פירוש על קידושין 40:24

Ultimately, he will come to sell himself off to idolatry itself. The midrash here expounds on some of the superfluity in Leviticus 25:47 reading into it three categories—a convert, a righteous non-Jew, a non-Jew, and then adding in even to be a slave for a Temple.
This is the end of the midrash. The question therefore has been asked—why is the law lenient when it comes to the redemption price when we can see that someone who sells himself into slavery must have, at one point, committed the serious sin of violating the Sabbatical year.

Abaye responds that the verse itself says that after this person has reached the depths of depravation and sold himself to be a slave for idolatry, he still must be redeemed. Thus, even though he was a sinner, the law should still treat him leniently when it comes to redemption.

Again, the other rabbi pushes back against Abaye. Yes, he must be redeemed, but this does not mean he should be redeemed at the lower value.

R. Nahman b. Yitzchak finds another way of deriving the law that he is always redeemed for the lesser amount of money. Instead of the years being “increased” or “decreased” years? Rather, the increase or decrease refers to his value.

The final difficulty is why not read the verses according to their simple meaning—the amount he pays to redeem himself accords with how many years he works. This is clearly the original meaning of the verses.
The rabbis tease out the extra midrashic reading from the prefix “ב.” The prefix seems to them to be extraneous and thus allows them to find extra meaning in the verse, one which accords with the midrash that we learned yesterday.

The final difficulty is why not read the verses according to their simple meaning—the amount he pays to redeem himself accords with how many years he works. This is clearly the original meaning of the verses.
The rabbis tease out the extra midrashic reading from the prefix “ב.” The prefix seems to them to be extraneous and thus allows them to find extra meaning in the verse, one which accords with the midrash that we learned yesterday.

R. Joseph thinks R. Nahman’s interpretation is so great, it’s as if the verses were given at Sinai. High praise indeed!

The question is can a Hebrew slave buy back part of his freedom, and thereby reduce the remaining time of servitude.

When it comes to redeeming one’s ancestral field (Leviticus 25:26), the field must be redeemed in its entirety. So the question is whether the same laws apply to redeeming the slave sold to a non-Jew.
R. Sheshet answers by using another comparison. A Jew can be sold only in his entirety. He cannot be half sold. So too, he cannot be half redeemed.

When it comes to redeeming one’s ancestral field (Leviticus 25:26), the field must be redeemed in its entirety. So the question is whether the same laws apply to redeeming the slave sold to a non-Jew.
R. Sheshet answers by using another comparison. A Jew can be sold only in his entirety. He cannot be half sold. So too, he cannot be half redeemed.

Abaye now explores the ramifications of holding that a slave may be half redeemed in a case where his value changes and shows how this creates both a stringency and a leniency. If he can be half redeemed, and his value goes up, the law will be relatively lenient.

The problem with Abaye’s above scenario is that we said earlier that his redemption must be from the amount of money he was bought for. If he goes up in value, he is redeemed for what the original value was and not the higher amount at the end.
The Talmud solves this by suggesting a case where he fluctuates in value. He is sold for 200, then his value decreases to 100. He now redeems half of the value. Then his value goes up again to 200, and he now redeems the other half for 100 and it turns out he pays only 150, less than his original and current value.

Abaye now explains how being able to be half redeemed could lead to a stringency. If he is worth 200 he will need to pay 100 to redeem half of his value. If his value then decreases to 100, he will pay another 50 and go free, for a grand total of 150.
But if we said he cannot be half-redeemed, even if he paid 100 when his value stood at 200, this payment is considered only a deposit. In the end, when he is worth 100, he can go out free without paying any more.

The word “his redemption” is used both in the case of the walled city and in the case of redeeming an ancestral field. When it came to the ancestral field, there was a midrash that taught that in order to be redeemed, the whole field must be redeemed. It cannot be half-redeemed. So do we apply this law to the walled city as well? Or do we say that the Torah specified in the case of the ancestral field that it cannot be half-redeemed, but it did not specify this in the case of the walled city, therefore it can be half-redeemed.

The word “his redemption” is used both in the case of the walled city and in the case of redeeming an ancestral field. When it came to the ancestral field, there was a midrash that taught that in order to be redeemed, the whole field must be redeemed. It cannot be half-redeemed. So do we apply this law to the walled city as well? Or do we say that the Torah specified in the case of the ancestral field that it cannot be half-redeemed, but it did not specify this in the case of the walled city, therefore it can be half-redeemed.

The answer will come from a midrash stated by R. Shimon below. The verse quoted here refers to one who consecrates his ancestral field. Such a person can borrow money in order to redeem it, and he can redeem half of it. This differs from one who sells his ancestral field, who can neither borrow to redeem it, nor redeem half.

R. Shimon explains why one who sells his field cannot borrow and redeem or redeem half. Since he will get the field back anyway at the Jubilee year, if he wants to redeem it, he must redeem it fully and without borrowing.

One who dedicates a field to the Temple, loses the field permanently at the Jubilee if he does not redeem it before then. Therefore, since he has more to lose, he may borrow and redeem, or redeem just a half.

One who sells his house in a walled city may also lose it permanently, even before the Jubilee. If he does not redeem it within a year, the house permanently goes to the purchaser. Therefore, like the one who dedicates a field to the Temple, he can redeem it in halves.

This baraita is brought as an objection against R. Sheshet. The baraita learns from a midrash that one may redeem half of a field that he has dedicated to the Temple (this is the same as above). But then it argues that from a logical perspective, just as one who sells his field cannot redeem half of it, so too one who dedicates his field cannot redeem half of it. This is the opposite of R. Shimon’s midrash from above.

This baraita is brought as an objection against R. Sheshet. The baraita learns from a midrash that one may redeem half of a field that he has dedicated to the Temple (this is the same as above). But then it argues that from a logical perspective, just as one who sells his field cannot redeem half of it, so too one who dedicates his field cannot redeem half of it. This is the opposite of R. Shimon’s midrash from above.

The baraita now continues and argues that deriving the law about one who consecrates his field from one who sells his field is not possible, because the latter cannot redeem his field immediately, whereas the former can. To prove therefore that it would have been logical to claim that one who consecrates his field cannot redeem half, the baraita turns to the one who sells a house in a walled city. He too can redeem immediately, and yet he can still redeem half. This final line is where the difficulty on R. Sheshet lies—it proves that one who sells a house in a walled city cannot redeem half.

Indeed, the two baraitot do disagree, but that is because they represent two tannaitic opinions. The rabbis hold that he may not redeem half and R. Shimon holds that he may.