Responsa על כתובות 107:9

Your statement is correct. The act of a married woman who disposed of her clothes on her death-bed, is invalid. The clothes must be returned to the husband. For a husband buys raiment for his wife only for the purpose of her wearing them, not for the purpose of her giving them away. Although the husband was present at the time the gifts were made, and did not protest, his silence did not indicate consent. It rather showed a knowledge that his wife's act was invalid, and required no protest.
This Responsum is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Asher."
SOURCES: Am II, 34.

Q. A and his son-in-law B were partners in a house. A leased his half to B for an indefinite period till the latter's death, at a fixed annual rental. Subsequently, A wanted to sell his part, but B objected. The case was brought before R. Meir who sustained B's objection. Now B is seeking to sell his half and also his right to a fixed rental for the other half. A, however, objects to a sale by B of the right to a fixed rental claiming that he had originally leased his half to B for a low rental in order that B and his family live therein and enjoy it themselves, but not for the purpose of selling it to another. Is A's objection valid? Also, please note that A's daughter, B's wife, was dead, but the children she bore to A are living; does the fact that B's wife is dead prejudice B's rights? Moreover, B claims, and witnesses support his claim, that the agreement of lease was reached between A and B after a sharp quarrel which followed their buying of the property. Thus the lease was not a gift of love [in which case the purpose of the gift must be taken into consideration], but was rather the outcome of litigation and compromise and was, therefore, of the nature of a sale. B further states that should A's objection be sustained in court, he would sell his own half of the house and would dwell in the other half, or would rent out the latter half and would use the rent for his sustenance. Please further inform me, on the other side of this sheet, as to what was done in the case of the widow from Spiers and her two Levite levirs. Signed: Asher b. Rabbi Yehiel.
A. We are not to take into consideration A's purpose in leasing his half of the house to B, for various reasons. a) When B sells his right to a fixed rental to a third party, he benefits from such sale as much as he would have benefited from living in the house himself. b) Since B has lived in the rented half of the house for a long time, the transaction of the lease is by now complete so that A's original purpose in leasing it is no longer of any consequence. c) A transaction of sale, lease, or even gift, is concluded by two parties, being the result of a meeting of both minds and, therefore, such transaction is not conditioned by the special purpose or intent of one party when such purpose or intent was not in the mind of the other party. Therefore, even if B had no surviving children from A's daughter, the validity of the lease would not have been affected. d) According to your letter, the lease was not motivated by feelings of kindliness, but was a purely business transaction. R. Meir adds: Regarding the widow mentioned above, I shall order that my Responsum pertaining thereto be copied for your benefit.
The answer bears the superscription: "To my teacher Rabbi Asher."
SOURCES: Cr. 315; Am II, 174. Cf. Asheri B. M. 8, 25.

Q. A's heirs refuse to support, out of their inheritance, all the members of the household of A's widow.
A. If the widow had a servant while A was alive, she is entitled to have one now that A is dead; and this servant must be supported out of A's estate.
SOURCES: Cr. 275; L. 244; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 371a.

Q. A and his son-in-law B were partners in a house. A leased his half to B for an indefinite period till the latter's death, at a fixed annual rental. Subsequently, A wanted to sell his part, but B objected. The case was brought before R. Meir who sustained B's objection. Now B is seeking to sell his half and also his right to a fixed rental for the other half. A, however, objects to a sale by B of the right to a fixed rental claiming that he had originally leased his half to B for a low rental in order that B and his family live therein and enjoy it themselves, but not for the purpose of selling it to another. Is A's objection valid? Also, please note that A's daughter, B's wife, was dead, but the children she bore to A are living; does the fact that B's wife is dead prejudice B's rights? Moreover, B claims, and witnesses support his claim, that the agreement of lease was reached between A and B after a sharp quarrel which followed their buying of the property. Thus the lease was not a gift of love [in which case the purpose of the gift must be taken into consideration], but was rather the outcome of litigation and compromise and was, therefore, of the nature of a sale. B further states that should A's objection be sustained in court, he would sell his own half of the house and would dwell in the other half, or would rent out the latter half and would use the rent for his sustenance. Please further inform me, on the other side of this sheet, as to what was done in the case of the widow from Spiers and her two Levite levirs. Signed: Asher b. Rabbi Yehiel.
A. We are not to take into consideration A's purpose in leasing his half of the house to B, for various reasons. a) When B sells his right to a fixed rental to a third party, he benefits from such sale as much as he would have benefited from living in the house himself. b) Since B has lived in the rented half of the house for a long time, the transaction of the lease is by now complete so that A's original purpose in leasing it is no longer of any consequence. c) A transaction of sale, lease, or even gift, is concluded by two parties, being the result of a meeting of both minds and, therefore, such transaction is not conditioned by the special purpose or intent of one party when such purpose or intent was not in the mind of the other party. Therefore, even if B had no surviving children from A's daughter, the validity of the lease would not have been affected. d) According to your letter, the lease was not motivated by feelings of kindliness, but was a purely business transaction. R. Meir adds: Regarding the widow mentioned above, I shall order that my Responsum pertaining thereto be copied for your benefit.
The answer bears the superscription: "To my teacher Rabbi Asher."
SOURCES: Cr. 315; Am II, 174. Cf. Asheri B. M. 8, 25.

a) Q. A married L in Mayence, or in another locality, where the ketubah is valued at two hundred marks. They then removed to a different locality where the ketubah is valued at much less. They lived in the latter place until A's death. How much money is L entitled to as her ketubah?
A. The opinion of R. Simon b. Gamaliel (Ket. 110b) is accepted that a woman is entitled to the ketubah current in the locality where her marriage took place.
b) Q. After A died L took over, and managed, his estate. Why, then, did you write that the estate was considered, nevertheless, to be in the possession of the orphans?
A. R. Hananel decided that the estate managed by the widow is considered to be in the possession of the orphans. The widow is merely a managing trustee. Therefore, all the profit accruing because of her management, belongs to the orphans and she can not collect her ketubah therefrom. When the widow demands her ketubah she loses her right to receive her sustenance from the estate. She must, then, take an oath while holding the Scroll of the Law; and whatever she thus states under oath to have given away, or to have retained for herself, to have given to her daughter, or to have given to charity, is deducted from her ketubah.
c) Q. L lent some of the money to lords and "men of violence", and it is doubtful whether the latter will pay their debts.
A. L is responsible for these bad investments. Ordinarily when heirs pay the ketubah to a widow, they may give her in payment any kind of property, or any object even bran; but they cannot pay her by transferring to her money due them from others, since the collection of debts often involves litigations to which a woman is not accustomed. However, in our case, the orphans may transfer to L the money she has invested with the lords and the "men of violence", in payment of her ketubah, since she had no right to make such unsafe investments.
d) Q. While L managed the estate she gave presents to certain persons thinking she had the right to do so. Are the orphans entitled to take back the presents?
A. The recipients are entitled to retain these presents since they may claim that L gave them out of her own property, and since it appears that the market ordinance (takkanat hashuk) was to apply to property given away as presents.
e) Q. Do we put forth the claim for the benefit of the orphans that L may have been a widow when she married A, or that A may have paid her one Mina.?
A. We surely put forth the above claims for the benefit of the orphans. However, if a report circulates that L was a virgin when she married A, she is entitled to the ketubah of a virgin, since the majority of women are married while virgins. [The principle of "a majority of cases" presumes that what is true in most instances, is also true in our case.] Although in litigation over money matters the principle of "a majority of cases" is not a factor, it is so when the claimant is in actual possession of the litigated money. In our case, L is in actual possession of the money; therefore, the combination of a "majority" and a "report" in her favor, is conclusive.
SOURCES: Cr. 127–8–9–30–31; L. 480–1–2–3.