Talmud Bavli
Talmud Bavli

Commentary for Kiddushin 82:7

חדא מחדא לא אתיא תיתי חדא מתרתי הי תיתי

Now, let the Divine Law write [the principle of agency] in respect to sacrifices, and these others can come and be derived from them? - Because it may be refuted: as for sacrifice, that is because most of their operations are through an agent.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' From the receiving of the blood onward, everything in connection with sacrifices was performed by priests acting on behalf of the Israelites who offered them.');"><sup>15</sup></span> One cannot be derived from another: but let one be derived from two [others]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By shewing that the factor common to both is also present in the third.');"><sup>16</sup></span> - Which can be thus derived?

Daf Shevui to Kiddushin

We have discussed four issues—marriage, divorce, terumah and sacrifices, and stated that the right to appoint an agent cannot be derived from one of them and therefore the Torah had to teach agency in all of them. But maybe we can derive from two of them that agency works in the others? If so, why would the Torah have to teach the efficacy of agency in the others? The Talmud will now test this out.
We could not derive agency in sacrifices from the other cases, because sacrifices are holy whereas the other matters are either not holy at all, or less so. Therefore, the Torah had to teach the efficacy of agency with regard to sacrifices.
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