Commentary for Kiddushin 15:25

"So too something worth money needs to have a fixed, known value". As for what we say later in Kiddushin 12a: "A man betrothed [a wife] with bundles of tow cotton. Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said and examined it—if it was worth a perutah, yes [the betrothal was effective]; if it was not, no". It seems like [Rav Shimi bar Hiyya] does not agree with Rav Yosef [since he allows the evaluation after the fact, while Rav Yosef requires the evaluation beforehand].

"What is it? Symbolic exchange (halifin)." A Hebrew slave can't be acquired through halifin and can't acquire himself through halifin, since the reason he can acquire with money is derived from this verse of "kesef miknato" later (on Kiddushin 14b). But a Canaanite slave can be acquired with halifin, as it teaches in the chapter Ha-Sholeah (Gittin 39b) regarding [the slaveowner] who took his hat and threw it at her and said to her: "Acquire this and acquire yourself", and it is implied there that his act did nothing because it was an item [the hat] belonging to the one who acquired [the slaveowner]. However, if it were an item of the acquirer [the slave], then she would have acquired [herself] through the laws of halifin, not the laws of money. This is also how Rabbenu Hananel explains it there.

"From where do I know this? As it is taught in a baraita: This calf..." He is bringing evidence according to the first version [of the sugya, where Rav Yosef agrees that one does not need an evaluation if he said "It is worth the minimum amount", which there is a perutah but here is 5 selaim. We know that he doesn't need an evaluation because, according to this baraita, all he has to do is to announce that the calf is worth 5 selaim and that is enough, because, like the silk which is obviously worth a perutah, the calf is clearly worth more than 5 selaim. The previous "From where do I know this?" of Rav Yosef at the top of the daf was within the world of "They also disagree if he said it was worth the minimum amount", so Tosafot is clarifying for us that we have returned to the earlier version of the mahloket].(See the Meharsha for his comments on the difficulty of this Tosafot and to resolve it in another way).

"Rav Kahana took a turban [as payment] for redemption of a firstborn son". This implies that Rav Kahana was a kohen. Problem: At the end of Elu Ovrin (Pesahim 49a) it imples that he was not a kohen, since he said, "If I hadn't married a kohenet, I would have not been exiled"! Solution: There were 2 Rav Kahanas. Alternative solution: It was because of his wife that he could purchase [i.e. redeem the firstborn son], as we find in chapter Ha-Zaro'a (Hullin 132a) "Rav Kahana eats [terumah] because of his wife".

"Who was a great man" - and he didn't go out with his head uncovered.

"But for general people—no". Problem: Why doesn't this work!? Is it worse than a gift with the understanding that you need to return it, that we say earlier (in Kiddushin 6b) that it is an effective gift!? Solution: Yes indeed it is worse, for there (in 6b) it was a significant thing that was the gift [a maneh], even though it was given with the understanding that it should be returned. But here, regarding redemption, the turban wasn't worth 5 selaim and so when he gave it to him he did not fulfil his obligation of giving [whereas had he given him a maneh, 25 selaim, then he would have fulfilled the technical giving requirement even though he had to return it afterwards].

According to this version, R. Joseph would rule strictly also in the case of a husband who says, “Be betrothed to me for whatever it is worth.” Just as a woman will know how much the money is worth, so too the woman has to know how much the goods are worth.

R. Joseph takes a source about a Hebrew slave who buys his freedom. The verse implies he was acquired with money, which the rabbis understand as excluding produce or utensils.

The baraita cannot possibly mean that a slave cannot be acquired by “produce or utensils” for we have an explicit source that says that he can. When he pays back his purchase price, he can pay back the equivalent of money. Thus he must have been acquired through goods as well.

The produce and utensils would not be valid to acquire the slave if they were less than a perutah, but this is true also of money. So why specify produce and utensils.

This is the conclusion of R. Joseph’s proof. The problem with acquiring a slave with produce or utensils is that they do not have definite value. Thus the same, according to R. Joseph, applies to kiddushin—the goods used for kiddushin must have a definite value.

Rabbah argued earlier that the goods being used for kiddushin do not need to be of definite value. So how does he read this baraita, such that it does not prove R. Joseph’s rule? He reads it as excluding “exchange” as a means to acquire a slave (or to betroth). “Exchange” is the symbolic act whereby one person symbolically acquires something of insignificant value and thereby gives the other person something of significant value. This was often done with a handkerchief. Sometimes today it is done with a pen. The two most common occasions on which one would see this is with the signing of the ketubah and with selling chametz.

There is a debate in Bava Metzia whether produce can be used in “exchanges.” R. Nahman says it cannot and thus there is no need to exclude produce.

The Talmud now retracts and says that “produce and utensils” are invalid only if they are not worth a perutah. Above, we rejected this interpretation because the same is true of money—it too must be worth a perutah. So why specify “produce and utensils”? The answer is that we might actually have thought that goods worth less than a perutah can be used for kiddushin because they can be used immediately. For instance, if you need an eraser, it might be worth more to you than a perutah, even if you would not pay a perutah for an eraser at the store. Therefore, the baraita needs to teach us that a slave cannot be bought for less than a perutah. But according to Rabbah, the goods need not have a definite value.

The Talmud now retracts and says that “produce and utensils” are invalid only if they are not worth a perutah. Above, we rejected this interpretation because the same is true of money—it too must be worth a perutah. So why specify “produce and utensils”? The answer is that we might actually have thought that goods worth less than a perutah can be used for kiddushin because they can be used immediately. For instance, if you need an eraser, it might be worth more to you than a perutah, even if you would not pay a perutah for an eraser at the store. Therefore, the baraita needs to teach us that a slave cannot be bought for less than a perutah. But according to Rabbah, the goods need not have a definite value.

The baraita here is about redemption of the first born son which must be done with five selas. A father can use the equivalent of money, but he must state that it is worth five selas.
Now, R. Joseph asks, what’s the purpose of stating the amount? If the object is not worth five selas, then saying it is worth that much does not change reality. Rather, it must actually be worth that amount. The point of saying “five selas” is that the price needs to be determined. So too, R. Joseph would argue, does the money used for betrothal.

The baraita here is about redemption of the first born son which must be done with five selas. A father can use the equivalent of money, but he must state that it is worth five selas.
Now, R. Joseph asks, what’s the purpose of stating the amount? If the object is not worth five selas, then saying it is worth that much does not change reality. Rather, it must actually be worth that amount. The point of saying “five selas” is that the price needs to be determined. So too, R. Joseph would argue, does the money used for betrothal.

The Talmud rejects R. Joseph’s proof. It could be that the animal was not actually worth five selas. As long as it is worth five selas to the Kohen accepting the animal, the redemption is valid.

R. Ashi says that the story about R. Kahana accepting a scarf worth less than five shekels for the redemption of a son works only for a great man like R. Kahana. Evidently, in R. Ashi’s times, great men would pay large amounts to cover their heads. But most people would not, and therefore the object used for redemption must actually be worth five shekels.

The man here says that he is betrothing her with a maneh (100 dinars) but then only gives her one dinar. The question is—is the betrothal valid, and he simply must give her the rest later? Or is the betrothal invalid until he actually gives her 100 dinars?
The answer is that since he says “on condition” the betrothal takes place immediately. She is betrothed to him and he must pay the rest. The ramification of this is that should she wish try to be betrothed to someone else, the betrothal would not be valid.

The man here says that he is betrothing her with a maneh (100 dinars) but then only gives her one dinar. The question is—is the betrothal valid, and he simply must give her the rest later? Or is the betrothal invalid until he actually gives her 100 dinars?
The answer is that since he says “on condition” the betrothal takes place immediately. She is betrothed to him and he must pay the rest. The ramification of this is that should she wish try to be betrothed to someone else, the betrothal would not be valid.

The Talmud raises a difficulty. A man says to a woman “be betrothed to me with a maneh” and begins to count out the money. The betrothal is not final until he gives her the entire maneh. This opposes R. Elazar who says the betrothal is final after the first dinar and that he simply owes her the rest.
The resolution is that in this case he said, “with this maneh.” Since he said the formula in this way, he must have meant that he needs to give her this maneh right now.

The Talmud raises a difficulty. A man says to a woman “be betrothed to me with a maneh” and begins to count out the money. The betrothal is not final until he gives her the entire maneh. This opposes R. Elazar who says the betrothal is final after the first dinar and that he simply owes her the rest.
The resolution is that in this case he said, “with this maneh.” Since he said the formula in this way, he must have meant that he needs to give her this maneh right now.

The Talmud points out that in the second clause the man says, “this maneh.” The assumption then is that in the first clause he said “a maneh” and not “this maneh.” This would then be again a difficulty against R. Elazar.

The Talmud points out that in the second clause the man says, “this maneh.” The assumption then is that in the first clause he said “a maneh” and not “this maneh.” This would then be again a difficulty against R. Elazar.

The Talmud resolves it by saying that in both cases he said “this maneh.” The second half of the baraita clarifies that the first half referred to a case where he said “this maneh.” Had he said “a maneh” she would be betrothed immediately and he would be obligated to give her the rest of the maneh.
This reading of the baraita is also logical, so the Talmud argues. For if the first case was “a maneh” and still she is not betrothed until he gives her the complete maneh, then obviously if he says “this maneh” she is not betrothed until he gives her the complete maneh.

The Talmud resolves it by saying that in both cases he said “this maneh.” The second half of the baraita clarifies that the first half referred to a case where he said “this maneh.” Had he said “a maneh” she would be betrothed immediately and he would be obligated to give her the rest of the maneh.
This reading of the baraita is also logical, so the Talmud argues. For if the first case was “a maneh” and still she is not betrothed until he gives her the complete maneh, then obviously if he says “this maneh” she is not betrothed until he gives her the complete maneh.

The last piece of logic from above does not prove that the first clause must deal with “this maneh.” For it could be that the first clause refers to “a maneh” and yet the second clause still teaches “this maneh” to make sure that you interpret the first clause in the opposite way. In other words, do not say that the second clause is obvious. Say that the second clause teaches you how to interpret the first clause.
The conclusion here is that the resolution of the difficulty on R. Elazar stands but is not proven through logic. R. Elazar can interpret the baraita so that it does not contradict him, but the baraita does not need to be interpreted in that way.

R. Ashi offers a different resolution of the difficulty. If the man is counting, then clearly he intends to give her the whole sum right now and she is not betrothed until he does so. But if he just says “a maneh” and gives her a dinar, his intention is to owe her the rest and she is betrothed immediately.

The baraita had ruled that the copper dinar is invalid. But if she saw it and accepted it, why should this be a problem? A woman has the right to accept what she wants for her betrothal as long as it is worth a perutah.
The answer is that he gave it to her without knowing, for instance at night, or buried among the other dinarim. But if she willingly accepted the lesser coin, she is betrothed.

If the “bad dinar” referred to in the baraita is also not usable, then how is it different from the “copper dinar.” Why teach essentially the same thing twice? The answer is that it is usable, but with difficulty. Again, we can assume that if she accepted it, then the betrothal is valid. It is invalid only if she does not know what she is accepting.

The man betroths a woman and promises to give a maneh. But instead of giving her the money itself, he gives her a pledge, an object for her to keep until he gives her the maneh.
R. Nahman rules that the betrothal is not valid. She has not received the maneh and the pledge is not hers. So in essence he has not given her anything.

"Since it wouldn't be kiddushin with a nonspecific maneh, we need [to learn the case with] a specific maneh!?" Problem: Perhaps this is what it is teaching us: A specific maneh, even though she didn't change her mind [like in the reisha], it wouldn't be kiddushin because it turned out to be lacking [less than the promised maneh, and therefore the seifa is in fact necessary because otherwise we wouldn't know about the case where she didn't change her mind]! Solution: You can learn this from the reisha since, [there,] with a nonspecific maneh, she is able to change her mind and we don't say that he should complete [the maneh]—therefore, the kiddushin does not take effect at all until he completes [the maneh, in other words the main point of the reisha is that he hasn't paid yet, not that she is able to change her mind]. So too if he said to her "With this specific maneh" and it turned out to be lacking, the kiddushin did not take effect and even the completion was not effective, for she was not expecting him to pay her anything other than the maneh that he showed to her and it was lacking. [Therefore we can derive the law of the seifa on a specific maneh from the law of the reisha on a nonspecific maneh and the seifa is indeed unnecessary, the Gemara's resolution up to here works (though will be subsequently rejected).]