פירוש על קידושין 24:26

Poor Judith, wife of R. Hisda. Her birth pains are so bad that she claims that she was betrothed to someone else and therefore her marriage to R. Hiyya is invalid. Essentially, she is in such pain that she wants to end her marriage. Like R. Hisda, R. Hiyya says that people cannot just make up things to invalidate marriages. Such power could threaten to destabilize marriage altogether.

The other rabbis respond to R. Hisda—how can you invalidate the betrothal? There are witnesses elsewhere who will vouch for the fact that the stone was worth a perutah.

R. Hisda responds that the court does not take into account witnesses who are not present. This also came up in a case that came before R. Hanina. The case is found in Ketubot. Shmuel’s daughters appear at court and say that they were taken captive but that they were not raped. [If they were raped, they would be prohibited from marrying a Kohen. Any woman who has had sex with someone prohibited to her cannot marry a Kohen, even if the sex was not willing]. Since they testify that they were taken captive, they are also believed to say that they were not raped (the principle of “the mouth that prohibits is the same mouth that permits”). This is so even though there are witnesses sitting right outside that say that she was taken captive. The principle is clear—the words of witnesses are taken into account only if they actually testify. We are not “concerned” that there might be witnesses elsewhere.

R. Hisda responds that the court does not take into account witnesses who are not present. This also came up in a case that came before R. Hanina. The case is found in Ketubot. Shmuel’s daughters appear at court and say that they were taken captive but that they were not raped. [If they were raped, they would be prohibited from marrying a Kohen. Any woman who has had sex with someone prohibited to her cannot marry a Kohen, even if the sex was not willing]. Since they testify that they were taken captive, they are also believed to say that they were not raped (the principle of “the mouth that prohibits is the same mouth that permits”). This is so even though there are witnesses sitting right outside that say that she was taken captive. The principle is clear—the words of witnesses are taken into account only if they actually testify. We are not “concerned” that there might be witnesses elsewhere.

Abaye and Rava disagree with R. Hisda’s analogy between the case of a captive woman and the married woman. The rabbis were lenient in the case of the captive woman because they assume she will try to prevent herself from being raped. She, they argue, is not at all an adulteress.
But there is no reason to be lenient about the married woman. Furthermore, the prohibition here is much more serious than a woman marrying a priest. Here, if the first marriage is valid, the second marriage is adulterous. Therefore, we should be concerned about witnesses who might know that the object is worth a perutah.

Abaye and Rava disagree with R. Hisda’s analogy between the case of a captive woman and the married woman. The rabbis were lenient in the case of the captive woman because they assume she will try to prevent herself from being raped. She, they argue, is not at all an adulteress.
But there is no reason to be lenient about the married woman. Furthermore, the prohibition here is much more serious than a woman marrying a priest. Here, if the first marriage is valid, the second marriage is adulterous. Therefore, we should be concerned about witnesses who might know that the object is worth a perutah.

R. Joseph sends back two laws. We will start with the second—the marriage is valid and therefore she requires a divorce, should she want to marry someone else. This is true even though the myrtle branch is probably not worth a perutah, because, as Shmuel taught, we are concerned lest the object is worth a perutah somewhere else.
However, he is also to be lashed for Rav said that it is immodest to betroth a woman in the marketplace. This begins a list of actions that are technically legal but should not be done. Betrothal can, according to the mishnah, be performed through intercourse. But Rav does not allow it and punishes one who does so. Shiddukhin are akin to modern betrothal—a non-legal commitment to marry made by the two families. While a man can betroth a woman without arranging it with her parents, Rav would punish one who does so. Annulling a divorce before the get arrives in the woman’s hand is possible. But since it creates so many potential problems, namely the woman might think she is divorced when she is not, Rav punishes one who does so.
The next two have to do with respect for rabbinic authority. Harassing a messenger of the rabbis shows lack of respect for the rabbis.
The rabbis have the power to put someone under the ban (to excommunicate him) in order to force him to act in accordance with the law, for instance to pay a debt. Someone who allows this ban to remain for over thirty days is punished additionally by lashes.
The final case is also different. A son-in-law should not live with his mother-in-law for fear of sexual impropriety.

R. Joseph sends back two laws. We will start with the second—the marriage is valid and therefore she requires a divorce, should she want to marry someone else. This is true even though the myrtle branch is probably not worth a perutah, because, as Shmuel taught, we are concerned lest the object is worth a perutah somewhere else.
However, he is also to be lashed for Rav said that it is immodest to betroth a woman in the marketplace. This begins a list of actions that are technically legal but should not be done. Betrothal can, according to the mishnah, be performed through intercourse. But Rav does not allow it and punishes one who does so. Shiddukhin are akin to modern betrothal—a non-legal commitment to marry made by the two families. While a man can betroth a woman without arranging it with her parents, Rav would punish one who does so. Annulling a divorce before the get arrives in the woman’s hand is possible. But since it creates so many potential problems, namely the woman might think she is divorced when she is not, Rav punishes one who does so.
The next two have to do with respect for rabbinic authority. Harassing a messenger of the rabbis shows lack of respect for the rabbis.
The rabbis have the power to put someone under the ban (to excommunicate him) in order to force him to act in accordance with the law, for instance to pay a debt. Someone who allows this ban to remain for over thirty days is punished additionally by lashes.
The final case is also different. A son-in-law should not live with his mother-in-law for fear of sexual impropriety.

R. Joseph sends back two laws. We will start with the second—the marriage is valid and therefore she requires a divorce, should she want to marry someone else. This is true even though the myrtle branch is probably not worth a perutah, because, as Shmuel taught, we are concerned lest the object is worth a perutah somewhere else.
However, he is also to be lashed for Rav said that it is immodest to betroth a woman in the marketplace. This begins a list of actions that are technically legal but should not be done. Betrothal can, according to the mishnah, be performed through intercourse. But Rav does not allow it and punishes one who does so. Shiddukhin are akin to modern betrothal—a non-legal commitment to marry made by the two families. While a man can betroth a woman without arranging it with her parents, Rav would punish one who does so. Annulling a divorce before the get arrives in the woman’s hand is possible. But since it creates so many potential problems, namely the woman might think she is divorced when she is not, Rav punishes one who does so.
The next two have to do with respect for rabbinic authority. Harassing a messenger of the rabbis shows lack of respect for the rabbis.
The rabbis have the power to put someone under the ban (to excommunicate him) in order to force him to act in accordance with the law, for instance to pay a debt. Someone who allows this ban to remain for over thirty days is punished additionally by lashes.
The final case is also different. A son-in-law should not live with his mother-in-law for fear of sexual impropriety.

R. Joseph sends back two laws. We will start with the second—the marriage is valid and therefore she requires a divorce, should she want to marry someone else. This is true even though the myrtle branch is probably not worth a perutah, because, as Shmuel taught, we are concerned lest the object is worth a perutah somewhere else.
However, he is also to be lashed for Rav said that it is immodest to betroth a woman in the marketplace. This begins a list of actions that are technically legal but should not be done. Betrothal can, according to the mishnah, be performed through intercourse. But Rav does not allow it and punishes one who does so. Shiddukhin are akin to modern betrothal—a non-legal commitment to marry made by the two families. While a man can betroth a woman without arranging it with her parents, Rav would punish one who does so. Annulling a divorce before the get arrives in the woman’s hand is possible. But since it creates so many potential problems, namely the woman might think she is divorced when she is not, Rav punishes one who does so.
The next two have to do with respect for rabbinic authority. Harassing a messenger of the rabbis shows lack of respect for the rabbis.
The rabbis have the power to put someone under the ban (to excommunicate him) in order to force him to act in accordance with the law, for instance to pay a debt. Someone who allows this ban to remain for over thirty days is punished additionally by lashes.
The final case is also different. A son-in-law should not live with his mother-in-law for fear of sexual impropriety.

Rav would lash a son-in-law only for living with his mother-in-law, but not for simply passing by her house. R. Sheshet, though, once lashed a son-in-law for merely passing by his mother-in-law’s house. But that was because there was already suspicion about them.
We should note that it might not have been uncommon for a mother-in-law to be a similar age to her son-in-law. If men got married about ten years later than women, the mother-in-law might have been closer to him in age than his wife.

The Nehardeans, a group of rabbis who lived in the city of Nehardea, taught a much shorter list of things Rav (an earlier amora) would beat men for. According the Nehardeans, Rav would lash only those who betrothed through intercourse, according to one version without shiddukhin, and according to the other even with shiddukhin. Betrothing by intercourse is, while a valid form of kiddushin, is considered licentious behavior.

The issue here is what was the man was betrothing her with—the mat of myrtle twigs or the money in it? She thought it was a worthless mat of twigs before she received it, and only saw the money after. The fact that she is silent after receiving it and does not protest is not, according to Rava, sufficient for her to be betrothed.

Rava uses this baraita to prove that silence after accepting the money is not akin to consent. There are two situations in the baraita:
1) He says he is giving her the money as a deposit and then changes his mind and say it is kiddushin money. If she accepts the money, she is betrothed, even if she does not say yes. This is because she knows it is kiddushin before she accepts it.
2) He gives her the money as a deposit and then says it is kiddushin. If she accepts the proposal, she is betrothed. But if all she does is remain silent, she is not betrothed. Since she did not know what it was before she accepted it, she needs to have an active affirmation of her acceptance.
This is how Rava learns that silence after accepting the money is not legally significant. On the other hand, silence before receiving the money is legally significant. The very act of taking the money from the husband counts as kiddushin.

Rava uses this baraita to prove that silence after accepting the money is not akin to consent. There are two situations in the baraita:
1) He says he is giving her the money as a deposit and then changes his mind and say it is kiddushin money. If she accepts the money, she is betrothed, even if she does not say yes. This is because she knows it is kiddushin before she accepts it.
2) He gives her the money as a deposit and then says it is kiddushin. If she accepts the proposal, she is betrothed. But if all she does is remain silent, she is not betrothed. Since she did not know what it was before she accepted it, she needs to have an active affirmation of her acceptance.
This is how Rava learns that silence after accepting the money is not legally significant. On the other hand, silence before receiving the money is legally significant. The very act of taking the money from the husband counts as kiddushin.