita holds like the Rabbis whereas he holds like Rabbi according to whom the divorce is valid for he holds that it is a stipulation.
But according to R. Yohanan who holds that these statements imply “partial” application, this statement should not work at all for there can be no “partial” divorce. There is a rule that the divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife. If so, she should be able to have yibbum for she is a widow not a divorcee.

This baraita seems to imply that when one says “Behold this is your divorce from today and after” it is doubtful whether it is a stipulation “from today if I die” in which case she is divorced or a retraction (and means she is divorced only after his death) in which case she is not divorced. To remedy the situation she must have halitzah (in case she is not divorced) but can’t do yibbum (in case she was divorced). This accords well with Rav. And Shmuel could say that this baraita holds like the Rabbis whereas he holds like Rabbi according to whom the divorce is valid for he holds that it is a stipulation.
But according to R. Yohanan who holds that these statements imply “partial” application, this statement should not work at all for there can be no “partial” divorce. There is a rule that the divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife. If so, she should be able to have yibbum for she is a widow not a divorcee.

Rava explains that to R. Yohanan in this case the divorce is partial but death completes the severing of the ties. Therefore, even R. Yohanan can explain why she must have halitzah (she’s not fully a divorcee) but not yibbum (she is partially a divorcee).

Abaye notes that we cannot so easily combine the effects of divorce with the effects of death. Divorce causes her to be exempt from yibbum whereas death makes her liable for yibbum. Thus we need another way for R. Yohanan to read the baraita according to which she must undergo halitzah and not yibbum.

Abaye says that in principle R. Yohanan would hold that if he says “From today and when I die” this would not be a valid get and she could have yibbum (because she would be a widow). But he does not allow her to undergo yibbum lest people think that the same would be true if he says, “From today if I die” which is definitely a valid get, since this is certainly a stipulation.

The Talmud notes that the logic should work in the other direction as well. If we say that she cannot have yibbum in one case then we should say the same about the other case. In other words, they are both similar, so we should not let he have yibbum in one lest she come to perform yibbum in the other.

In the end, the Talmud admits that while it is preferable for her to have halitzah in a case where he says “from today and after my death” if she does have yibbum it is not a problem. Again, in this case there is no real doubt to R. Yohanan that this is not a valid divorce. It is only a rabbinic prohibition that she should have halitzah and not yibbum lest people allow the woman divorced by a man who said “from today if I die” who most certainly may not have yibbum.

In the end, the Talmud admits that while it is preferable for her to have halitzah in a case where he says “from today and after my death” if she does have yibbum it is not a problem. Again, in this case there is no real doubt to R. Yohanan that this is not a valid divorce. It is only a rabbinic prohibition that she should have halitzah and not yibbum lest people allow the woman divorced by a man who said “from today if I die” who most certainly may not have yibbum.

In such a case the woman is immediately betrothed and the man must thereafter give her two hundred zuz. If he does not give her two hundred zuz, the betrothal becomes invalid. The problem is that since he didn’t set a time limit he has an unlimited time to give her the two hundred zuz. Potentially, the only way for the betrothal to become invalid would be for him to die before he gives her the money. In such a case she would not be considered his widow and she would not be liable for yibbum. Therefore, this is not a particularly good way of performing betrothal, especially for the woman.

In such a case the woman is immediately betrothed and the man must thereafter give her two hundred zuz. If he does not give her two hundred zuz, the betrothal becomes invalid. The problem is that since he didn’t set a time limit he has an unlimited time to give her the two hundred zuz. Potentially, the only way for the betrothal to become invalid would be for him to die before he gives her the money. In such a case she would not be considered his widow and she would not be liable for yibbum. Therefore, this is not a particularly good way of performing betrothal, especially for the woman.

In this case, all the man has to do is demonstrate that he owns two hundred zuz. Again, she is betrothed immediately and he must prove that he has two hundred zuz. However, we should note that in order to be certain that the betrothal is invalid she would have to prove that he doesn’t own two hundred zuz. This will not be easy and again the woman is in a disadvantageous situation.

Here he must not only own two hundred zuz, but show her the cash (or its equivalent). He may not show her two hundred zuz lying on a table unless he actually owns them. Just as in section two, this too seems to be better for the woman. Here she can actually see that he owns the two hundred zuz and need not worry about proving (or disproving) it.

The mishnah only stated that “he must give the two hundred zuz.” The amoraim disagree over whether this means that she is betrothed immediately and he owes her 200 zuz, or whether the betrothal takes effect only after he gives her the two hundred zuz.

The practical difference between these two opinions would arise in a case where before receiving the two hundred zuz she accepted kiddushin from another man. If the original act of kiddushin was a condition then the second act of kiddushin is not valid. But if we say that the first act is not valid until he gives the money, then the second act would be valid.

As we have already seen a few times, the same exact debate occurs with regard to divorce—is the divorce valid and then she must give the money. Or is the divorce valid only when she gives the money.