פירוש על קידושין 66:18

Jews recite the Shema in praise of God twice a day. A Torah scholar should not rise before his teacher more than twice a day so that the teacher’s honor not supersede that of God. I think we can sense here that rabbis were accorded a high level of honor, and that there was a fear that this honor would exceed proper boundaries and perhaps the students would revere their teacher’s more than God. It is this mentality that R. Yannai is trying to curb.

Jews recite the Shema in praise of God twice a day. A Torah scholar should not rise before his teacher more than twice a day so that the teacher’s honor not supersede that of God. I think we can sense here that rabbis were accorded a high level of honor, and that there was a fear that this honor would exceed proper boundaries and perhaps the students would revere their teacher’s more than God. It is this mentality that R. Yannai is trying to curb.

Jews recite the Shema in praise of God twice a day. A Torah scholar should not rise before his teacher more than twice a day so that the teacher’s honor not supersede that of God. I think we can sense here that rabbis were accorded a high level of honor, and that there was a fear that this honor would exceed proper boundaries and perhaps the students would revere their teacher’s more than God. It is this mentality that R. Yannai is trying to curb.

R. Elazar reads a verse in Kohelet in light of the verse about standing before a sage in Leviticus. Both contain the phrase “fear God” and while other verses talk about fearing God in the context of other mitzvoth (not having false weights, and not lending to other Jews with interest) only these two verses use the word “pene.” The verse about rising reads “מפני שיבה” and the verse in Kohelet says, “מלפני אלוהים.”
R. Elazar derives that he will forget his Talmud from the phrase “Good (tov) will not be”—“good” is a code word for Torah, as in the phrase, “For I have given you a good teaching.”

R. Elazar reads a verse in Kohelet in light of the verse about standing before a sage in Leviticus. Both contain the phrase “fear God” and while other verses talk about fearing God in the context of other mitzvoth (not having false weights, and not lending to other Jews with interest) only these two verses use the word “pene.” The verse about rising reads “מפני שיבה” and the verse in Kohelet says, “מלפני אלוהים.”
R. Elazar derives that he will forget his Talmud from the phrase “Good (tov) will not be”—“good” is a code word for Torah, as in the phrase, “For I have given you a good teaching.”

If the son is the father’s teacher, does the son still have to rise before his father? In other words, if one relationship has been turned on its head, the norm being that the older person is the teacher, is the other relationship, father-son, overturned as well?

This story seems to prove that a son should always stand before his father, for Shmuel instructs R. Judah to stand in front of his father, even though his father was his son’s student.
The Talmud rejects this argument—R. Judah was not told to stand in front of his father because of his father’s scholarly characteristics. It was his father’ good deeds that caused Shmuel to rebuke R. Judah for not standing, and even other sages stood in front of him.
What Shmuel was telling him was not just to honor his father. He was telling him to honor his father even at Shmuel’s expense.

This story seems to prove that a son should always stand before his father, for Shmuel instructs R. Judah to stand in front of his father, even though his father was his son’s student.
The Talmud rejects this argument—R. Judah was not told to stand in front of his father because of his father’s scholarly characteristics. It was his father’ good deeds that caused Shmuel to rebuke R. Judah for not standing, and even other sages stood in front of him.
What Shmuel was telling him was not just to honor his father. He was telling him to honor his father even at Shmuel’s expense.

Above we said that the son who is a scholar need not stand in front of his father. But should the father stand in front of him.
R. Joshua ben Levi says that the only reason he stands before his son is that his son is part of the Nasi’s (the political leader’s) household. But, the Talmud reasons out, that the reason the father says he should not stand in front of his son is that the father is the teacher. But if the son were the teacher, the father would stand in front of him.

Above we said that the son who is a scholar need not stand in front of his father. But should the father stand in front of him.
R. Joshua ben Levi says that the only reason he stands before his son is that his son is part of the Nasi’s (the political leader’s) household. But, the Talmud reasons out, that the reason the father says he should not stand in front of his son is that the father is the teacher. But if the son were the teacher, the father would stand in front of him.

The Talmud adjusts the meaning of what R. Joshua ben Levi said. R. Joshua b. Levi thinks it is always inappropriate for a father to stand in front of his son, even if the son is the teacher.

The question is whether one must stand in front of one’s teacher if the teacher is riding by on a horse. Is he considered to be sitting, in which case one must rise, or do we consider him walking, in which case one need not rise?
Abaye derives the answer from a mishnah about purity. The issue is how impurity is conveyed in a “tent”—the branches of the tree overshadow both the impure person and the pure person.
If the impure person is sitting, he conveys impurity.
If the impure person is standing, he does not convey impurity.
If a person is carrying an impure stone, and he sits down, the stone conveys impurity. But if he is standing, the stone does not convey impurity.
From this line, R. Nahman b. Cohen proves that riding is the same as walking. The impure stone is riding on the person, but is considered to be walking, and therefore does not convey impurity.

The question is whether one must stand in front of one’s teacher if the teacher is riding by on a horse. Is he considered to be sitting, in which case one must rise, or do we consider him walking, in which case one need not rise?
Abaye derives the answer from a mishnah about purity. The issue is how impurity is conveyed in a “tent”—the branches of the tree overshadow both the impure person and the pure person.
If the impure person is sitting, he conveys impurity.
If the impure person is standing, he does not convey impurity.
If a person is carrying an impure stone, and he sits down, the stone conveys impurity. But if he is standing, the stone does not convey impurity.
From this line, R. Nahman b. Cohen proves that riding is the same as walking. The impure stone is riding on the person, but is considered to be walking, and therefore does not convey impurity.

The question is whether one must stand in front of one’s teacher if the teacher is riding by on a horse. Is he considered to be sitting, in which case one must rise, or do we consider him walking, in which case one need not rise?
Abaye derives the answer from a mishnah about purity. The issue is how impurity is conveyed in a “tent”—the branches of the tree overshadow both the impure person and the pure person.
If the impure person is sitting, he conveys impurity.
If the impure person is standing, he does not convey impurity.
If a person is carrying an impure stone, and he sits down, the stone conveys impurity. But if he is standing, the stone does not convey impurity.
From this line, R. Nahman b. Cohen proves that riding is the same as walking. The impure stone is riding on the person, but is considered to be walking, and therefore does not convey impurity.

The question is whether one must stand in front of one’s teacher if the teacher is riding by on a horse. Is he considered to be sitting, in which case one must rise, or do we consider him walking, in which case one need not rise?
Abaye derives the answer from a mishnah about purity. The issue is how impurity is conveyed in a “tent”—the branches of the tree overshadow both the impure person and the pure person.
If the impure person is sitting, he conveys impurity.
If the impure person is standing, he does not convey impurity.
If a person is carrying an impure stone, and he sits down, the stone conveys impurity. But if he is standing, the stone does not convey impurity.
From this line, R. Nahman b. Cohen proves that riding is the same as walking. The impure stone is riding on the person, but is considered to be walking, and therefore does not convey impurity.

This is the source of the practice of standing up in the presence of the Torah.

R. Shimon b. Abba describes himself as only a “haver.” In this context it seems to mean that he is less than a sage. This is the first reason that they should not rise in front of him. The second reason is that since they are actively engaged in studying Torah, they are Torah itself. He, on the other hand, is just a student of Torah.
It is admittedly a strange story. Perhaps it shows some discomfort that sages felt with having other sages stand in front of him.

R. Elazar held that students who are studying Torah cannot rise before their teacher. The act of study takes priority over the respect due to the teacher. But Abaye believed that this was disrespectful to the teacher and therefore he cursed anyone who acted in this way. [Seems a bit harsh to curse them, but I guess he felt pretty strongly about it].

The Talmud cites a dispute between two amoraim concerning the verse that describes the people looking at Moses until he enters the tent. Those who interpret it derogatorily refer to a midrash not even cited by the Talmud. Rashi explains that the people were making fun of Moses’ appearance—his fat thighs and oily neck. [I’m serious—this is what Rashi says!]

The Talmud cites a dispute between two amoraim concerning the verse that describes the people looking at Moses until he enters the tent. Those who interpret it derogatorily refer to a midrash not even cited by the Talmud. Rashi explains that the people were making fun of Moses’ appearance—his fat thighs and oily neck. [I’m serious—this is what Rashi says!]

The Talmud cites a dispute between two amoraim concerning the verse that describes the people looking at Moses until he enters the tent. Those who interpret it derogatorily refer to a midrash not even cited by the Talmud. Rashi explains that the people were making fun of Moses’ appearance—his fat thighs and oily neck. [I’m serious—this is what Rashi says!]

Sukkah and lulav can be performed only on Sukkot, and the shofar only on Rosh Hashanah.
Tzitzit is not worn at night, and tefillin are not worn on Shabbat or holidays. Thus these too have a set time.