Responsa על סוכה 60:5

Q. A claims that when the overlord seized his valuables he also seized L(eah)'s valuables which were in the same room; and that when he finally settled with the overlord to pay him a fixed sum of money, and the latter returned all of the valuables to him, he pledged them with the persons who went surety for him to the overlord. L demands her valuables, and A demands that L pay part of the tax he promised to pay to the overlord.
A. If A's claim regarding the seizure of L's valuables is true, it is presumed that L abandoned all hope of recovering them. Although in the case of an ordinary robber no such presumption exists (B. K. 114a), at present every overlord is king in his domain; no one exercises any restraint upon him, and we presume that owners of movables seized by an overlord have abandoned all hope of recovery. Therefore, L's seized valuables belong to A since he acquired them through abandonment (yeush) and change of possession (shinui reshut), although the principle "the law of the land prevails" does not apply in this case of robbery and extortion. However, A is not entitled to collect any additional tax-money from L, since she was not personally included by the overlord in his extortionist act on A. Although all persons earning money in a town or locality must share the burden of taxation of such a town or locality, this ruling applies only to regular taxes of a fixed amount annually collected by the king (or overlord) from the entire community in one lump sum. The robbery and extortion of an overlord, however, on pretext or false accusation, is to be borne only by the person unfortunately caught in his toils, but not by those who, probably by the grace of God, have escaped them.
R. Meir adds the obscure statement: L must pay the rent for the house but would be permitted to deduct therefrom whatever she will assert under oath that he failed to spend on wood and illumination.
This Responsum is addressed to R. Isaac, R. Samuel, and R. Yehiel.
SOURCES: L. 381; Rashba I, 1105.

Q. When the fence, which separates A's yard from that of his Gentile neighbor, broke down, the Gentile rebuilt the fence on A's property and wrested from A a piece of ground two yards wide and twenty yards long. A was afraid to protest as the Gentile was a violent man. Subsequently, B bought the Gentile's property without A's knowledge or consent. A, therefore, demands that B return to him the piece of property which the Gentile wrongfully acquired from him since title to real property cannot be acquired by violence, and that property, therefore, still belongs to A. B refuses to do so. Furthermore, he is about to rent the property to Gentile occupants.
A. The principle that title to real property cannot be acquired by violence refers only to the realm of Mitzvot (religious acts) but not to the realm of commerce. Therefore, though the Gentile took A's ground by force and violence, he, nevertheless, gained title to it by taking possession and building a fence on it. The sale of such property to B was valid and B is under no obligation to A. B, however, should not rent the property to Gentile occupants.
(2). Q. B claims that A constructed apertures for window lights facing his (B's) yard after he (B) bought the yard from the Gentile. A claims that those windows were always in their present place, but that they were closed by wooden boards because he did not want the Gentile to look into his house. He wants to keep those windows open now that he has a Jewish neighbor.
A. A cannot reopen his windows, since B does not want A to be able to look into his (B's) yard.
SOURCES: Pr. 674–675.