Responsa על כתובות 174:18

Q. A set apart the land upon which he dwelt for the payment of his wife's ketubah. After his death, the trustee of the orphans demanded that A's widow take an oath to the effect that she did not appropriate anything that belonged to her husband, before she be permitted to collect her ketubah from this real estate. Is the trustee justified in his demand?
A. Since the property was mortgaged to A's widow, she is now considered to be in possession of her ketubah. And as long as she does not demand her ketubah, she is not required to take an oath (Ket. 87b) unless the orphans claim positive knowledge of her having appropriated anything that belonged to their father. Therefore, A's widow is not required to take an oath.
SOURCES: Cr. 266; Am II, 6; Mord. Ket. 224. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 96.

Case. When A died he left to his widow, Leah, and to his young daughter, an estate of two pounds plus a few articles of clothing. Before Leah remarried, she entrusted the two pounds to her cousin, Rabbi Yedidyah, who was also A's brother, as a trust fund for her daughter. Her second marriage, to the son of R. Isaac of Coburg, was an unhappy one as she had to wander from town to town with her children on her shoulder to procure her daily sustenance, not receiving any support from her husband. She succeeded, however, in saving the sum of twenty-two schillings which she deposited with her mother in payment of a silken garment, valued at three pounds, which she bought for her daughter. When her husband learned about it, he went to Leah's mother and tricked her into giving him the garment. Leah then demanded her daughter's garment from her husband. The latter, however, claimed that, since whatever a wife possesses belongs to her husband, the silken garment belonged to him. He further demanded that Leah return to him all the garments and objects she had given to her daughter.
Rabbi Moses was the judge in the case and decided that Leah must take an oath that she did not give to her daughter directly or indirectly any money belonging to R. Isaac's son. Rabbi Yedidyah then wrote to R. Meir, and, enclosing a copy of R. Moses' decision, argued against it since he thought that R. Moses imposed an oath on Leah even though her husband was not positive she took his money and maintained only a possibility of it. R. Meir wrote his opinion that we can impose an oath on a wife only when the husband is positive that she misused his money, (which was in seeming contradiction to that of R. Moses). He sent this opinion to R. Yedidyah and adjured him to show it only to R. Moses who, R. Meir hoped, would retract his decision. R. Moses, however, felt humiliated, protested that Leah's husband was positive in his claim, and produced a statement from the local Beth-din which read: "Our teacher, Rabbi Meir: We let you know that the husband was positive in his claim and enumerated all the things he demanded of his wife. Since he was positive in his claim, and did not merely suggest a possibility of it, we have imposed an oath on the wife as advised by our teacher, Rabbi Moses." R. Moses further stated that R. Yedidyah made public R. Meir's letter and caused him great shame and humiliation. R. Meir, then, withdrew from the case, saying that he did not want to be a party to the personal quarrel between R. Yedidyah and R. Moses unless he could effect a reconciliation between the two.
SOURCES: Pr. 982; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 172d.