Commentary for Kiddushin 63:19

From whose: Does he give him food and does he give him drink.

Rav Yehuda says, "From that of the son": RI (Rabbi Yitzchak) was precise, according to the one that holds it is from that of the son - what should one do if he was confronted by the honor of his parent, his own lost object and the last object of his fellow [all at the same time]? If he occupies himself with the honor of his parent, does not the lost object of his fellow take precedence? As we say in [the chapter entitled] Elu Metziot (Bava Metzia 32a), "Perhaps [if] his father said to him, 'Do not return [it],' perhaps he should listen to him? [Hence] we learn to say, etc." And this, "Do not return," is that he says, "Occupy yourself with my honor." For [regarding], "Do not return," for nothing, I do not need a verse! It is therefore implied that the lost object of his fellow takes precedence over the honor of father and mother. But if he occupies himself with the lost object of his fellow, behold his lost object takes precedence! As it is written (Deuteronomy 15:4), "However, there will not be among you any needy one" - yours is before [that of] all people (Bava Metzia 30b, 33a). And if he occupies himself with his lost object, behold the honor of his parent takes precedence, according to the one that holds it is from that of the son. So it appears to RI that he should leave the honor of his parent and the lost object of his fellow and occupy himself with his [own] lost object. For that which it said that the honor of a parent takes precedence is only when he allows his parent to do what he wants with his money. For this is the crux of honor. But with his lost object: Since the parent does not benefit from the lost object itself, the son is not obligated to lose his lost object because of his parent. And even though we say adjacently, "Such that he takes a purse and throw it into the sea, and the son does not embarrass him" - according to the one that holds it is from that of the son, it is speaking there about such a manner in which the father derives pleasure from it. For example, he throws it into the sea to cause fear among the people of his household. For if it were not thus - if he throws it into the sea for nothing, he is wicked; as he transgresses, do not waste! And even when it is inadvertent and he throws it in his anger, he nevertheless derives pleasure from throwing his purse. And because of that, one may not embarrass him.

The Sages gave this ruling to Rav Yirmeyah, "It is like the one who says it is from that of the father": It is implied that this is the law. And so did Rav Achai Gaon decide in his Sheiltot in Parashat Vayishma (The end of Section 57). But he [also] decided that when the father does not have and the son has, the son is obligated to feed his father. And so did RI and Rabbenu Chananel decide - that if the father has no money but the son has, the son must sustain his father from that which is his. For he is no less than another [who is needy]. It is as it said in [the chapter entitled] Naarah SheNitpatetah (Ketuvot 49b) that Rav forced that man and extracted four hundred zuz for charity. Moreover, we say in the Yerushalmi, "Rabbi Yose said, 'Were it only so, that all of my teachings were as clear as that which we force a child to sustain his parent.'" And there is another proof from that which it said in the Yerushalmi that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yoshayah were walking on the road. A man came and kissed the feet of Rabbi Yochanan. [Rabbi Yoshaya] said, "What is this?" He said to him, "Because I said to him,' Go and yell in the synagogues,'" meaning I taught him that he should do so much, so that his son will sustain him. He said to him, "Why did the master not force [the son to sustain him]?" [Rabbi Yochanan] said to him in wonderment, "We force in something like this?" He said [back], "Did you not know that we force? It is obvious that we force." And there is another proof from the Yerushalmi that I brought before (Tosafot on Kiddushin 31a, s.v. Kaved): "Honor the Lord with your wealth" - if one has money, he is obligated; but if not, he is exempt. But with the honor of father and mother, it is stated, "Honor your father and your mother"; so it implies whether he has money or whether he does not have [it].

What difference does it make to him (lit. what comes out from him): What loss of money is there [for] him.

They may redeem the second tithe for each other: If his father has second tithe, the son may redeem it with his [money] for what his father needs, without [the extra fee of] a fifth. And we do not say, behold he is like [the father] himself: As surely he loves him and his sustenance is upon him, so he is not a different [person] concerning him; and behold it is like someone who redeems it himself.

And they may feed each other poor man’s tithe: If the son has poor man's tithe to distribute to the poor, he may feed it to his father if his father is poor. And likewise, all of them. And if he did not have have this tithe in his hands, he must give him nourishment from his [funds].

For the surplus: It is impingent upon him to give food to him and to give drink to him on a middling level. But if his father requires more of a meal, he may feed him from poor man's tithe.

That he takes a purse, etc.: And if you say the honor of the father that is upon the child [that involves] monetary loss is only [taken] from the father - if so, that purse that Rabbi Eliezer spoke about is the father's. So what difference is there to the son, [that he would] embarrass him?

But perhaps he would become angry: And he would have said something to his father in anger.

And he would have violated: Rav Huna.

On account of, "before the blind": Such that he would cause his son to sin.

At the seam: In the place of the stitch, such that he would not lose [any] of his money with this; such as at the hem.

Those to be burned [became mixed in] among those to be stoned: It is implied that one [person] who was to be burned was mixed in with many to be stoned. And we have established it (Sanhedrin 79b) [that] all those liable for death penalties in the Torah that became mixed up - and it is not known which of them are with the lighter [punishment] and which with the stringent - are all sentenced to the lighter. For you are not permitted to move over the light to a stringent punishment for which one has not become liable.

Rabbi Shimon says, "They are judged with stoning": As it is lighter, for Rabbi Shimon [holds that] burning is more stringent than stoning. And the reason is explained in Sanhedrin (50a).

He said to him: Rav Yehudah, his son, [said] to Rav Yechezkel, "Father, do not teach it this way, 'Those to be burned [became mixed in] among those to be stoned'" - and the ones to be stoned would be the majority. As, if so, why did you attach the reason - that burning is more stringent. I will teach it, because it cannot be said that they would all be with burning. For if so, you have gone after the minority.

Those to be stoned [became mixed in] among those to be burned: As even though those to be burnt are the majority, they are judged with stoning, since it is lighter.

There it is the Rabbis who are saying to Rabbi Shimon, etc.: That which they said that stoning is more stringent is not that they are giving a reason for their words. Rather they are saying that they be judged with burning, following the majority. And that which you said [that] they should be judged with stoning to be more lenient upon them - you are not being more lenient but more stringent, since stoning is more stringent.

Do not speak to your father like that: To suddenly inform him that he is mistaken; that you said to him, "Do not teach it this way,"

This is what is written in the Torah? He will cause him suffering: And behold, it is as if he is saying to him, "You have transgressed the words of the Torah."

This verse is written in the Torah: And he says to him the verse as it is written; and [the father] will understand by himself that he erred.

[If my] father says, "Give me water": And there is another mitzvah before me to do, such as to bury the dead or a funeral.

The rabbis dispute who must pay, but ultimately the majority holds that the parent must use his own funds to provide for himself. I should note that this section assumes that both parties have resources.

A baraita that we saw earlier seems to say that a person must honor his parents at personal cost. But what personal cost can there be if the parent pays for his own upkeep? The answer is personal loss of work time. If one needs to help one’s parents and by doing so he will lose time at work, he must nevertheless do so.

Every third and sixth year of the sabbatical cycle a Jew must give 10 per cent of his produce to the poor. But a son can give it to his poor father. The problem is that one should not be filling debts with the poor person’s tithe. So this would imply that feeding one’s father is not the responsibility of the son. This therefore is a difficulty on Rav Judah from above.
The resolution is that the son is giving him extra food from the poor tithe, not the basic amount he is obligated to give him by law.

Every third and sixth year of the sabbatical cycle a Jew must give 10 per cent of his produce to the poor. But a son can give it to his poor father. The problem is that one should not be filling debts with the poor person’s tithe. So this would imply that feeding one’s father is not the responsibility of the son. This therefore is a difficulty on Rav Judah from above.
The resolution is that the son is giving him extra food from the poor tithe, not the basic amount he is obligated to give him by law.

R. Judah commented on this baraita, saying essentially that it is disgraceful to feed one’s father poor tithe. It looks like one really does not want to honor one’s father by taking care of him. But if the son is only giving the father extra food, then why should he be cursed for using poor tithe.
The answer is that even if its extra food, it is still disgraceful to use poor tithe to feed one’s father. People do not like to be treated as if they were poor and if the son has the means to feed his father without using his poor tithe, he should do so.

As we have seen before, the height of honoring one’s parents means watching the parent throw away a purse of money into the sea and not shaming the parent. But if the parent has to pay for his own upkeep, then it really does not matter, because the financial loss is the parent’s loss. So its not such a great show of honor to not get angyr.
The answer is that it does matter—if the child will inherit the parent. In essence, the parent’s current loss is the future loss to the child.
This section does acknowledge an inherit tension between parents and children, one that still exists to this day. Currently, the parent’s assets belong to the parent and the parent can dispose of them at his/her will. However, this money will eventually go to the inheritor, usually the child, and if the child is taking care of the parent, and in some ways has authority over the parent’s money, the child may be hesitant to spend it, especially if he perceives the spending to be frivolous.

R. Huna tests his son to see if his son will be angry when R. Huna tears up his own property. R. Huna seems to want to see if his son cares for him, or only cares for his father’s property.

If Rabbah gets angry then R. Huna will have caused him to sin by dishonoring his parents, and it is against the Torah to try to incite another person to sin.
The answer is that R. Huna forgave his honor. I’m not really sure how this would work—if he tells Rabbah he is forgiving his honor, then the whole test won’t really work. And if he doesn’t tell him, then how is he forgiving his honor?

Again, the Talmud wonders how R. Huna could do this—isn’t it forbidden to needlessly destroy property
The answer is that he tore the garment at the seam, so it could be resewn.
But if he tore it at the seam, then it might not have been a good test. Maybe he didn’t get angry because he saw that no harm was done.
The answer is that Rabbah was already angry about something else. Once angry, he would not notice that the tear was at the seam.
I think we can see here that the Talmud is not comfortable with R. Huna’s test of his son.

According to R. Shimon, burning is a more severe penalty than stoning. And since the court cannot give a condemned criminal a worse death penalty, they must all be executed by stoning.

R. Judah points out that if the majority are condemned to be stoned, then there would be two reasons to stone them and not burn them—1) It is a less severe penalty; 2) It is what the majority are to receive. Rather, he should change the order of the words—it is a few who are to be stoned who are mixed up with the majority that are to be burned. This helps isolate R. Shimon’s principle. Despite the fact that the majority should have been burned, they all must be stoned because it is prohibited to give a criminal a more severe penalty than he deserves.

R. Yehezkel responds—if you switch around the words such that the majority should have been burned, then the sages’ position has the same problem that R. Shimon’s statement had according to the original version. The sages think that stoning is the worse punishment and therefore they are all to be burned. But if the majority is those that should have been burned, then again, there are two reasons they all are burned.

R. Judah responds that in this line the rabbis are just responding to R. Shimon, disagreeing with him as to which punishment is more severe.
This is the end of the section about stoning and burning. The Talmud will now discuss how R. Yehezkel’s son interacted with him.

Shmuel rebukes R. Judah, whom he calls “toothy one” for speaking so directly to his father. One is allowed to tell one’s father that he has done something wrong—but he must say so in a very indirect manner, one that will not cause the father grief.

The issue here is a conflict between honoring one’s parent and performing a mitzvah. According to the first opinion, since all Jews are obligated to perform mitzvoth, the son should first perform the mitzvah and then honor is father. But the second opinion looks at the issue more pragmatically—can both mitzvoth be accomplished. If the other mitzvah, for instance, such as burying the dead, can be performed by others, then he should let others do that mitzvah and he should help his father. Note there is still a hierarchy here, but if it is possible to avoid the conflict, the conflict should be avoided.

All rabbis agree that a parent can forgo his rights to his honor. But they argue about whether a rabbi can. R. Yitzchak argues that he cannot. A sage’s honor is due him because of the Torah he has learned—this Torah is not his and therefore he cannot forgo his honor.
R. Joseph argues through an analogy with God that a sage can forgo his honor. If God humbled God’s self by leading the people through the wilderness, then a sage too should be allowed to forgo his honor.
But Rava pushes back—God can forgo God’s honor because the world belongs to God. But the Torah does not belong to the sage. The sage cannot forgo the honor due him because the honor is not really due him—it is due to his Torah learning, which is not really his.

All rabbis agree that a parent can forgo his rights to his honor. But they argue about whether a rabbi can. R. Yitzchak argues that he cannot. A sage’s honor is due him because of the Torah he has learned—this Torah is not his and therefore he cannot forgo his honor.
R. Joseph argues through an analogy with God that a sage can forgo his honor. If God humbled God’s self by leading the people through the wilderness, then a sage too should be allowed to forgo his honor.
But Rava pushes back—God can forgo God’s honor because the world belongs to God. But the Torah does not belong to the sage. The sage cannot forgo the honor due him because the honor is not really due him—it is due to his Torah learning, which is not really his.